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Opening Remarks
1
Opening Remarks
1.1 Introduction
The interaction of economics and population dynamics is complex and often bi-directional
in nature. On the one hand, population dynamics influence the economy for example
through consumption and labor supply. On the other hand, economic circumstances
influence population dynamics for example though partnership and fertility decisions.
Germany, as well as many other developed countries, experienced fertility rates below
replacement for a substantial time now. In Germany, since the 1980’s, fertility rates have
consistently been below 1.5 children per mother. Even though there is a current slight
increase in the number of children, total fertility rates in Germany are sill far below the
replacement rate.
Looking at the bigger picture, the low fertility rates observed today are a rather new
phenomenon. Back in medieval times and throughout most of history, women in Germany
and in many other European countries often had a substantially larger number children.
These high fertility rates were accompanied with low living standards and low levels of
economic growth and development. During those times, individuals and societies were
trapped in a Malthusian Regime, where it was optimal for individuals to get as many
children as they could afford. This phenomenon was put to an end by the demographic
transition, where individuals deliberately reduced their fertility, invested more in the
human capital of their children and thus contributed to the onset of sustained growth
(Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011).
In Germany, from the beginning of the 20th century until now, interrupted by war-
time distortions, the total fertility rate of women in Germany has fallen to the low
rates observed today. Two factors are behind these low fertility rates: A low number
of children per mother and an increasingly large fraction of women who never become
mothers. While Germany is not the only country facing this issue (Baudin et al., 2015,
2020; Myong et al., 2018), understanding this issue in the context of Germany is important
as it largely contributes to the low fertility rates observed in the country today. While
there already exists a long literature on fertility, most of the work so far has ignored
the rise in childlessness observed in many countries around the world. The decision to
become a mother, the decision on how many children to have and when to have them as
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well as the decision on marriage formation are linked and partly determined by economic
factors and policies.
The underlying mechanisms that determine fertility and partnership formation deci-
sions are partially determined by labor market situations. Early works on the economics
behind partnership formation include the seminal works by Becker (1973, 1974). Mod-
ern partnership formation models stress possibility of specialization within the household
and the importance of the insurance motive within marriage. Social policies that aim at
reforming the labor market may have unanticipated consequences for marriage formation
and fertility, which affect population dynamics in the long run.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
My dissertation consists of three independent studies on the interaction of economics
and population dynamics. All chapters have a separate introduction which includes a
literature review. The notation in each chapter is self-contained. Selected additional
results can be found in the appendices of the respective chapters.
Chapter 2 is joint work with Uwe Sunde. It provides an empirical investigation of the
hypothesis that population shocks such as the outbreak of the Black Death affected the
timing of the onset of the demographic transition. The empirical analysis uses disaggre-
gate data from Germany and exploits geographic variation in the exposure to medieval
plague shocks. The findings document that areas with greater exposure to plague out-
breaks exhibited an earlier onset of the demographic transition. Additional analyses con-
firm this finding using data from France. The results are consistent with the predictions
of the unified growth literature and provide novel insights into the largely unexplored
empirical determinants of the timing of the transition from stagnation to growth.
Chapter 3 develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of fertility with en-
dogenous marriage formation, linking the timing of fertility to its intensive (number of
children) and extensive (having children) margin. The model features rational, forward-
looking agents who make decisions on marriage and fertility, and are exposed to declining
fecundity rates over time. In every period, agents face a trade-off between work and child-
rearing, and across time there is a trade-off between having children early or late in life.
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I identify the model parameters using four distinct facts of the 2008 and 2012 German
Microcensus: (i) fertility until age 30 decreases with education for married and single
women, (ii) fertility after age 30 increases with education for married and single women,
(iii) childlessness increases with women’s education, (iv) marriage rates decrease with
education for women and increase with education for men. I obtain three main insights.
First, postponement of childbirth combined with the natural decline of fecundity over
time can explain up to 15% of childlessness, depending on education. Second, by esti-
mating the model separately for East and West Germany, I find that institutions and
economic conditions matter: the two major factors for childlessness in West Germany are
postponement of childbirth and high opportunity costs of children due to lack of public
childcare. By contrast, in East Germany, social sterility plays a larger role. Finally, using
the estimated model parameters for counterfactual analysis, I evaluate consequences of
reoccurring labor market interruptions and policies aimed at reconciling work and family
life.
Chapter 4 is joint work with Bastian Schulz. In this paper, we empirically investi-
gate how labor market institutions shape economic incentives to get or remain married,
using the example of the unemployment insurance system. The underlying thought is
that marriage and divorce decisions are influenced by the institutional environment in
which they are made To identify institutional effects on marriage and divorce decisions,
we exploit a reform of household-level means testing in Germany that altered said incen-
tives. Means-testing exemption amounts were sharply reduced in January 2003 and this
increased the extent to which spouses have to insure each other against unemployment.
We argue that the extent to which (potential) spouses were affected by this reform varies
with individuals’ migration background. Using the universes of marriages and divorces in
Germany between 1997 and 2013, we find that increased means-testing made the forma-
tion of interethnic marriages significantly less attractive. At the same time, it increased
marital stability: interethnic marriages formed after the reform are more stable than
interethnic marriages marriages formed before the reform.
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Chapter 2
Disease and Demographic
Development:
The Legacy of the Plague
This chapter is joint work with Uwe Sunde from the University of Munich.
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Disease and Demographic Development
2.1 Introduction
One of the key questions in economics concerns the reasons for development differences
across countries and regions. In view of the non-monotonic dynamics of long-run devel-
opment, as maintained by unified growth theories, the answer to this question is closely
related to the reasons for differences in the timing of the take-off in economic and de-
mographic development. The timing of the demographic transition plays a central role
in this context since it is widely viewed as a prerequisite of economic development. Ac-
cording to the canonical view, the demographic transition begins with a reduction in
mortality that is followed, with some delay, by a decline in fertility. This marks the onset
of the fertility transition, which represents the key turning point for population dynamics,
education, and the transition to sustained growth. In particular, the deliberate reduc-
tion in fertility allowed for intensified child rearing, increased human capital investment,
and ultimately a sustained increase in incomes per capita as consequence of continuing
productivity improvements (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011). Consequently, the tran-
sition from a Malthusian population regime with slowly increasing population density and
living standards to a Modern Growth regime with a sustained growth in incomes that is
accompanied by a decline in fertility constitutes the central building block of the mecha-
nisms underlying unified growth theory. While there is widespread agreement about the
role of the fertility transition for the economic take-off and ample evidence regarding the
mechanics of these transitions, there is relatively little empirical work in economics that
has investigated the determinants of the timing of the fertility transition.1
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the empirical determinants
of the timing of the fertility transition. The empirical approach is motivated by the
conjecture that mortality shocks might have triggered adjustment mechanisms that led
to shifts in the Malthusian equilibrium with the consequence of higher population density
(Voigtländer and Voth, 2013b,a), which ultimately provided the ground for the transition
from (Post-)Malthusian stagnation to a modern growth regime (Galor and Weil, 2000).
Evidence on this conjecture is scant, however.
1For simplicity and since the distinction is inconsequential for the purpose of this paper, the terms
“fertility transition” and “demographic transition” are used as synonyms in the remainder of the paper.
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A first set of regressions of the timing of the onset of the fertility transition in cities
or regions in Germany on the number of plague outbreaks indeed provides evidence that
cities that experienced more frequent plague-related population shocks also experienced
an earlier fertility transition. To rule out spurious results, the analysis controls for an
extensive set of additional variables that potentially affect the timing of the fertility
transition. While the extensive specification of the empirical model makes it unlikely
that the finding is driven by third factors, historical data on plague outbreaks are fraught
with error. The empirical strategy used to address this problem is based on variation
in the spread of repeated outbreaks of plagues in Europe during the Middle Ages and
the resulting variation in the exposure of cities or regions to plague shocks. Regardless
of whether outbreaks of the plague after the 1348 outbreak of the Black Death occurred
spontaneously from reservoirs in Europe or from repeated reintroductions from Asia,
outbreaks spread inland along medieval travel routes. From maritime harbors, where
they were recognized first, plague epidemics spread concentrically and with an intensity
that decreased in travel distance to the entry ports. This motivates an identification
strategy that builds on the insight that cities that were closer to these harbors were
affected more by outbreaks of the plague. A second set of results based on reduced
form estimates reveal that greater exposure to plague outbreaks as proxied by lower
travel time to the nearest entry port is associated with a significantly earlier onset of the
demographic transition. The third step of the analysis applies an instrumental variables
approach that uses travel time to the nearest entry port as instrument for the number of
plague outbreaks. The corresponding estimation results reveal instrument relevance and
confirm the finding that cities that experienced more plague shocks showed an earlier
onset of the demographic transition.
Several robustness checks confirm this finding. The results are robust to controlling
for other characteristics, including access to medieval and modern trade routes that
have been conjectured to be relevant predictors of the demographic transition, as well
as accounting for additional historical and geographic information. In particular, by
accounting for access to maritime trade routes, access to the hanseatic trade network, and
trade networks during the 19th century, the analysis disentangles the role of population
shocks related to medieval plague exposure from effects that are exclusively related to
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trade or other mechanisms, such as the demand for human capital, that affect the timing
of the transition but are not related to population shocks. Additional analyses reveal
that this pattern is also found for France, providing additional support for the external
validity of the results. Taken together, the empirical results support the hypothesis that
the fertility decline in the context of the demographic transition occurred earlier in cities
and regions that were more exposed to the plague and correspondingly experienced more
frequent plague-related population shocks.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. The results provide em-
pirical support for some of the central predictions of unified growth theory, according
to which the demographic transition, which was the prerequisite for long-run develop-
ment, was fostered by reduced Malthusian population pressure and an increase in the
demand for skills (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011). Despite the important negative
short-run consequences of disease shocks (see, e.g., Shankha et al., 2010; Bhattacharya
and Chakraborty, 2017) and the set-backs in long-run development caused by repeated
epidemic shocks (Lagerlöf, 2003), the evidence shown here suggests that frequent expo-
sure to diseases might indeed have induced transitions to Malthusian steady states with
higher population density as response to major population shocks and as consequence
of behavioral responses that foster development in the long-run. The findings thereby
provide empirical support for the implications of the mechanisms proposed by Voigtlän-
der and Voth (2013b), who suggest that exogenous disease shocks like the outbreak of
the Black Death might have triggered a transition to a new Malthusian equilibrium with
higher wages and population density, with important consequences for long-run devel-
opment. For instance, plague-related population shocks might have ultimately triggered
fertility reduction by fostering female employment and delaying marriage and childbirth
(Voigtländer and Voth (2013a), see also Clark (2008)), although this pattern was more
prevalent in Northern Europe than in Southern regions like Italy (De Moor and Van
Zanden, 2010). The empirical validity of this channel is also a matter of ongoing debate
in light of findings that delayed marriage did not affect total fertility (Ortmayr, 1995)
and that the plague exhibited a similar age pattern in mortality for men and women,
while there are no significant gender-differences in mortality (De Witte, 2010; Curtis and
Roosen, 2017; Alfani and Murphy, 2017; Alfani and Bonetti, 2019), implying that the po-
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tential comparative advantage underlying this mechanism might have been weaker than
previously thought. Alternatively, plague shocks might have led to changes in household
composition that favored investments in child quality. If larger households were more
affected by plague shocks than smaller households, as suggested by recent evidence by
Alfani and Bonetti (2019), and had a greater propensity toward child quality and more
resources to spend on each child, a quantity-quality argument would imply that this led
to a shift in the Malthusian equilibrium and ultimately led to an earlier transition from
a Malthusian or post-Malthusian equilibrium to a modern growth regime.2 While the
findings presented in this paper are not suited for disentangling the empirical relevance
of the different mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, they suggest that
greater plague exposure was associated with an earlier fertility decline. In this sense,
the results also complement recent evidence for England by Crafts and Mills (2017) that
is overall consistent with the view that the plague shifted the pre-industrial Malthu-
sian equilibrium and eventually gave rise to a demographic transition that marked the
onset of modern growth. Likewise, Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2020) find evidence that
plague outbreaks led to the adoption of policies and institutions that were favored by the
protestant reformation and that fostered human capital acquisition and greater popula-
tion growth until the 19th century. While their argument rests on the randomness of the
timing outbreaks during a short period, our analysis is based on the overall exposure to
plague-related shocks. Our results add to their findings by providing new information
about the heterogeneity of the timing of the fertility transition about one century later.
Using spatial variation in the plague-related mortality at the city level, Jebwab et al.
(2019) explore the impact of the outbreak of the Black Death 1347-1352 on city growth.
They present new evidence for the duration until the populations recovered as well as
its determinants and document heterogeneity regarding geographic endowments of cities
in terms of land suitability and access to trade networks. On the other hand, recent
work by Alfani and Percoco (2019) on Italian cities suggests that the plague epidemic of
1629-30 represented a productivity shock that caused a long-run decline in city growth
and urbanization rates. The empirical analysis in this paper provides evidence that
complements these findings by documenting that repeated plague outbreaks might in
2This conjecture is in line with recent evidence reported by Galor and Klemp (2019).
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fact have led to an earlier fertility transition once controlling for heterogeneity in other
factors.3 At the same time, the approach focuses on a confined area of comparable
geography, demography, and institutional environment in Northern Europe, thereby to a
certain extent implicitly accounting for the heterogeneity of the impact of the plague that
has been documented by Pamuk (2007) and more recently by Alfani (2013) in the context
of Europe. The findings thereby also contribute an explanation for the heterogeneity in
fertility dynamics across regions that eventually converged in the context of changes in
transportation and migration, as recently documented by Daudin et al. (2019).
Our findings also complement evidence that fertility reductions in Germany and
France were linked to increased education (Becker et al., 2010; Becker et al., 2013; Mur-
phy, 2015; De La Croix and Perrin, 2018) consistent with the unified growth perspective
of a close link between the fertility transition, education and economic development. This
paper adds the exposure to population shocks during the middle ages as a long-run deter-
minant of the relative timing of the transition in different regions. The empirical findings
also complement evidence of higher education attainment in predominantly Protestant ar-
eas (Becker and Woessmann, 2008, 2009, 2010), while Protestantism was mainly adopted
in regions where the return to education was comparably high, related to, e.g., access to
major trade routes of the time, which affected the demographic dynamics above and be-
yond the distance to entry ports of reintroduced plague outbreaks (Cervellati and Sunde,
2016). The results are also consistent with a role of greater life expectancy for long-run
development (Cervellati and Sunde, 2013, 2015), because plague outbreaks represent in-
frequent epidemics that unfold their consequences through population dynamics at the
macro level rather than through individual incentives for education attainment. Finally,
the use of disaggregate data complements recent evidence for the role of policies, such as
the introduction of public health systems, for longevity and development (Strittmatter
and Sunde, 2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the back-
ground of the resurgent outbreaks of the plague in Europe and the resulting hypothesis.
3Higher disease exposure also exerts greater evolutionary pressure, with important implications for
long-run development, see, e.g., Galor and Moav (2002). However, the lack of immune resistance to
plague and the short period since the medieval outbreaks makes the evolutionary channel appear less
relevant in the present context.
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Section 2.3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 2.4 presents the main
results. Section 2.5 provides a discussion of the findings.
2.2 Background and Main Hypothesis
2.2.1 The Plague in Medieval Europe: Some Background
The first outbreak of the plague in medieval Europe, the Black Death of 1347, marks one
of the largest pandemics in human history. This experience has influenced the social and
cultural thinking, unlike any other epidemic disease (and even unlike the earlier outbreak
of the “Justinian Plague” in 541), and it is present even in today’s consciousness regarding
public health (see, e.g., Cantor, 2002; Slack, 2012).
The (bubonic and pneumonic) plague is a zoonotic disease that is caused by the
bacterium Yersinia pestis. Three different variants of yersinia pestis have been shown to
be responsible for the major outbreaks of the plague in history, the Justinian plague in
541, the medieval Black Death that began in 1347, and the outbreak in China in 1890,
all of which originated in Asia. The disease primarily affects mammals, with more than
200 mammalian species reported to be naturally infected with the pathogen, but rodents
are the most important hosts, see Perry and Fetherston (1997).
Transmission of the disease can occur through direct contact or ingestion, but trans-
mission is mostly through fleas, in particular the oriental rat flea (Xenopsylla cheopis),
which acquire the pathogen from mammals, in particular rodents, through blood meals.
The virulence of yersinia pestis is temperature-dependent and increases due to the tem-
perature difference between the flea and infected mammals.4 Usually, the pathogen first
spreads to lymph nodes, where it multiplies (causing the swelling known as bubonic
plague), but depending on the infected organs, this can also lead to pneumonic plague
(which is highly infectious from human to human). In light of the contagiousness and
4Upon infection with Yersinia pestis, the fleas develop a blockage of their esophagus, which leads to
repeated attempts to feed. The blockages causes blood sucked from the mammal host to be mixed with
Yersinia pestis bacilli in the flea’s esophagus and ultimately to be re-injected to the host by regurgitation.
Within the mammal host, most Yersinia pestis cells are initially destroyed by the immune system.
However, already after three to five hours at high temperatures in the mammal (with body temperatures
at and above 37oC, which is about 15oC higher than in the flea’s body), yersinia pestis develops resistance
to the phagocytes (i.e., the bacterium cannot be detected by the immune system anymore) and leads to
an infection in the entire body (sepsis).
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fast spread of the epidemic, there has been a debate as to whether the plague had poten-
tially been caused by some other pathogen, possibly a virus. Recent DNA evidence from
grave samples confirmed an infection by yersinia pestis throughout Europe (see, e.g., the
discussion in Campbell, 2016, Section 4.03). Nevertheless, the transmission of plague is
not well understood (see, e.g., Alfani and Murphy, 2017, for a survey of the state of
the literature). In terms of intensity, recent research points towards substantially higher
plague-related mortality than earlier estimates, indicating that the impact of the plague
might have even underestimated previously (Benedictow, 2004; Alfani, 2013; Alfani and
Murphy, 2017).
The prevalent view regarding repeated outbreaks is that the bacterium had stayed
in Europe after the introduction of Yersinia pestis in 1347 and reproduced in rodent
reservoirs in wildlife or urban environments. From these reservoirs, repeated spontaneous
outbreaks were thought to have led to waves of plague in Europe, until the disappearance
of the plague during the 19th Century (see, e.g., Davis, 1986; Keeling and Gilligan, 2000).
The origins and dynamics of these outbreaks have been an issue of some debate in the
literature (see, e.g, Cohn (2008)for a survey). Outbreaks have been shown to depend
on the relative abundance of host populations and vector populations (Reijniers et al.,
2012).5 Recently, Schmid et al. (2015) conjectured that instead of persisting in hidden
reservoirs in Europe, Yersinia pestis was repeatedly reintroduced from Asia following
particular climatic conditions that favored the outbreak and spread of the pathogen.
Instead of new outbreaks being the result of a transmission from other European cities,
they argue that outbreaks were the result of repeated reintroductions of the plague from
outbreaks in Central Asia, with the respective entry ports all located at trade points
connecting Europe with trading routes to Asia. Building on earlier evidence by Stenseth
et al. (2006) and Samia et al. (2011), Schmid et al. (2015) argue that all outbreaks can
be related to suitable climatological conditions in Asia for an outbreak more than ten
years earlier. In contrast, recent work based on ancient DNA (aDNA) analysis has been
able to show that later European outbreaks of plague were caused by strains of Y. pestis
5The outbreaks and transmission dynamics have also been shown to heavily depend on climatic
conditions, which might have favored a synchronization of host and vector populations, and thereby an
increased risk of an outbreak, as documented by evidence from Asia (Stenseth et al., 2006; Kausrud
et al., 2007; Cohn, 2008; Samia et al., 2011).
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that are related to the strains found in burial cites of victims of the 14th century Black
Death (e.g., Bos et al., 2016) report evidence for burial sites of victims of the outbreak
of 1722 in Marseille, France, whereas Seifert et al. (2016) report genetic similarities in
aDNA of Y. pestis strains across different burial sites in Germany that span 300 years,
and Spyrou et al. (2016) report similarity of Y. pestis strains among plague victims
of the Black Death in Barcelona and two subsequent historical outbreaks in Russia and
Germany). This evidence supports the view of reoccurrence of the plague in Europe from
local reservoirs, although the location of these reservoirs is still debated. While it seems
accepted by now that the bacterium can survive and remain active in soil for prolonged
periods (e.g., Ayyadurai et al., 2008), recent evidence points at plague foci close to the sea
as consequence of the salt tolerance of Y. pestis (Malek et al., 2017). This is consistent
with the finding that plague outbreaks in Europe can be traced back to outbreaks in
the vicinity of ports or to maritime imports from other cities. In fact, outbreaks at the
beginning of the chain of maritime transmissions can be isolated as outbreaks for which
there was no earlier plague outbreak (within a time span of two years) within a 500km
radius on land, or 1000km radius for harbors. Figure 2.1 provides a map of the location
and the dates of the respective outbreaks of new waves of the plague.
2.2.2 Empirical Hypothesis
Regardless of the underlying reasons for renewed outbreaks of the plague during the
middle ages, new waves of the plague repeatedly spread across Europe, initiating from
ports and spreading through overland trade routes and waterways. The spread of the
plague was related to human interaction, and the speed of this spread has been estimated
to have been several kilometers per day (e.g., Benedictow, 2004). Hence, geographic
location to a large extent determined the exposure to plague outbreaks, with cities and
regions closer to the ports where the new waves originated facing a higher risk of being
hit by a new outbreak. Due to this opaque and irregular pattern, outbreaks of the plague
were taken as random events, possibly caused by metaphysical or other forces (Cantor,
2002). As consequence, there was no systematic migration related to the infrequent
outbreaks of the plague that would indicate that individuals avoided particular ports
and the related trade routes. Moreover, recent work by Skog and Hauska (2013) suggests
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Figure 2.1: Plague Reintroductions in Europe
Notes: Red triangles denote plague entry ports in terms of maritime harbors exhibiting plague outbreaks that are not
related to nearby land-based or maritime outbreaks, bold face names denote entry ports for plague reintroductions,
reproduced from Figure 1 in Schmid et al. (2015). The years next to the cities indicate plague outbreaks that have
not been preceded by a plague outbreak on land within a 500 km radius and on harbors within a 1000 km radius
for two years prior to the outbreak.
that the spread of the Black Death in Sweden in 1350 is well approximated by travel
distances on the medieval road network, and evidence by Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2020)
and Yue et al. (2016) indicates that locations close to ports, rivers and trade routes were
particularly affected by the diffusion of the plague.6 Taken together, this suggests that,
ceteris paribus, the mortality shocks caused by outbreaks of the plague were more frequent
and intense in locations closer to the ports where the new plague waves originated.
In the centuries that followed the outbreak of the Black Death in 1347, plague and
other deadly epidemics ravaged throughout the continent and caused millions of casual-
ties. According to Keyser (1941), these deaths were followed by higher birth rates that
compensated the population loss in the aftermath of the outbreak. This implies that
medieval Europe can be described as being governed by a Malthusian population regime.
Voigtländer and Voth (2013b) argue that population shocks like plague epidemics imply
large shocks to income per capita, and in the medium run lead to increased urbanization,
birth and death rates, and ultimately to a transition from one Malthusian regime to a
6Conversely, the spread of epidemics like the plague has been used as proxy for relative trade inten-
sities, which is consistent with the approach taken here, see, e.g., Boerner and Severgnini (2014).
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another Malthusian regime with higher population density. The loss of lives caused by
an epidemic outbreak also led to a temporary scarcity of labor and increased land-labor
ratios, favoring more land-intensive production in terms of animal husbandry as com-
pared to the relatively labor-intensive plow agriculture producing crops. According to
Voigtländer and Voth (2013a), this and the comparative advantage of women in pastoral
farming increased the incentives for female employment, leading to higher marriage ages
and lower fertility in the aggregate, and hence a Malthusian equilibrium characterized by
better living conditions and greater population density. In a longer perspective, greater
population density fostered the demand for skills, while lower fertility, in turn, implied
lower opportunity costs for undergoing the demographic transition, from quantity to qual-
ity investments in children. This development was accompanied by institutional changes,
for instance in inheritance rules, that were triggered by repeated plague outbreaks (see,
e.g., Alfani and Di Tullio, 2019) and ultimately constituted the basis for the economic
take-off (Galor, 2011). Regardless of the precise mechanisms that were triggered by the
population shocks due to epidemics, the consequences and the resulting change in fertility
behavior were presumably more prevalent and powerful in the locations hit harder by the
plague.
The core hypothesis that follows from this discussion is that greater exposure to the
plague might have accelerated the demographic development and ultimately led to an
earlier fertility transition. By spreading from city to city, the outbreak of the plague
might have had a major impact on many cities. Importantly, however, this impact was
likely to be heterogeneous, depending on the location of the city which determined the
exposure to the occasional outbreaks of the plague. Hence, cities and regions that were
more exposed to these outbreaks faced more frequent and pronounced population shocks
and, ceteris paribus, a faster demographic development along the lines outlined before.
In particular, the greater exposure to plague outbreaks is expected to be reflected by an
earlier onset of the fertility transition.
This paper provides a reduced form analysis of the effect of variation in the exposure
to repeated plague outbreaks on the timing of the fertility transition across regions in
Germany and France.7
7Since the focus of this paper is on the long-run development implications of population shocks, and
for reasons of data availability, this study focuses on variation in the timing of the fertility transition
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2.3 Data and Empirical Approach
2.3.1 Data
Fertility Transition Data. The baseline analysis is conducted for Germany. The
demographic information central to our analysis is the timing of the fertility transition.
The main data source is Knodel (1974), who provides detailed data on the on fertility and
age distribution of the population in Germany on a regional level within the boundaries
of 1900 (district boundaries from 1901).
Marital fertility rates, which provide the most reliable source of fertility data, are
used to calculate the onset of the fertility transition for 237 cities in 56 German regions
based on data covering the time from 1871 to 1939. Among a variety of definitions
of fertility rates, Knodel (1974) puts most emphasis on the marital fertility instead of
total fertility, which also includes illegitimate births since these are more likely to be
misreported as result of social pressure. The marital fertility rates take into account
different age distributions in different German regions, and thus provide a comparable
measure of fertility in terms of the actual number of births during a year relative to the
potential fertility.8 The onset of the fertility transition is defined as the year in which
marital fertility reached a threshold.9 There is some arbitrariness associated with this
definition, since it does not measure the onset of the decline in fertility, but the time of
reaching a threshold. However, at the same time this definition is transparent and avoids
confusion of the onset of the fertility transition with a temporary decline or fluctuations
in fertility, e.g., due to a war or German unification. Figure 2.2 provides a map that
illustrates the timing of the fertility transition.
As alternative source of demographic data, we use the data set assembled by Galloway
(1994, 2007). These data contain detailed information on vital statistics at the level of
Prussian regions. To construct a measure of the timing of the fertility transition, we
make use of the standard thresholds for fertility and mortality used in demography and
across regions in Germany and France and does not investigate the short and medium-run implications
of the plague for development in urban versus rural areas, as done, e.g., by Alfani (2013).
8The marital fertility is defined as Ig = BL/(
∑
imiFi) where BL is the number of legitimate births,
mi is the number of women in the (five-year) age interval i, and Fi is the age-specific natural fertility,
proxied by the fertility of a married Hutterite woman in 1921-1930, see also Table A.1 in the Appendix.
9Consistent with the interpretation by Knodel (1974), this threshold is taken to be 0.5 in the baseline
analysis. In robustness checks, we consider an alternative threshold of 0.6.
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Figure 2.2: The Timing of the Fertility Transition in Germany
Notes: Districts colored by the year of the fertility transition (threshold 0.5) according to Knodel (1974).
code the onset of the transition as the year in which the thresholds are surpassed for the
first time.10 To demonstrate the robustness and external validity of the main finding,
below we also consider the timing of the fertility transition in France using data from the
Princeton European Fertility Project (Coale and Coats-Watkins, 1986).
Travel Distance from Plague Entry Ports. The exposure to plague outbreaks is
measured by the geographic travel distance from the initial entry ports depicted in Figure
2.1. These ports are: Danzig (Gdansk), Hamburg and Lübeck, Venice, Genova, Marseille,
Montpellier, Bordeaux, and Barcelona. The final dataset is constructed on the basis of
about 5.7 million road/river segments with elevation data at both the start and end of
each of these line segments. The data covers continental Europe West of, and including,
Poland and the Czech Republic. In order to measure the travel times from the harbors
to the different cities, we combine data from two sources. The data for the road and
river network of Europe is taken from Openstreetmap.org via MapCruzin.com. These
data comprise of about 8 million line segments, representing roads and about 2 million
10The thresholds are a crude birth rate lower than 35 per 1000 and a crude death rate lower than 30
per 1000, see Chesnais (1992) and Cervellati and Sunde (2011). To account for the fact that the mortality
transition precedes the fertility transition and to account for measurement error in the Galloway data,
we use the average of the two years in which the two thresholds are passed.
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line segments representing waterways in all over Europe and parts of western Asia. The
dataset includes countries ranging from Portugal to parts of western Russia and Turkey.
The additional data for the elevation is taken from DIVA-GIS. This data is available
for each country and provides precise elevation data for a fine raster. The elevation data
for the individual countries was merged to create an elevation profile for Western and
central continental Europe.11
The travel distance is constructed from a road map that is based on contemporaneous
road network, adjusted for historic travel times. In order to ensure the validity of this
measure, the basic dataset is adjusted as follows. Historically, the existing roads in Europe
were continuously developed up to the road network observed today. This has been done
mainly by expanding existing roads. The most prominent example for this is probably
the “Via Appia” in Italy, an old roman road that is still used today. Obvious deviations
are, e.g., the system of motor ways (Autobahn) which was built for a completely different
purpose and without historic predecessors. Hence, motor ways and other constructions
that were obviously not in place in medieval and early modern times, such as tunnels
and canals, were excluded from the dataset. This implies a rather realistic dataset for
measuring the distances, especially in areas with mountains such as the Alps.12
A comparison between maps of the historical road network in Germany during the
19th century and the network obtained by this methodology confirms its validity. To
illustrate this, Figure 2.3 provides a direct comparison for the region around Leipzig,
Halberstadt and Wittenberg. Panel (a) shows the map of this region with medieval trade
routes as depicted in the atlas of hanseatic routes by Bruns and Weczerka (1962). Panel
(b) shows the digitized data for roads. All streets that have been used for determin-
ing travel distance are shown in grey, the most important hanseatic routes are marked
with red (including the modern street labels and numbers). These are the basis for the
computation of travel distance in terms of time as discussed below.
11In order to check the accuracy of the elevation data, the DIVA-GIS elevation data was compared to
the elevation data provided by Bosker et al. (2013). The reported elevation difference was in the range
of up to four meters. The difference could be a result of a different raster size of the elevation data.
Furthermore, the maximal elevation difference of four meters lies well in the range one can expect to be
within a certain city.
12Furthermore, areas that are not relevant for the empirical analysis, such as Turkey and Russia, were
excluded from the data.
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Figure 2.3: Comparing Historical and Contemporaneous Road Networks
(a) Historical Road Map (b) Digitized Road Map
Notes: Panel (a) depicts a map of historical hanseatic trade routes reproduced from Bruns and Weczerka (1962).
Panel (b) depicts the digitized road map that is used to determine the distances and travel times for the empirical
analysis.
In a second step, the road map was projected into “Europe Equidistant Conic”, a
coordinate system that preserves distances between points. This is necessary to avoid
distortions due to projecting the three-dimensional world on a two-dimensional map.
An equidistant projection does not distort the distances between cities and entry ports,
which is crucial for measuring the travel times.13 Figure 2.4 shows the projected road
and river map of Europe. In addition to the road and river network shown in Figure
2.4, the data use about 5.7 million line segments including detailed elevation data. Using
elevation data at both ends of these line segments, we computed the absolute difference
in elevation over the length of the line segment and calculated the corresponding slope
of the line segments (in degrees) as the arctangens of the elevation difference relative to
the length of the segment.
Based on the information from the road and river network map and the slopes of the
street segments, we calculated the travel time from the individual ports to each city. The
travel times depend crucially on the assumptions about travel speeds for the different
means of transportation. Transport via ships on rivers used to be substantially faster
than traveling by foot. Transport of people and goods over land was mostly performed
by horse coaches, which were just little faster than walking. The average speed of travel
was around five to seven kilometers per hour (Ritter, 1966, p. 28). This corresponds to
alternative sources according to which goods transport was possible at a speed of about
13The potential distortions are quite small for cities close together, but increase with the distance
between the cities. Hence, if not projected to an equidistant format, the distortions would increase with
the distance to the harbor and thus introduce systematic and potentially substantial measurement error
that might lead to misleading results.
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Figure 2.4: Travel Distances from Entry Ports
Notes: Map of roads (brown) and waterways (blue) used to compute travel distances from entry ports (red triangles).
Cities are depicted as black dots. Red line represents German border as of 1900.
30 kilometers per day (in flat areas up to 40 kilometers), which corresponds to about six
to eight hours at a speed of five kilometers per hour (Bruns and Weczerka, 1962, 1967).
Similarly, historical accounts of mail deliveries over long distances managed travel speeds
of approximately 5.5 to 6.5 kilometers per hour (Hitzer, 1971). Since for horse coaches
it was virtually impossible to travel on very steep roads, the travel time decreases with
the slope and roads with a slope of more than 45o constituted a natural barrier. Hence,
following this literature, we assume specific travel speeds by surface type and slope of
line segment.14
14See Table A.2 in the Appendix for details. For slopes steeper than 45o, the transport was mostly
done by physical man labor for purposes other than travel. Even today the transport of food and other
necessary equipment to remote cottages in the hills is done by carrying. Line segments with a slope larger
than 45o are assigned a speed of zero and are thus assumed to be bypassed on other roads. Obviously,
the measured time depends on the assumed travel speed. The precise assumptions about the travel speed
itself are irrelevant for the empirical analysis (and only affect the size of the coefficient). The important
feature is the relative decline in the travel speed for the different slope brackets. Since assigning the
travel speed contains an arbitrary element, this constitutes the most serious threat to validity. The main
problem is that there are not many sources that provide reliable travel speeds at the medieval times,
other than that traveling was exhausting and took a long time. In order to check for robustness, the
regression is performed with alternative speed schedules, with similar results as shown below.
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The travel time is consequently defined as the minimum time necessary to travel the
distance of the line segment given the speed restriction of the slope. The travel times
to entry ports are then calculated in two steps. First the time to cover the particular
line segment is assigned to the individual line segment given surface type and slope as
described above. In the second step the path with the shortest sum of travel times is
selected among all paths, and the total travel time from each entry port to each city is
computed using the Dijkstra-algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959). The resulting variable Travel
Time represents the travel time in hours from the closest port to the respective city.
This variable serves as proxy for the relative risk of being exposed to outbreaks of the
plague, which are expected to have occurred more often the closer the nearest entry port.
The use of the travel times, rather than the simple distance, is essential to the analysis,
since the spread of the plague requires human contact to infected hosts and vectors. The
simple horizontal distance is therefore an inadequate proxy for the relative risk of being
exposed to plague epidemics, since remote places were less likely to be affected by an
outbreak. As additional control, the analysis also makes use of the variable Number of
Ports, which measures the number of ports that can be reached from the respective city
within 100 hours.
Other Variables. To account for relevant heterogeneity across cities and regions, we
use additional information from various sources. The analysis controls for access to the
trade network of the Hanseatic League, as well as distance to trade ports that became
important after the discovery of the Americas and to the main trade ports of the 19th
century. City-level controls for religion, the associated cultural differences, as well as for
specific institutions, are taken from data constructed by Cantoni (2012). This data set
includes 259 cities in Germany and Austria, with information about population at various
points in time and other background information. In particular, the data include binary
indicators that denote whether a city was considered protestant after the 15th and 16th
century, respectively, whether a city belonged to the Hanseatic League, whether a city
was considered a free imperial city, whether a city had a printing press by the year 1517
or whether a city had a university or was located on a navigable river.15
15Additional variables indicate the number of monasteries within a 10 km radius of the respective city
for all monasteries and monasteries of the Order of Saint Augustine.
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To account for agricultural potential, we use information about the soil suitability
for agriculture (in terms of caloric yield of the most important crop) based on data
constructed by Galor and Özak (2016).16 Together with the measure for ruggedness, these
variables provide valuable insight in the agricultural potential of a region. Additional
indicator variables include information whether a city was affected by the 30-year war
1618-1648 or the 7-year war 1756-1763, in terms of plundering or other warfare events.17
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the core variables of the analysis, the distance,
in terms of travel time in hours, to the closest entry port for new plague outbreaks, the
number of entry ports within a 100-hour radius, population density in 1890, the (log)
population in 1500, and population growth from 1300 to 1500.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Onset Dem. Tr. (Year) 1,912.4 7.5 1,889 1,931
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) 2.2 5.1 0 30
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) 1.1 3.1 0 23
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) 1.7 4.2 0 28
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) 1.5 3.9 0 26
Travel Time 48.3 19.5 .19 86
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 6.6 15.4 0 56
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 41.7 18.3 .19 81
Number of Plague Ports (100h) 3.0 0.9 2 6
Population Density 1900 (log) 4.8 0.7 3.7 10
Population in 1400(log) 0.5 0.9 0 3.7
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) 0.5 0.9 -2.2 3
Protestant 0.8 0.4 0 1
Monasteries (p.c.) 1.3 1.8 0 15
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) 0.1 0.3 0 1
University 0.1 0.2 0 1
Hanseatic City 0.1 0.3 0 1
Reichsstadt 0.2 0.4 0 1
Printing Press 0.1 0.3 0 1
River 0.4 0.5 0 1
Caloric Yield 9,103.2 454.6 7,614 10,109
30y War 0.5 0.5 0 1
7y War 0.2 0.4 0 1
Latitude 50.9 1.6 48 54
Longitude 10.3 2.7 6.1 18
The statistics refer to 237 cities in Germany.
16This variable measures the average potential crop yield in terms of calories (millions of kilo calories
per hectare and year) for the most productive crop available for cultivation before 1500CE. In robustness
tests, we also consider an index of land suitability for agriculture designed by Ramankutty et al. (2002)
that uses the daily sum of temperature over a base temperature of 5 degree Celsius, the pH-level of
the soil, the soil carbon density and a moisture index, calculated by the actual evapotranspiration over
the potential evapotranspiration, in order to calculate a single number that indicate the suitability for
agriculture.
17The information for these variables is taken from records of city archives (Keyser, 1974).
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2.3.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis tests the hypothesis that cities with greater exposure to plague
epidemics experienced an earlier fertility transition during the 19th Century. The analysis
is based on a simple linear regression model
Transition Y eari = β0 + β1Plague Exposurei + γXi + εi (2.1)
where i indicates city, Transitioni is the year of the onset of the demographic transition,
which is measured in terms of the onset of the fertility decline, and Plague Exposurei
is the exposure of city i to the plague. X is a vector of control variables, which include
other relevant determinants of the timing of the fertility transition. The empirical anal-
ysis accounts for cities located within the same administrative region by clustering the
standard errors correspondingly.18
The identification of the coefficient of interest, β1, requires a reliable measure of plague
exposure that is exogenous, conditional on variation captured by the control variables
included in the vector Xi. The focus on cities in Germany (and below also France) has
the advantage of comparing variation across environments that are otherwise rather com-
parable, other than when comparing across countries or even world regions like Europe
and Asia.19
The main problem in this context is that existing measures of plague exposure, such
as counts of outbreaks or plague-related casualties, are fraught with measurement error.
In addition, the hypothesis to be tested is that the timing of the fertility transition, which
took place in the late 19th and early 20th century, was related to the long-run exposure
to plague epidemics centuries earlier through potentially various, mutually non-exclusive
channels whose consequences unfolded over time.
To address these issues, the empirical strategy is based on the use of proxy measures
for the exposure to repeated plague outbreaks in history. In particular, to account for
the fact that the number of outbreaks affecting cities during different historical phases is
a coarse measure that is likely to be fraught by measurement error, we apply geographic
18The data by Knodel (1974) is based on 56 regions.
19The obvious limitation of this approach is that the analysis does not provide insights as to why the
demographic transition happened earlier in Europe than in other parts of the world.
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proxies of the exposure to plague outbreaks. The use of geographic proxies, either in a
reduced form approach or in the context of an instrumental variables approach, enables a
better identification of the effect of plague exposure on the timing of the fertility transition
than plain OLS. In particular, we use variables that are based on the exposure in terms
of the travel distance to the ports where the new plague waves originated. The main
measure accounts for the distance to the nearest entry port. Additional analyses also
make use of a measure of the number of entry ports within a perimeter of 100 hours
travel time.
According to the empirical hypothesis, β1 is expected to be negative, in the sense that
greater exposure to the plague led to an earlier fertility transition. The identification of
the effect rests on the assumption that exposure to repeated outbreaks of the plague (in
terms of location relative to entry ports) is conditionally exogenous to the timing of the
fertility transition of a city. The key issue for identification is therefore to account for
confounding factors, such as access to trade in medieval times and, especially, during the
19th century, or other historical or geographical features that might be picked up by the
measure of exposure to repeated outbreaks of the plague. We thus apply specifications
with various sets of controls, including geographic controls such as a measure whether
a city was affected by the very first outbreak of the Black Death in 1347-1352, popula-
tion controls, religion controls, institutional controls, controls for agricultural yields, and
exposure to wars.
While these extensive controls help isolating the role of plague exposure, it is hard
if not impossible to disentangle the role of different mechanisms through which plague
exposure influenced the timing of the fertility transition as consequence of the singular
nature of the fertility transition and the resulting restriction to the availability of cross-
sectional variation in the timing of the fertility transition. For instance, an important
determinant of plague exposure is related to closer access to the main trade network of
medieval Europe, since plague contagion is related to human interaction. While it should
be clear that the empirical analysis in this paper is confined to a reduced form approach,
it is nevertheless possible to rule out contemporaneous trade access by disentangling
the variation in the importance of trade ports over time and thereby isolating long-run
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effects of plague exposure from trade effects related to trade in the 19th century. Below,
we present results from an extensive number of robustness checks.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition
As a first step, we regress the timing of the demographic transition in Germany, measured
as the year in which a city experienced the fertility decline in terms of a marital fertil-
ity below 0.5 as dependent variable, on exposure to plague shocks as measured by the
total recorded number of plague outbreaks before 1900 in a city. The results, which are
presented in Table 2.2 document a consistently negative effect of the number of plague
outbreaks on the year of the fertility transition. This is an indication that cities that
experienced more frequent plagues also experienced an earlier fertility transition. The
prevalence of a plague outbreak during the first wave of the Black Death in 1347-1352,
instead, does not seem to be related to the timing of the fertility transition. However,
the discussion above suggests that the outbreak of the Black Death during the first wave
might itself be related to access to trade at the time. In order to account for systematic
heterogeneity that might affect this finding, we replicate the analysis by including vari-
ous sets of control variables. In particular, we add demographic controls (for population
density in 1400, as well as for population growth between 1400 and 1600), religion con-
trols (whether a city had adopted Protestantism by 1600, the number of monasteries per
capita, and the number of Augustinian monasteries), institution controls (the existence
of a university, membership in the Hanseatic league, the status of a free imperial city, or
the presence of a printing press by the time of the protestant reformation), controls for
geography (location on a navigable river, maritime port, latitude and longitude), suitabil-
ity for agriculture (in terms of caloric yield of the most important crop), and exposure
of the city to wars (30-year war and 7-year war). Regardless of the specification, the
coefficient estimates for plague outbreaks are significantly negative, indicating an earlier
transition in line with the hypothesis. The similarity of the coefficients of interest across
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the different specifications suggests that the omission of relevant variables or problems
due to the inclusion of endogenous (“bad”) controls are unlikely to drive the result.
The coefficient estimates for these control variables also reveal a coherent pattern.20
Consistent with historical accounts that the demographic transition occurred first in
France and North-West Europe, but also with the hypothesis that greater exposure to
plague outbreaks implied an earlier onset of the fertility transition, we find evidence
for an earlier onset being associated with greater latitude and longitude. Moreover,
greater population density during the 19th century is associated with an earlier onset
of the fertility transition, consistent with the conjecture maintained in unified growth
theories. The results for the religion controls confirm the intuition of an earlier onset of the
fertility transition in cities that adopted Protestantism. Adding controls for institutions
reveals that the existence of a university or a printing press implied an earlier fertility
transition, although the coefficient estimates are not significant. Greater agricultural
potential, as proxied by caloric yield of the most important crop, is also associated with
a significantly earlier fertility transition, supporting arguments that are based on the
interplay between environmental and cultural factors (see, e.g., Galor and Özak, 2016).
Finally, in line with previous arguments on the role of wars, we find that a greater
exposure to the 30-year war was associated with an earlier onset of the demographic
transition. Together, these findings are consistent with the joint role of population shocks,
access to trade, and war for the demographic development as suggested by Voigtländer
and Voth (2013a). Importantly, however, accounting for these control variables leaves
the main results regarding the role of the exposure to the plague for the timing of the
fertility transition essentially unaffected. As suggested by the relatively low variance
inflation factors, the estimation results also seem not to be affected by multicollinearity.
This finding provides a first piece of evidence that population shocks, proxied by
the exposure to plague outbreaks, indeed had an effect on the timing of the demographic
transition. However, while the stability of the coefficient estimates with respect to the ad-
dition of different sets of control variables indicates that plague outbreaks exert a largely
independent effect that is unlikely driven by third factors, the use of historical data on
plague outbreaks might be problematic as these data are based on various sources of dif-
20See Table A.3 in the Appendix for the respective results.
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Table 2.2: Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic Transition
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.411∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.118) (0.108) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
Controls
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.043 0.329 0.410 0.439 0.447 0.480 0.491
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.312 0.387 0.409 0.407 0.439 0.446
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.61 1.66 2.42 2.43 2.69 2.71 2.73
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ferent quality and reliability. In particular, the data on outbreaks exhibit little variation
and are measured very coarsely. Recent papers have emphasized several shortcomings of
historical plague data, including the lack of heterogeneity and reliability (see, e.g., Alfani,
2013), or comparability as consequence of different data sources and coverage (see, e.g.,
Roosen and Curtis, 2018).21 The results of a significant and robust relation between
plague outbreaks and the timing of the fertility transition should therefore be seen as
preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis of the influence of plague exposure.
The size of the estimates is not informative as result of measurement error.
2.4.2 Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition
Reduced Form Estimates: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demo-
graphic Transition. In order to explore the measurement issue and the robustness of
the results, and to obtain more reliable estimates, we next replicate the analysis using
information from a geography-based measure of plague exposure in a reduced form exer-
cise. In particular, we use the distance to the closest entry port for plague outbreaks in
terms of travel time, instead of the measured number of plague outbreaks, as proxies for
21Even greater concerns apply to data of plague casualties before the outbreak of the 30-year war,
e.g., by Biraben (1975, 1976), or Büntgen et al. (2012), or mortality data (in terms of the percentage
of the population killed by the Black Death after 1348) that has been constructed for selected cities by
Olea and Christakos (2005), which is why we refrain from considering these data.
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plague exposure. Otherwise, we apply the same specifications of the empirical model in
terms of controls as before.
The results are shown in Table 2.3. The results in Panel A document that greater
exposure to plague outbreaks, proxied by greater proximity to the nearest entry port in
terms of travel time is associated with a significantly earlier onset of the fertility transition
in German regions. This finding is robust to the inclusion of an indicator of outbreaks
during the first wave of the Black Death, geographic controls such as (in the order of
columns) latitude, longitude, or access to riverine or maritime trade routes; controls for
population density and dynamics; controls for religious factors like protestantism or the
number of monasteries; controls for institutions like free imperial city, university, printing
press, or membership to the Hanseatic league; agricultural suitability; and the exposure
to wars.22 Taken together, the findings indicate that the fertility transition occurred
earlier in more densely populated (and presumably richer since more urbanized) areas.
These findings are robust across different specifications that become increasingly more
comprehensive. They are consistent with the main mechanism underlying the onset of the
demographic transition in the canonical unified growth model, which relates to greater
population density and greater demand for human capital as the main factors behind the
onset. However, the results suggest that the exposure to population shocks as reflected
by the exposure to plague outbreaks potentially was a key factor for the shifts in the
Malthusian equilibrium that eventually gave way to the demographic transition.
This finding is unaffected when measuring travel time distance along all roads or when
distinguishing between Roman and non-Roman roads, respectively. In particular, Panel
B shows the respective results when accounting separately for distance on Roman roads
versus non-Roman roads to account for the persistent role of Roman institutions and the
Roman road network for long-run development (see, e.g., Wahl, 2017).23 Overall, the
results are qualitatively similar and quantitatively even slightly larger when considering
Roman roads, but the coefficients are not significantly different from each other and
from those in Panel A. The plague exposure proxy alone explains around 25 percent of
22The respective estimation results are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
23Roman roads in this context are defined as roads within the borders of the Roman Empire at
maximum extent, Non-Roman roads are defined as roads in areas that were never under the control of
the Roman empire. The respective estimation results for the control variables are reported in Table A.5
in the Appendix.
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the variation in the timing of the fertility transition, whereas adding the extensive set
of additional control variables does not deliver a drastic increase in explanatory power
of the empirical model. As with the OLS results, the estimation results seem not to be
affected greatly by multicollinearity. Quantitatively, the coefficient estimates individually
imply that a reduction in the travel distance to the nearest plague port by 100 hours is
equivalent to an onset of the fertility transition that occurs a quarter of a century earlier.
Table 2.3: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Baseline Specification
Travel Time 0.206∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.073) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.249 0.357 0.471 0.495 0.510 0.550 0.557
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.340 0.450 0.468 0.474 0.515 0.518
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.02 4.32 4.41 4.42 4.90 4.91 5.10
Panel B: Accounting for Roman Roads
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.260∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.102) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.082) (0.082)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.069) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.273 0.411 0.490 0.509 0.523 0.557 0.564
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.393 0.468 0.480 0.486 0.521 0.524
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.20 6.50 6.61 6.72 7.02 7.11 7.23
joint F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Controls (both Panels)
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2SLS Results: Plague Exposure, Plague Outbreaks, and the Timing of the
Demographic Transition. To shed light on the quantitative implications of these
results and, indirectly, whether and how the previous regression results are affected by
measurement error, we report the results from the application of an instrumental variables
approach. Since travel distance to the entry ports represents a proxy for plague exposure
that exhibits sufficient (continuous) variation, we use this variable as an instrument for
the number of plague outbreaks. In addition, we consider the most extensive specification
of control variables, including the prevalence of a plague outbreak during the first wave
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of the Black Death in 1347-1352. Notice that the validity of an instrumental variables
approach in this context requires the instrument to be correlated with the instrumented
variable (relevance) but uncorrelated with the measurement error (validity). The validity
assumption appears plausible in the present context since the geographic distance from
entry ports is unlikely to be relevant for the reliability of the count of plague outbreaks
that is based on archival information. Moreover, the extensive specification controls
for correlations between the outcome variable, the timing of the fertility transition, and
the geographic features contained in the instrument through the presence of proxies (in
particular the prevalence of a plague outbreak during the first wave of the Black Death).
Table 2.4 presents the corresponding estimation results. Panel A contains the results
for travel distance to plague ports on any road, while Panel B contains results when
distinguishing between Roman and non-Roman roads. The first column in both panels
replicates the OLS results of Column (7) of Table 2.2 for all plague outbreaks before
1900. The coefficient estimate for the number of plague outbreaks is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating an earlier onset of the fertility transition. The remaining columns of
Table 2.4 report the 2SLS results for different specifications of the variable of plague out-
breaks. Throughout all specifications, the first stage results suggest that the instrument
is relevant. In particular, the estimates document that the proxies of plague exposure
are indeed correlated (positively) with the frequency of plague outbreaks in different
epochs.24
Column (2) contains the results when all outbreaks before 1900 are instrumented
using the travel distance to the nearest entry port of the plague. The second stage results
reveal a significant negative IV-estimate for the number of outbreaks, which suggests an
earlier onset of the fertility transition in cities that experienced more plague shocks. The
coefficient estimate is more than ten times larger than the OLS estimate, which indicates
substantial attenuation of the OLS results due to measurement error. The estimates are
even larger when restricting attention to plague outbreaks before the peace of Augsburg
1555, or before the onset of the 30-year war 1618, as indicated by the results in Columns
(3) and (4). Column (5) presents results for the number of outbreaks between 1360 and
24Table A.6 in the Appendix reports the respective coefficient estimates of the first stage regressions.
30
Disease and Demographic Development
1618, i.e., when excluding the first wave of the Black Death that began in 1347.25 These
results are robust to the distinction of travel times on Roman and non-Roman roads, as
indicated by the very similar results in Panel B.26
Taken together these estimates suggest that an additional plague outbreak during the
middle ages implied that the onset of the fertility transition occurred around four to six
years earlier, holding everything else constant.
Table 2.4: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: IV
Results
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Baseline Specification
OLS IV
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.343∗∗∗ -4.869∗∗∗
(0.102) (1.846)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -7.981∗∗∗
(2.963)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.785∗∗
(2.644)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -7.036∗∗
(2.788)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.052∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.036∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237
F-Stat in FS 7.57 8.91 6.68 6.29
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Panel B: Accounting for Roman Roads
OLS IV
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.343∗∗∗ -4.926∗∗∗
(0.102) (1.838)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -8.113∗∗∗
(2.924)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.893∗∗∗
(2.486)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -7.118∗∗∗
(2.587)
First Stage
Travel Time (Roman Roads) -0.055∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.030) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) -0.053∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237
F-Stat in FS 3.93 4.87 3.84 3.68
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
Hansen J (p-value) 0.57 0.60 0.87 0.91
Full Set of Controls (both Panels) X X X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative region, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
25The corresponding coefficient estimates for all variables are contained in Table A.7 in the Appendix.
26The coefficient estimates for the other variables can be found in Tables A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix
respectively.
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2.4.3 Robustness and Additional Results
To investigate the robustness of these results, we conducted different robustness checks.
Instead of exploring the role of the exposure to repeated population shocks as consequence
of plague outbreaks using city-level data, one might alternatively analyze the data on the
level of regions. Given that the main information source on the timing of the fertility
transition is on the regional level (Knodel, 1974), this could be viewed as a more natural
level of the analysis. On the other hand, however, this means using variation in the data
at a higher level of aggregation. Checking the sensitivity of the empirical results with
respect to the level of aggregation also provides a sensible robustness check in general.
The results confirm the findings on the city level, namely that regions with more entry
ports in a reasonably close distance are associated with a significantly earlier fertility
transition. Likewise, regions that are less exposed to plague outbreaks as measured by
a greater distance in terms of travel time to the nearest plague entry port experience a
significantly later onset of the fertility transition.27 Interestingly, the coefficient estimates
are quantitatively very comparable to those obtained for data on the city level. At the
same time, the findings regarding an earlier transition for more densely populated regions,
for regions that are predominantly of Protestant denomination, and for regions that have
better access (in terms of lower distance) to major trade routes are confirmed using
regional data.
A second set of robustness refers to the measurement of the timing of the fertility
transition. To this end, we use an alternative measure based on a threshold of marital
fertility of 0.6 instead of 0.5 relative to maximum (Hutterite) fertility to indicate the
onset of the fertility transition, using the same data source (Knodel, 1974). The results
obtained for the two alternative measures of the timing of the fertility transition are
qualitatively very similar to the baseline results.28 As alternative measure, we construct
the timing of the fertility transition from vital rates provided by Galloway (2007). The
advantage of the Galloway data is that they allow for a robustness check with data from
a second source; the disadvantage is that they available for Prussia only and thus only
contain information for a small subset of the cities in the baseline data set. Nevertheless,
27Table A.10 in the Appendix presents the respective results. The travel times are computed as
average of the cities located in the region.
28See Table A.11 in the Appendix for the respective results.
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the results are qualitatively similar.29 The results of unreported estimates also reveal
similar results when weighting the distance to the nearest port by the number of plague
outbreaks as reported in Figure 2.1, or when distinguishing between Roman and non-
Roman roads.
A third set of robustness checks concerns the relevance of the assumptions about
travel speeds and road structures. In general, historical sources on travel speeds both
over land and on waterways are both rather scarce and vague. There are several ways
of addressing this issue. When performing robustness checks based on a different travel
time schedule or when calibrating the Dijkstra-algorithm in order to minimize the travel
time avoiding roads whenever possible, and restricting to only roads, the results are
qualitatively similar to the baseline results, which suggests that these results are not due
to assumptions about travel speeds or transportation mode.30
A fourth set of robustness exercises addresses the possible confound that instead of
distance to entry ports from which the plague spread repeatedly during the middle ages,
travel time to the entry ports is merely a proxy for access to (maritime) trade. In order
to account for this possibility and to rule out potentially spurious results, the baseline
results are obtained with an extensive specification of control variables. As an additional
robustness check to address this issue, we estimate extended empirical specifications that
the number of plague entry ports within a travel distance of 100 hours. This variable can
be viewed as alternative proxy for plague exposure (akin to an extensive margin), whose
inclusion is justified by the moderate correlation and the fact that the use of more than
one suitable proxy is strictly preferable. Alternatively, however, this proxy can pick up
access to medieval trade routes related to proximity to entry ports. The reduced form
results for this extended specification indicate that the inclusion of the this measure of
exposure leaves the results for the travel distance unchanged and instead also delivers a
significant and negative coefficient indicating that an additional plague port anticipates
the fertility transition by more than two years.31 Aggregating the effects following the
methodology of Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) delivers a total estimate of a reduction
29See Table A.12 in the Appendix.
30Completely deleting roads would reduce the number of observations dramatically as many cities
cannot be reached solely by waterways due to their location away from rivers or within river deltas. See
Table A.13 in the Appendix for the respective results of the reduced form and 2SLS analysis.
31See Table A.14 for the corresponding results.
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in the travel distance to the nearest plague port by 100 hours of about 35 years, which
can be seen as an upper bound of the effect which likely comprises plague and trade
exposure.32 We also replicated the instrumental variables approach while including the
number of plague ports within a 100-hour perimeter as additional control. Together with
the prevalence of a plague outbreak during the first wave of the Black Death in 1347-1352,
this control implies that the identifying variation of the travel distance now comes from
the variation above and beyond the variation accounted for by the controls, which proxy
for access to trade and exposure to the singular epidemic of the Black Death. The results
again deliver a very similar picture and leave the main results unaffected qualitatively
and quantitatively.33
2.4.4 External Validity: The Demographic Transition in France
The hypothesis that greater exposure to population shocks such as repeated plague out-
breaks ultimately contributes to an earlier fertility transition is generic and not restricted
to the context of Germany. In an attempt to investigate the external validity of the em-
pirical results, we replicate the same empirical approach for France. The case of France
is particularly interesting for several reasons. France was the first country to experience
the demographic transition. In addition, it has been argued that the fertility transition in
Europe was influenced by social and behavioral changes that originated in France (Spo-
laore and Wacziarg, 2014). Moreover, outbreaks of the plague to Europe occurred first
in France, and much research on the Black Death has focused on France as consequence
of an arguably higher data quality for plague outbreaks in France than in other parts of
Europe.34
32Following Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006, p. 534), and noting a covariance of the onset of the
fertility transition with the number of plague ports within 100 hours circumference of -0.0256 and with
the distance to the nearest plague port of 0.4911, the respective effect in terms of distance is given by,
e.g., 0.238 + (−0.0256/0.4911) · (−2.253) = 0.355 for the estimates the first column of Table A.14 Panel
A, and by 0.187+(−0.0256/0.4911) · (−3.172) = 0.352 for the estimates in the last column of Table A.14
Panel A.
33See Table A.15 in the Appendix for details. We refrain from including both travel distance to the
nearest plague port and the number of plague ports in a 100-hour perimeter as instrumental variables,
because the null of both being relevant instruments for the number of plague outbreaks is rejected by
conventional Hansen tests of overidentification. Details are available upon request.
34For instance, the coverage of the data by Biraben (1975, 1976) is comparably high for France, while
even here full availability and comparability of sources is not ensured, see, e.g., Roosen and Curtis (2018).
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The replication of the main analysis for France requires the use of different data and
data sources, and thus puts limits on the comparability with the earlier estimation results
for Germany, particularly concerning the control variables. At the same time, this is a
useful complement to the analysis for data from Germany as it provides insights into
the external validity and greater statistical power. The timing of the fertility transition
is constructed based on data from the Princeton European Fertility Project (Coale and
Coats-Watkins, 1986) using the same definition as for Germany.35 Other variables are
constructed from different sources. The onset of the fertility transition in France, although
occurring earlier than in Germany, also exhibits considerably variation (see Figure A.3
in the Appendix).
In terms of the specification, the analysis of France requires several modifications.
First, whereas Germany was largely located beyond the Roman Limes, which implies
that most streets were not of Roman origin, France had entirely belonged to the Roman
empire.This makes the distinction between roads of Roman and non-Roman origin even
more relevant when extending the analysis to include France. In light of arguments that
social and behavioral changes that affected the timing of the fertility transition spread
concentrically from Paris (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2014), the empirical specification in-
cludes a measure of the travel distance to Paris.
Repeating the OLS regressions of the timing of the fertility transition on the number
of plague outbreaks before 1900 at the city level delivers mixed results for France, whereas
for the pooled sample the estimates appear indicative of an earlier fertility transition in
cities with a greater number of plague-related population shocks, although coefficient
estimates are insignificant.36
Table 2.5 presents the reduced form results for the proxy measures of plague exposure
for France (Panel A) and when pooling cities in Germany and France (Panel B) while
accounting separately for travel distances along Roman and non-Roman roads. The esti-
mates confirm the earlier results for Germany that a greater plague exposure, as proxied
by proximity to the entry ports, is associated with an earlier onset of the fertility tran-
sition. Coefficients for distances on Roman roads are significant but similar in size to
35As baseline, we code the first year in which marital fertility reached a threshold of 0.5 as the onset,
for robustness we also present results for an alternative threshold of 0.6 with similar results.
36See Table A.16 in the Appendix for the respective results.
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the insignificant coefficients for distances on non-Roman roads. The size of the coeffi-
cient estimates as well as the findings for the other regressors are comparable when not
distinguishing between Roman and non-Roman roads.37
Table 2.5: Plague Exposure and Timing of the Demographic Transition: Germany
and France
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: France
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.085 0.655∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.193
(0.188) (0.216) (0.215) (0.211) (0.211) (0.213) (0.224) (0.398)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) -0.002 0.537 0.560 0.572 0.572 0.558 0.559 -0.309
(0.295) (0.355) (0.358) (0.345) (0.345) (0.343) (0.344) (0.532)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.007 0.113 0.115 0.133 0.133 0.141 0.141 0.190
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.097 0.093 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.102 0.148
Number of Cluster 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Highest VIF 1.01 2.80 3.09 3.10 3.10 3.14 3.38 17.74
joint F 0.90 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13
Panel B: Germany and France
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.114 0.356∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗
(0.152) (0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.129) (0.130) (0.128) (0.118)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.043 0.305 0.311 0.311∗ 0.307 0.303 0.314∗ 0.263
(0.176) (0.188) (0.188) (0.187) (0.188) (0.186) (0.188) (0.165)
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.623 0.654 0.655 0.656 0.657 0.659 0.660 0.672
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.650 0.649 0.650 0.649 0.650 0.650 0.662
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Highest VIF 2.20 2.98 3.17 3.22 4.93 4.94 4.97 9.78
joint F 0.75 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Controls (both Panels
Distance to Paris X X X X X X X
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Calories X X
Coordinates X
France Dummy (Panel B) X X X X X X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative region, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, we replicate the IV approach for city samples for Germany and France. Table
2.6 reports the results for the baseline specification in Panel A, and when accounting
for travel time along Roman and non-Roman roads in Panel B. In addition, the analysis
accounts for plague outbreaks during different phases. The results for Germany are
replicated for completeness and comparability with the results for France, since some
of the controls in the baseline specification are not available for the sample of cities in
France.38 Overall, the results confirm the earlier findings for Germany and document
37See Table A.17 in the Appendix. and Tables A.18 and A.19 in the Appendix contain detailed results
for all covariates.
38The corresponding coefficient estimates for the first stages are reported in Tables A.20 and A.22,
and for the second stages in Tables A.21 and A.23.
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that a greater exposure to plague-related population shocks is associated with an earlier
fertility transition in both countries. The effect of one additional outbreak varies across
samples but amounts to roughly one decade, regardless of whether all plague outbreaks
are considered or whether one restricts attention to plague outbreaks before the peace
of Augsburg 1555, before the outbreak of the 30-year war 1618, or when restricting to
plague outbreaks after the first wave of the Black Death. Similar results are obtained for
more extensive specifications regarding geographic controls.39
2.4.5 Disentangling Plague Exposure and 19th Century Trade
While the results so far are indicative of an effect of the proxy of plague exposure in terms
of travel distance to the closest plague entry port above and beyond a rich set of control
variables, the observation that new waves of the plague repeatedly spread across Europe,
initiating from ports and spreading through overland trade routes and waterways, raises
the concern that the timing of the fertility transition might have been determined entirely
by trade. When considering the role of trade for the timing of the fertility transition, it
is important to recognize that the plague outbreaks mainly occurred during the (late)
middle ages while the fertility transition happened during the late 19th Century. The
final step of the analysis therefore disentangles the role of trade and plague exposure that
is related to medieval trade by accounting for the differences in trade access during the
middle ages and the 19th century. In light of this, the analysis makes use of the fact that
not all maritime harbors were recognized as entry points of new epidemic outbreaks, but
all were access hubs to trade. In addition, trade networks during the 19th century had
changed in comparison to the time of the plague outbreaks. This allows us to disentangle
the role of the exposure to plague-related population shocks (which spread along trade
routes, but much earlier in time) from access to trade during the 19th Century as a direct
driver of the timing of the fertility transition.
In order to explore the relevance whether a greater proximity to a port or generally
a good connection to trade networks are a driver for the fertility transition, we perform
several analyses. The first uses information about ports that had no relevance during
medieval times but during the 19th century. In particular, we explore the robustness of
39See Table A.24 in the Appendix.
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the results with respect to accounting for the proximity to ports that were only founded
(or gained importance) after the middle ages and that were important trade hubs in
the 19th century (such as Rotterdam). The second analysis controls for access to the
Hanseatic trade network, accounting for the shortest way along which goods could be
shipped or transported over land. For both explorations, we estimate more extensive
specifications by adding controls for the travel distance to the closest trade port in the
19th Century, or for the distance to the closest Hanseatic city, or both, and alternatively
for the average distance to the 19th century trade ports. Notice that these estimations
correspond to a falsification test in the sense that if access to trade was the main trigger
for the fertility transition, it should be the distance to the 19th Century trade ports that
affects the timing of the transition, and not the distance to medieval entry ports, which
already had lost importance. The results leave the main findings unaffected.40 Additional
unreported falsification tests based on variables for access to placebo ports including or
excluding Hamburg using similar variables (regarding the number of maritime ports in
a perimeter of 100 hours travel time and the distance to the closest maritime port for
maritime ports that were not entry ports for the plague) confirm the main results and
document that the findings are not merely driven the distance to maritime harbors. In
particular, while the main results for plague exposure are unchanged, these estimates
deliver no evidence for an influence of the placebo ports on the timing of the fertility
transition.
In a final step, we additionally exploit variation in distance to 19th century trade
ports and to the closest hanseatic city or maritime port in the pooled data for Germany
and France. In particular, conducting similar robustness and placebo checks for access to
trade as before does not affect the reduced form results.41 Moreover, also 2SLS estimates
with additional controls for trade access and accounting for different waves of plague out-
breaks analogous to the analysis in Table 2.6 confirm the main findings.42 In particular,
the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar regardless of considering all plague
outbreaks in history, or when considering only plague outbreaks before 1555 (the peace
40See Tables A.25 and A.26 in the Appendix for the estimation results for the reduced form and IV
specifications, respectively, for Germany.
41See Tables A.27 and A.28 in the Appendix.
42See Table A.29 in the Appendix.
39
Disease and Demographic Development
of Augsburg) or excluding outbreaks related to the Black Death of 1347 or the 30-year
war and focusing on outbreaks during the period 1360-1618. Interestingly, when restrict-
ing attention to outbreaks during the 30-year war, the instrumentation becomes weak
and the second stage delivers positive instead of negative coefficient estimates. This is
reassuring and constitutes a falsification test of the empirical approach, since during the
war, outbreaks did not spread through the usual routes but were governed by war-related
movements of troops and population. Additional unreported robustness checks that ac-
count for institutional differences during the 19th century by controlling for membership
to centralized states such as Prussia or France also confirm the main results.
Taken together, the robustness of the result to the inclusion of controls for trade,
particularly during the 19th century, suggests that trade per se is unlikely to be the
sole determinant of the timing of the fertility transition. Instead, plague outbreaks in the
centuries before appear to be systematically related to the onset of the fertility transition.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presented an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that cities or regions
that that were more (and more often) exposed to major population shocks related to the
medieval plague experienced an earlier fertility transition. This hypothesis follows from
recent work on the long-run implications of plague outbreaks and complements existing
evidence that has not considered the timing of the fertility transition. The findings pro-
vide novel evidence in line with the implications of earlier contributions predicting that
the population shock associated with the plague led to shifts in the Malthusian equilib-
rium and ultimately accelerated the mechanisms behind the demographic transition as
predicted by the canonical unified growth framework.
Given the importance of the demographic transition for long-run development, the
evidence shown here provides new insights into the reasons for regional development
differences that might be related to historical coincidences and points to various directions
for future research regarding the underlying mechanisms. The literature has described
several candidate mechanisms working through fertility which are related to age of first
marriage or knowledge and attitudes regarding birth control. However, direct evidence on
40
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these mechanisms is scarce and empirical findings indicate no clear correlation between
age of first marriage and total fertility. Others have pointed to changes in the population
composition as result of plague shocks, which are related to gender ratio, age composition,
and household size. Finally, repeated plague outbreaks might have led to the adoption of
institutions, e.g., regarding inheritance rules, that might have ultimately led to a reduced
demand for children and an earlier demographic transition. More evidence is needed to
shed light on the empirical relevance and relative importance of these mechanisms.
41
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Appendix A
Figure A.1: Plague Reintroductions in Europe
Notes: Red triangles denote plague entry ports in terms of maritime harbors exhibiting plague outbreaks that are not
related to nearby land-based or maritime outbreaks, bold face names denote entry ports for plague reintroductions,
reproduced from Figure 1 in Schmid et al. (2015). The years next to the cities indicate plague outbreaks that have
not been preceded by a plague outbreak on land within a 500 km radius and on harbors within a 1000 km radius for
two years prior to the outbreak. Black dots indicate cities contained in the data set for Germany. Black diamonds
indicate cities contained in the data set for France.
Figure A.2: Travel Distances from Entry Ports: France
Notes: Map of roads (brown) and waterways (blue) used to compute travel distances from entry ports (red triangles).
Cities are depicted as black dots, Red line represents French border.
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Figure A.3: The Timing of the Fertility Transition in France
Notes: Departements colored by the year of the fertility transition (threshold 0.5) according to Coale and Coats-
Watkins (1986).
Table A.1: Hutterite Fertility: Number of births per married woman conditional
on age
Age group (i) Number of Births (Fi)
20-14 0.55
25-29 0.502
30-34 0.447
35-39 0.406
40-44 0.222
45-49 0.061
Notes:Standard schedule according to Henry (1961). The numbers are a benchmark for the natural fertility without
active birth control.
Table A.2: Assumptions about Travel Speed
Type of line segment Slope Speed normal Speed slow
River 15 km/h 10 km/h
Road 0 7 km/h 5 km/h
Road (0;15] 5 km/h 3 km/h
Road (15;30] 3 km/h 2 km/h
Road (30;45] 1 km/h 1 km/h
Road >45 0 km/h 0 km/h
Notes: Assumed travel speeds per hour by type (river, road) and slope of the line segment (in degrees). The main
analysis uses assumptions about normal speed.
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Table A.3: Plague Outbreaks and The Timing of the Demographic Transition
None Geographic Population Religion Insitutions Calories Wars
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.411∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.118) (0.108) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
Outbreak following 1348 4.520 4.779∗∗ 3.244 1.736 1.965 2.133 1.982
(2.920) (2.221) (2.095) (1.868) (2.025) (1.937) (1.882)
Latitude -1.845∗∗∗ -1.772∗∗∗ -1.531∗∗∗ -1.592∗∗∗ -1.725∗∗∗ -1.880∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.542) (0.539) (0.567) (0.535) (0.542)
Longitude -0.873∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -1.024∗∗ -1.013∗∗ -0.867∗∗ -0.826∗∗
(0.370) (0.381) (0.397) (0.415) (0.402) (0.400)
Navigable River 1.058 0.850 0.747 0.942 1.692 1.724
(1.241) (1.192) (1.122) (1.145) (1.153) (1.134)
City with Maritime Port -1.045 -0.952 -0.514 -0.678 -0.559 -0.015
(3.050) (2.957) (2.777) (2.797) (2.655) (2.368)
Population Density (log) -3.223∗∗∗ -2.989∗∗∗ -3.028∗∗∗ -3.550∗∗∗ -3.641∗∗∗
(0.848) (0.844) (0.866) (0.834) (0.843)
Population in 1400(log) 0.798∗ 0.705 0.824 1.084∗ 1.158∗∗
(0.451) (0.474) (0.568) (0.549) (0.568)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) -0.028 -0.030 -0.018 0.120 0.266
(0.698) (0.685) (0.683) (0.664) (0.677)
Protestant -3.757∗∗ -4.070∗∗ -3.583∗∗ -4.060∗∗
(1.581) (1.576) (1.527) (1.596)
Monasteries (p.c.) -0.410 -0.467 -0.390 -0.289
(0.290) (0.302) (0.299) (0.301)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) 0.440 0.538 1.208 1.210
(1.365) (1.416) (1.483) (1.495)
University -2.254 -2.518 -2.257
(1.906) (1.836) (1.823)
Hanseatic City 0.508 -0.447 -0.257
(1.677) (1.590) (1.473)
Reichsstadt 0.042 -0.454 -0.050
(1.046) (1.070) (1.047)
Printing Press -1.237 -0.677 -0.883
(1.884) (1.906) (1.854)
Caleoric Yield -0.004∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
30y War -1.887∗∗
(0.910)
7y War 0.610
(1.091)
Constant 1912.779∗∗∗ 2015.566∗∗∗ 2029.328∗∗∗ 2018.920∗∗∗ 2022.424∗∗∗ 2061.367∗∗∗ 2069.161∗∗∗
(1.082) (27.976) (25.266) (25.415) (26.833) (30.241) (29.999)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.043 0.329 0.410 0.439 0.447 0.480 0.491
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.312 0.387 0.409 0.407 0.439 0.446
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.61 1.66 2.42 2.43 2.69 2.71 2.73
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition
None Geographic Population Religion Insitutions Calories Wars
Travel Time 0.206∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.073) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062)
Outbreak following 1348 2.179 2.611 2.313 1.233 1.442 1.766 1.503
(1.683) (1.819) (2.043) (1.739) (1.904) (1.800) (1.739)
Latitude 0.382 0.689 0.775 0.891 0.838 0.697
(1.053) (0.905) (0.947) (0.934) (0.828) (0.833)
Longitude -0.943∗∗∗ -1.199∗∗∗ -1.182∗∗∗ -1.151∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.319) (0.324) (0.333) (0.308) (0.307)
Navigable River 0.398 0.131 0.186 0.418 1.231 1.258
(1.169) (1.104) (1.016) (1.042) (1.009) (1.004)
City with Maritime Port -1.657 -0.436 -0.185 -0.337 -0.186 0.239
(2.916) (2.648) (2.527) (2.605) (2.505) (2.335)
Population Density (log) -3.816∗∗∗ -3.574∗∗∗ -3.560∗∗∗ -4.142∗∗∗ -4.225∗∗∗
(0.790) (0.765) (0.752) (0.765) (0.782)
Population in 1400(log) -0.137 -0.224 -0.188 0.136 0.133
(0.462) (0.467) (0.532) (0.513) (0.512)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) -0.307 -0.347 -0.354 -0.182 -0.098
(0.727) (0.704) (0.689) (0.650) (0.667)
Protestant -3.062∗ -3.606∗∗ -3.027∗∗ -3.421∗∗
(1.624) (1.547) (1.502) (1.571)
Monasteries (p.c.) -0.496∗ -0.558∗∗ -0.473∗ -0.396
(0.251) (0.268) (0.269) (0.273)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) -0.169 -0.125 0.581 0.595
(1.267) (1.328) (1.336) (1.352)
University -3.477∗ -3.783∗∗ -3.603∗∗
(1.789) (1.738) (1.735)
Hanseatic City 0.771 -0.231 -0.134
(1.380) (1.305) (1.268)
Reichsstadt 0.922 0.398 0.711
(1.150) (1.126) (1.120)
Printing Press -0.944 -0.290 -0.470
(1.594) (1.539) (1.485)
Caleoric Yield -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
30y War -1.466∗
(0.803)
7y War 0.506
(1.026)
Constant 1902.589∗∗∗ 1892.510∗∗∗ 1896.639∗∗∗ 1894.621∗∗∗ 1888.193∗∗∗ 1926.201∗∗∗ 1933.486∗∗∗
(2.406) (55.310) (47.742) (50.353) (49.676) (46.389) (46.526)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.249 0.357 0.471 0.495 0.510 0.550 0.557
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.340 0.450 0.468 0.474 0.515 0.518
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.02 4.32 4.41 4.42 4.90 4.91 5.10
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition: Accounting for Roman Roads
None Geographic Population Religion Insitutions Calories wars
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.260∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.102) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.082) (0.082)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.069) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061)
Outbreak following 1348 1.470 2.233 2.137 1.257 1.327 1.660 1.369
(1.430) (1.538) (1.819) (1.605) (1.730) (1.665) (1.599)
Latitude 2.062∗ 1.711∗ 1.662∗ 1.698∗ 1.436∗ 1.298
(1.053) (0.937) (0.942) (0.948) (0.838) (0.857)
Longitude -1.061∗∗∗ -1.240∗∗∗ -1.228∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.311) (0.313) (0.325) (0.300) (0.299)
Navigable River 0.204 0.044 0.094 0.311 1.099 1.109
(1.113) (1.074) (1.016) (1.044) (0.995) (0.993)
City with Maritime Port -3.198 -1.548 -1.205 -1.201 -0.832 -0.366
(2.771) (2.644) (2.557) (2.567) (2.495) (2.355)
Population Density (log) -3.329∗∗∗ -3.179∗∗∗ -3.210∗∗∗ -3.846∗∗∗ -3.921∗∗∗
(0.739) (0.703) (0.697) (0.694) (0.705)
Population in 1400(log) -0.142 -0.225 -0.148 0.144 0.142
(0.425) (0.433) (0.530) (0.507) (0.505)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) -0.275 -0.322 -0.314 -0.164 -0.085
(0.666) (0.654) (0.641) (0.617) (0.636)
Protestant -2.590 -3.104∗∗ -2.695∗ -3.095∗∗
(1.572) (1.492) (1.449) (1.526)
Monasteries (p.c.) -0.421 -0.489∗ -0.428 -0.348
(0.254) (0.268) (0.276) (0.279)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) -0.733 -0.653 0.145 0.126
(1.436) (1.503) (1.455) (1.459)
University -3.691∗∗ -3.921∗∗ -3.746∗∗
(1.763) (1.733) (1.745)
Hanseatic City 0.815 -0.132 -0.051
(1.313) (1.233) (1.204)
Reichsstadt 0.499 0.122 0.436
(1.188) (1.156) (1.148)
Printing Press -0.622 -0.096 -0.274
(1.611) (1.572) (1.531)
Caleoric Yield -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
30y War -1.495∗
(0.798)
7y War 0.671
(1.005)
Constant 1903.753∗∗∗ 1804.867∗∗∗ 1840.732∗∗∗ 1845.734∗∗∗ 1843.908∗∗∗ 1891.046∗∗∗ 1897.951∗∗∗
(2.401) (55.261) (49.033) (49.499) (49.728) (45.436) (46.288)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.273 0.411 0.490 0.509 0.523 0.557 0.564
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.393 0.468 0.480 0.486 0.521 0.524
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.20 6.50 6.61 6.72 7.02 7.11 7.23
joint F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: First
Stage Results
0-1900 0-1555 0-1618 1360-1618
Travel Time -0.052∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.036∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Outbreak following 1348 5.025∗∗∗ 3.221∗∗∗ 4.432∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗
(1.787) (0.961) (1.431) (1.387)
Latitude -0.507∗∗ -0.232∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.318∗∗
(0.215) (0.115) (0.163) (0.159)
Longitude 0.035 0.026 0.034 0.030
(0.070) (0.037) (0.055) (0.055)
Navigable River 0.126 0.012 0.077 0.034
(0.456) (0.245) (0.352) (0.346)
City with Maritime Port 0.097 0.687 0.127 0.233
(2.876) (1.758) (2.306) (2.263)
Population Density (log) 0.619∗ 0.466∗ 0.533∗ 0.525∗
(0.369) (0.259) (0.317) (0.308)
Population in 1400(log) 2.509∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.250) (0.383) (0.378)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) 1.172∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.142) (0.222) (0.215)
Protestant 0.321 0.015 0.280 0.345
(0.572) (0.299) (0.434) (0.432)
Monasteries (p.c.) 0.165 0.072 0.103 0.104
(0.120) (0.063) (0.087) (0.087)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) -0.188 -0.164 -0.134 -0.176
(0.578) (0.292) (0.432) (0.445)
University 1.433 0.661 0.933 1.032
(1.647) (0.891) (1.191) (1.159)
Hanseatic City 1.719 1.022 1.523 1.461
(1.860) (1.081) (1.523) (1.469)
Reichsstadt -0.152 0.373 0.030 -0.073
(0.609) (0.375) (0.499) (0.476)
Printing Press 0.435 -0.190 0.151 0.045
(1.746) (0.938) (1.346) (1.280)
Caleoric Yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
30y War -0.866∗ -0.493∗ -0.610 -0.598
(0.482) (0.266) (0.374) (0.370)
7y War -0.507 -0.392 -0.403 -0.361
(0.544) (0.302) (0.447) (0.442)
Constant 21.453∗ 8.580 13.529 12.901
(12.275) (6.602) (9.511) (9.259)
Observations 237 237 237 237
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: IV
Results
OLS 0-1900 0-1555 0-1618 1360-1618
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.343∗∗∗ -4.869∗∗∗
(0.102) (1.846)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -7.981∗∗∗
(2.963)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.785∗∗
(2.644)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -7.036∗∗
(2.788)
Outbreak following 1348 1.982 25.970∗∗ 27.210∗∗ 31.572∗∗ 24.943∗
(1.882) (12.654) (12.067) (14.966) (12.933)
Latitude -1.880∗∗∗ -1.772∗∗∗ -1.157∗ -1.553∗∗ -1.543∗∗
(0.542) (0.670) (0.679) (0.686) (0.697)
Longitude -0.826∗∗ -0.791∗ -0.751∗ -0.728 -0.748
(0.400) (0.438) (0.418) (0.456) (0.458)
Navigable River 1.724 1.870 1.354 1.778 1.499
(1.134) (2.149) (1.912) (2.287) (2.281)
City with Maritime Port -0.015 0.711 5.724 1.100 1.875
(2.368) (13.258) (13.233) (14.728) (15.010)
Population Density (log) -3.641∗∗∗ -1.209 -0.508 -0.607 -0.529
(0.843) (1.810) (2.079) (2.134) (2.166)
Population in 1400(log) 1.158∗∗ 12.349∗∗ 10.612∗∗∗ 13.641∗∗ 13.829∗∗
(0.568) (4.842) (4.033) (5.467) (5.693)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) 0.266 5.607∗∗∗ 4.064∗∗∗ 5.556∗∗∗ 5.624∗∗
(0.677) (2.046) (1.437) (2.121) (2.211)
Protestant -4.060∗∗ -1.859 -3.302 -1.521 -0.995
(1.596) (2.898) (2.493) (3.095) (3.226)
Monasteries (p.c.) -0.289 0.405 0.178 0.300 0.337
(0.301) (0.661) (0.540) (0.620) (0.634)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) 1.210 -0.319 -0.711 -0.316 -0.643
(1.495) (2.700) (2.341) (2.777) (2.975)
University -2.257 3.373 1.670 2.731 3.655
(1.823) (8.287) (7.472) (8.344) (8.510)
Hanseatic City -0.257 8.233 8.022 10.199 10.145
(1.473) (9.290) (9.029) (10.803) (10.805)
Reichsstadt -0.050 -0.029 3.687 0.915 0.201
(1.047) (2.756) (3.138) (3.093) (3.024)
Printing Press -0.883 1.647 -1.987 0.553 -0.156
(1.854) (8.160) (7.226) (8.675) (8.520)
Caleoric Yield -0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
30y War -1.887∗∗ -5.681∗ -5.403∗∗ -5.607∗ -5.675∗
(0.910) (2.935) (2.642) (3.114) (3.237)
7y War 0.610 -1.963 -2.623 -2.226 -2.035
(1.091) (2.443) (2.558) (2.847) (2.850)
Constant 2069.161∗∗∗ 2037.936∗∗∗ 2001.964∗∗∗ 2025.287∗∗∗ 2024.250∗∗∗
(29.999) (38.609) (41.369) (41.625) (42.025)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.491 -2.739 -2.170 -3.387 -3.557
Adjusted R2 0.446 -3.066 -2.447 -3.771 -3.956
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56
F-Stat in FS 7.57 8.91 6.68 6.29
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: First
Stage Results
0-1900 0-1555 0-1618 1360-1618
Travel Time (Roman Roads) -0.055∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.030) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) -0.053∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Outbreak following 1348 5.030∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 4.446∗∗∗ 3.347∗∗
(1.796) (0.965) (1.438) (1.392)
Latitude -0.528∗∗ -0.253∗ -0.396∗∗ -0.388∗∗
(0.262) (0.141) (0.200) (0.195)
Longitude 0.037 0.028 0.040 0.037
(0.074) (0.039) (0.058) (0.058)
Navigable River 0.131 0.017 0.093 0.052
(0.466) (0.249) (0.356) (0.348)
City with Maritime Port 0.118 0.708 0.192 0.303
(2.889) (1.763) (2.316) (2.276)
Population Density (log) 0.609 0.455∗ 0.501 0.490
(0.382) (0.271) (0.322) (0.311)
Population in 1400(log) 2.509∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.990∗∗∗ 1.946∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.251) (0.385) (0.380)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) 1.171∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.142) (0.221) (0.214)
Protestant 0.309 0.004 0.245 0.307
(0.579) (0.301) (0.431) (0.431)
Monasteries (p.c.) 0.163 0.070 0.097 0.099
(0.121) (0.064) (0.087) (0.087)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) -0.171 -0.147 -0.084 -0.121
(0.606) (0.307) (0.461) (0.469)
University 1.438 0.666 0.949 1.048
(1.659) (0.898) (1.211) (1.178)
Hanseatic City 1.716 1.019 1.514 1.451
(1.865) (1.083) (1.526) (1.473)
Reichsstadt -0.142 0.382 0.060 -0.040
(0.630) (0.387) (0.516) (0.489)
Printing Press 0.428 -0.197 0.130 0.022
(1.769) (0.951) (1.372) (1.304)
Caleoric Yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
30y War -0.865∗ -0.492∗ -0.607 -0.595
(0.485) (0.267) (0.376) (0.372)
7y War -0.513 -0.398 -0.420 -0.380
(0.546) (0.305) (0.445) (0.440)
Constant 22.705 9.809 17.338 17.041
(16.095) (8.890) (12.622) (12.252)
Observations 237 237 237 237
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: IV
Results
OLS 0-1900 0-1555 0-1618 1360-1618
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.343∗∗∗ -4.926∗∗∗
(0.102) (1.838)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -8.113∗∗∗
(2.924)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.893∗∗∗
(2.486)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -7.118∗∗∗
(2.587)
Outbreak following 1348 1.982 26.276∗∗ 27.658∗∗ 32.071∗∗ 25.233∗∗
(1.882) (12.594) (11.915) (14.081) (12.146)
Latitude -1.880∗∗∗ -1.771∗∗∗ -1.145∗ -1.548∗∗ -1.539∗∗
(0.542) (0.674) (0.682) (0.693) (0.702)
Longitude -0.826∗∗ -0.791∗ -0.750∗ -0.726 -0.747
(0.400) (0.440) (0.420) (0.456) (0.459)
Navigable River 1.724 1.872 1.348 1.779 1.497
(1.134) (2.171) (1.941) (2.318) (2.311)
City with Maritime Port -0.015 0.720 5.820 1.119 1.898
(2.368) (13.424) (13.479) (14.983) (15.207)
Population Density (log) -3.641∗∗∗ -1.178 -0.453 -0.556 -0.491
(0.843) (1.814) (2.088) (2.109) (2.125)
Population in 1400(log) 1.158∗∗ 12.492∗∗∗ 10.783∗∗∗ 13.852∗∗∗ 13.987∗∗∗
(0.568) (4.848) (4.018) (5.264) (5.411)
Population Growth 1400-1600(log) 0.266 5.675∗∗∗ 4.134∗∗∗ 5.646∗∗∗ 5.692∗∗∗
(0.677) (2.064) (1.457) (2.096) (2.156)
Protestant -4.060∗∗ -1.831 -3.287 -1.478 -0.957
(1.596) (2.931) (2.529) (3.152) (3.272)
Monasteries (p.c.) -0.289 0.414 0.187 0.310 0.345
(0.301) (0.667) (0.547) (0.629) (0.641)
Augustian Monasteries (p.c.) 1.210 -0.339 -0.745 -0.342 -0.666
(1.495) (2.729) (2.369) (2.830) (3.016)
University -2.257 3.445 1.742 2.817 3.729
(1.823) (8.367) (7.571) (8.378) (8.495)
Hanseatic City -0.257 8.341 8.170 10.375 10.274
(1.473) (9.386) (9.139) (10.858) (10.814)
Reichsstadt -0.050 -0.029 3.749 0.931 0.204
(1.047) (2.787) (3.156) (3.131) (3.058)
Printing Press -0.883 1.679 -2.002 0.579 -0.146
(1.854) (8.276) (7.334) (8.863) (8.648)
Caleoric Yield -0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
30y War -1.887∗∗ -5.730∗ -5.466∗∗ -5.671∗ -5.723∗
(0.910) (2.949) (2.650) (3.066) (3.161)
7y War 0.610 -1.996 -2.680 -2.274 -2.068
(1.091) (2.474) (2.591) (2.898) (2.892)
Constant 2069.161∗∗∗ 2037.538∗∗∗ 2000.810∗∗∗ 2024.553∗∗∗ 2023.698∗∗∗
(29.999) (38.897) (41.552) (42.194) (42.516)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.491 -2.822 -2.266 -3.521 -3.659
Adjusted R2 0.446 -3.156 -2.552 -3.916 -4.067
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56
F-Stat in FS 3.93 4.87 3.84 3.68
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
Hansen J (p-value) 0.57 0.60 0.87 0.91
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition - Region Level (based on Knodel, 1974)
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: OLS Results
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.609∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.341∗ -0.204 -0.207 -0.232 -0.363
(0.158) (0.143) (0.192) (0.186) (0.224) (0.226) (0.246)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
R2 0.149 0.323 0.466 0.532 0.594 0.642 0.674
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.255 0.375 0.415 0.442 0.496 0.515
Highest VIF 1.31 1.37 3.63 3.75 4.82 5.00 5.23
Panel B: Reduced Form
Travel Time 0.223∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.104) (0.089) (0.089)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
R2 0.285 0.315 0.531 0.604 0.680 0.721 0.739
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.246 0.451 0.505 0.560 0.606 0.612
Highest VIF 1.08 6.34 6.41 6.66 9.07 9.09 9.52
Controls (Panel A & B)
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Panel C: IV Results (Full Set of Controls)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -2.309∗∗
(1.093)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -3.840∗∗
(1.580)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -2.950∗∗
(1.373)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -3.163∗∗
(1.554)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.146∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.107∗
(0.071) (0.036) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 56 56 56 56
F-Stat in FS 4.23 6.06 4.41 3.78
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Plague Exposure and Timing of the Demographic Transition: Robust-
ness
Coding of Onset at Alternative Threshold 0.6
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year), Alternative Threshold
Panel A: OLS Results
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.572∗∗ -0.523∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.209) (0.237) (0.220) (0.229) (0.228) (0.232)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.042 0.339 0.349 0.372 0.377 0.405 0.408
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.322 0.323 0.338 0.332 0.359 0.357
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.61 1.66 2.42 2.43 2.69 2.71 2.73
Panel B: Reduced Form
Travel Time 0.332∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.115) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.109) (0.112)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.292 0.381 0.394 0.414 0.427 0.463 0.464
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.365 0.370 0.383 0.386 0.421 0.417
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.02 4.32 4.41 4.42 4.90 4.91 5.10
Controls (Panel A & B)
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Panel C: IV Results (Full Set of Controls)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -4.869∗∗∗
(1.846)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -7.981∗∗∗
(2.963)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.785∗∗
(2.644)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -7.036∗∗
(2.788)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.052∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.036∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 237 237 237 237
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56
F-Stat in FS 7.57 8.91 6.68 6.29
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Plague Exposure and Timing of the Demographic Transition: Robust-
ness
Onset following Galloway (1994)
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Baseline Specification
Travel Time 0.161∗∗∗ 0.198 0.117 0.157 0.155 0.149 0.140
(0.053) (0.121) (0.105) (0.111) (0.113) (0.117) (0.122)
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
R2 0.107 0.124 0.250 0.287 0.305 0.308 0.309
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.082 0.194 0.215 0.207 0.203 0.191
Number of Cluster 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Highest VIF 1.01 3.80 3.86 4.21 4.28 4.57 4.83
Panel B: Accounting for Roman Roads
Travel Time (Roman Roads) -2.229∗∗∗ -2.133∗∗∗ -2.385∗∗∗ -2.325∗∗ -2.370∗∗ -2.464∗∗ -2.399∗∗
(0.304) (0.728) (0.695) (1.037) (1.030) (0.966) (1.137)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.210 0.130 0.164 0.163 0.156 0.150
(0.054) (0.130) (0.108) (0.115) (0.117) (0.120) (0.127)
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
R2 0.119 0.135 0.262 0.299 0.317 0.320 0.321
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.086 0.200 0.221 0.214 0.211 0.197
Number of Cluster 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Highest VIF 1.01 3.86 3.91 4.27 4.33 4.61 4.90
Controls (both Panels)
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Plague Exposure and Timing of the Demographic Transition:
Robustness to Assumed Travel Speeds and Modes
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Baseline Slow Travel Speed Avoiding Roads Roads Only
Panel A: Reduced Form
Travel Time 0.206∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.062)
Travel Time (slow) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.044)
Travel Time (avoiding roads) 0.162∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.043)
Travel Time (roads only) 0.149∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.065)
Full Set of Controls X X X X
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 227 227
R2 0.249 0.557 0.236 0.551 0.252 0.527 0.160 0.521
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.518 0.229 0.512 0.246 0.486 0.152 0.477
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.02 5.10 1.02 5.35 1.02 4.09 1.03 6.73
Panel B: IV Results
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -4.869∗∗∗ -4.913∗∗ -6.925 -3.457∗∗
(1.846) (1.952) (4.423) (1.591)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -7.981∗∗∗ -8.099∗∗ -9.234∗∗ -5.784∗∗
(2.963) (3.167) (4.570) (2.752)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.052∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011)
Travel Time (slow) -0.036∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008)
Travel Time (avoiding roads) -0.020 -0.015∗∗
(0.014) (0.007)
Travel Time (roads only) -0.054∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.023) (0.014)
Full Set of Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 227 227
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
F-Stat in FS 7.57 8.91 6.54 7.44 2.13 4.36 5.68 5.21
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.02
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition: Extended Specifications
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Baseline Specification
Travel Time 0.238∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.073) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060)
Number of Plague Ports (100h) -2.253∗∗ -1.655 -2.770∗∗ -3.313∗∗∗ -3.215∗∗∗ -3.194∗∗∗ -3.172∗∗∗
(1.004) (1.186) (1.094) (1.097) (1.077) (1.049) (1.034)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.292 0.360 0.499 0.540 0.551 0.590 0.597
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.343 0.479 0.515 0.518 0.558 0.561
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.16 7.00 7.08 7.28 7.77 7.78 7.89
joint F 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Accounting for Roman Roads
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.413∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.104) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.083) (0.082)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.188∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.065) (0.057) (0.060) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058)
Number of Plague Ports (100h) -4.322∗∗∗ -2.852∗∗ -3.476∗∗∗ -3.850∗∗∗ -3.716∗∗∗ -3.607∗∗∗ -3.580∗∗∗
(1.052) (1.101) (1.090) (1.101) (1.083) (1.038) (1.026)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.403 0.439 0.537 0.568 0.576 0.606 0.613
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.422 0.516 0.543 0.543 0.574 0.578
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 1.82 8.14 8.36 8.69 9.08 9.14 9.22
joint F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Controls (both Panels)
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Agriculture X X
Wars X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.15: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: IV
Results – Extended Specifications
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Baseline Specification
OLS IV
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.290∗∗∗ -3.918∗∗
(0.101) (1.576)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -6.621∗∗
(2.691)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -5.855∗∗
(2.570)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -6.034∗∗
(2.665)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.049∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
F-Stat in FS 6.45 7.96 4.90 4.64
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04
Panel B: Accounting for Roman Roads
OLS IV
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.290∗∗∗ -4.113∗∗
(0.101) (1.598)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -7.080∗∗∗
(2.698)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1618) -6.338∗∗∗
(2.452)
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -6.507∗∗∗
(2.513)
First Stage
Travel Time (Roman Roads) -0.054∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.045∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.029) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) -0.050∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
F-Stat in FS 3.39 4.39 3.00 2.89
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.07
Hansen J (p-value) 0.31 0.36 0.68 0.70
Full Set of Controls (both Panels) X X X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative region, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.16: Plague Outbreaks and The Timing of the Demographic Transition:
Germany and France
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: France
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.038 0.056 0.080 -0.395 -0.395 -0.267 -0.242 0.013
(0.505) (0.495) (0.511) (0.612) (0.612) (0.618) (0.600) (0.541)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.004 0.023 0.030 0.046 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.161
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.013 0.012 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.124
Number of Cluster 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Highest VIF 1.61 1.64 1.92 2.54 2.54 2.67 2.70 6.20
Panel B: Germany and France
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -0.162 -0.094 -0.121 -0.449 -0.424 -0.382 -0.376 -0.298
(0.357) (0.354) (0.359) (0.441) (0.441) (0.436) (0.435) (0.420)
Observations 523 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.623 0.634 0.635 0.639 0.639 0.641 0.641 0.660
Adjusted R2 0.621 0.630 0.630 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.650
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Highest VIF 1.65 1.96 2.21 2.42 4.16 4.20 4.24 9.32
Controls (both Panels
Distance to Paris X X X X X X X
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Calories X X
Coordinates X
France Dummy (Panel B) X X X X X X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative region, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.17: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition: France and Germany
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: France
Travel Time 0.053 0.607∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.169) (0.222) (0.228) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225) (0.228) (0.365)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.006 0.111 0.113 0.131 0.131 0.137 0.137 0.164
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.101 0.097 0.108 0.108 0.109 0.105 0.126
Number of Cluster 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Highest VIF 1.00 3.30 3.71 3.72 3.72 3.75 4.22 14.27
Panel B: Germany and France
Travel Time 0.084 0.246∗ 0.242∗ 0.244∗ 0.240∗ 0.244∗ 0.266∗ 0.277∗∗
(0.133) (0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136) (0.122)
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.623 0.633 0.634 0.636 0.640 0.643 0.646 0.648
Adjusted R2 0.621 0.630 0.629 0.630 0.633 0.635 0.638 0.638
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Highest VIF 1.05 2.74 2.80 2.81 4.01 4.02 4.08 8.64
Controls (both Panels
Distance to Paris X X X X X X X
Geography X X X X X X
Population X X X X X
Religion X X X X
Institutions X X X
Calories X X
Coordinates X
France Dummy (Panel B) X X X X X X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative region, in parentheses∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.25: Exposure to Plague Outbreaks and the Timing of the Demographic
Transition: Extended Specifications – Placebo for Trade
Outcome Variable Year of the Demographic Transition
Panel A: Controlling for Access to Trade
Travel Time 0.253∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.074) (0.064) (0.061) (0.085) (0.067)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.557 0.560 0.557 0.561 0.562 0.573
Adjusted R2 0.518 0.520 0.516 0.521 0.519 0.531
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 5.10 7.59 11.33 9.81 14.66 33.13
Panel B: Controlling for Access to Trade (Accounting for Roman Roads)
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.338∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.121) (0.096) (0.090) (0.122) (0.096)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.272∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.081) (0.071) (0.054) (0.090) (0.067)
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237
R2 0.564 0.574 0.568 0.568 0.576 0.580
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.530 0.523 0.524 0.528 0.533
Number of Cluster 56 56 56 56 56 56
Highest VIF 7.23 12.51 17.86 10.11 16.80 32.90
Controls (both Panels
Full Set of Controls X X X X X X
Closest 19th Century Port X X
Average 19th Century Port X X
Closest Hanse X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.26: Plague Exposure and the Timing of the Demographic Transition: IV
Results – Placebo for Trade
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Controlling for Trade
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -4.869∗∗∗ -5.131∗∗ -4.657∗∗∗ -6.216∗∗
(1.846) (2.120) (1.795) (2.576)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 237 237 237 237
F-Stat in FS 7.57 5.87 7.07 5.37
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Panel B: Controlling for Trade (Accounting for Roman Roads)
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -4.926∗∗∗ -7.101∗ -3.536∗∗∗ -5.520∗∗
(1.838) (3.676) (1.232) (2.436)
First Stage
Travel Time (Roman Roads) -0.055∗ -0.047 -0.055 -0.041
(0.030) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) -0.053∗∗∗ -0.041∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 237 237 237 237
F-Stat in FS 3.93 1.66 4.08 2.06
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.15
Hansen J (p-value) 0.57 0.73 0.11 0.21
Full Set of Controls (both Panels) X X X X
Average 19th Century Port X X
Closest Hanseatic City X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.27: France: Reduced Form Accounting for Trade Access
Outcome Variable Year of the Demographic Transition
Panel A: Controlling for Access to Trade
Travel Time 0.633∗∗∗ 0.416 0.440∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.451∗ 0.460∗
(0.228) (0.260) (0.260) (0.220) (0.257) (0.256)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.137 0.160 0.159 0.159 0.175 0.176
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.126 0.124 0.125 0.138 0.139
Number of Cluster 80 80 80 80 80 80
Highest VIF 4.22 7.98 6.62 4.26 8.32 6.71
Panel B: Controlling for Access to Trade (Accounting for Roman Roads)
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.718∗∗∗ 0.461 0.525∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.490∗ 0.552∗∗
(0.224) (0.280) (0.274) (0.226) (0.285) (0.271)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.559 -0.249 -0.121 0.476 -0.296 -0.195
(0.344) (0.396) (0.410) (0.377) (0.412) (0.417)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281
R2 0.141 0.203 0.195 0.168 0.223 0.222
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.161 0.156 0.124 0.176 0.178
Number of Cluster 80 80 80 80 80 80
Highest VIF 3.38 10.92 11.06 3.45 11.18 11.07
Controls (both Panels
Full Set of Controls X X X X X X
Closest 19th Century Port X X
Average 19th Century Port X X
Closest Port X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.28: Germany and France: Reduced Form Accounting for Trade Access
Outcome Variable Year of the Demographic Transition
Panel A: Controlling for Access to Trade
Travel Time 0.266∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(0.136) (0.121) (0.123) (0.153) (0.139) (0.142)
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.646 0.648 0.653 0.652 0.652 0.655
Adjusted R2 0.638 0.639 0.644 0.643 0.642 0.646
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136 136 136
Highest VIF 4.08 6.08 8.41 4.15 6.31 8.87
Panel B: Controlling for Access to Trade (Accounting for Roman Roads)
Travel Time (Roman Roads) 0.356∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.414∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗ 0.422∗∗
(0.128) (0.146) (0.204) (0.169) (0.167) (0.203)
Travel Time (non-Roman Roads) 0.314∗ 0.221 0.220 0.345 0.185 0.142
(0.188) (0.149) (0.217) (0.230) (0.171) (0.216)
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.660 0.678 0.680 0.675 0.687 0.689
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.667 0.669 0.664 0.675 0.678
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136 136 136
Highest VIF 4.97 13.28 25.23 6.28 13.81 25.88
Controls (both Panels
Full Set of Controls X X X X X X
Closest 19th Century Port X X
Average 19th Century Port X X
Closest Hanse (DE) / Closest Port (FR) X X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.29: Germany and France: IV Results Accounting for Trade Access and
Different Phases of Plague Outbreaks
Dependent Variable Onset of the Demographic Transition (Year)
Panel A: Outbreaks 0 - 1900
Number of Outbreaks (0-1900) -10.382∗ -14.427∗∗ -11.616∗∗ -14.034∗∗
(5.567) (6.553) (5.541) (5.956)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.027∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
F-Stat in FS 7.51 7.08 7.56 7.19
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Panel B: Outbreaks 0 - 1555
Number of Outbreaks (0-1555) -9.950∗∗ -13.243∗∗∗ -11.920∗∗ -13.879∗∗∗
(4.526) (4.868) (4.850) (4.838)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.028∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
F-Stat in FS 19.92 20.25 16.96 17.45
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Outbreaks 1360 - 1618
Number of Outbreaks (1360-1618) -9.831∗∗ -12.948∗∗ -11.518∗∗ -13.360∗∗∗
(4.751) (5.149) (5.063) (5.107)
First Stage
Travel Time -0.028∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
F-Stat in FS 12.34 12.48 10.80 11.15
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D: Outbreaks 1618 - 1648
Number of Outbreaks (1618-1648) 49.012 63.541∗ 94.626 98.673
(30.727) (36.226) (73.120) (68.097)
First Stage
Travel Time 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.004 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F-Stat in FS 4.45 5.29 2.19 2.90
Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM (p-value) 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.09
All Panels (A-D)
Observations 518 518 518 518
Number of Cluster 136 136 136 136
Full Set of Controls X X X X
Average 19th Century Port X X
Closest Hanseatic City / Port X X
Standard errors, clustered by administrative regions, in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.1 Introduction
From the second half of the 20th century until today, sustained below-replacement fertility
has become a common phenomenon in many developed countries. Germany, the world’s
fifth largest economy, is a particular case in point: Until the late 1960s, Germany’s total
fertility rate was still well above replacement level, but then declined sharply in the
decade that followed. From the early-1980s until the mid-2010s, the fertility rate has
been below 1.5, at times as low as 1.3, which is far below the 2.1 children per women
necessary to maintain a stable population size.
What is behind this decrease in the total fertility rate is not so much a change along
the intensive margin of fertility as it is a change along its extensive margin. For example,
among women born between 1945 and 1965, the average number of children per mother
decreased moderately from roughly 1.8 to 1.6, whereas the rate of childlessness almost
doubled from about 12% to more than 20%. This demographic development, and the
rise of childlessness in particular, is highly relevant for economic and social outcomes.
At the macro level, rising childlessness is one important factor that increases the ratio of
older to working-age adults, implying that the latter need to contribute a larger share of
their income to support social security and health care for the elderly. At the micro level,
parenthood entails substantial social and psychological benefits, and so childlessness—
especially if involuntary—may lower people’s well-being. Despite the importance of the
issue, there is still a lack of theoretically founded research that looks into the mecha-
nisms and parameters governing childlessness and fertility in the population at large. In
particular, the interplay between economic conditions that lead to women postponing
children and childlessness that results from naturally declining fecundity by age has not
been thoroughly assessed.
In this paper, I develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of childlessness
and fertility with endogenous marriage formation. The model’s key innovation is that
it endogenizes the timing of fertility in the context of childlessness. This allows me to
address long-standing questions related to the relationship between fertility postponement
and childlessness. In particular, the magnitude of this postponement effect has not yet
been assessed. My model fills this gap by linking the timing of fertility to its intensive
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and extensive margin. Moreover, by implementing the model in the context of Germany,
and by focusing on cohorts of East and West German women and men socialized in
different political regimes (the FRG versus the GDR), I provide a new perspective on
how institutions shape childlessness and fertility.
The economy features men and women who, in the beginning of the first period,
are matched with a potential partner of the opposite sex and decide whether to enter
marriage or not.43 In the first two periods of the model, couples and singles44 make
decisions about consumption and fertility. A key feature of the model is that individuals
are faced with a natural decline of fecundity over time: in the first period, individuals
are “young” and have a relatively high natural fecundity. In the second period, they are
“old” and their ability to conceive is lower. In the third and final period of the model,
women and men are no longer able to reproduce; Individuals who decide to distribute
the birth of their children over both fertile periods will experience lower wages as a result
of long lasting absence from the job market due to child-rearing.45
In every period, individuals face a trade-off between child-rearing and income-earning.
The timing of fertility, however, involves an inter-temporal trade-off: working less to have
children early has a negative impact on earnings potential later in life, due to negative
experience effects on wages. At the same time, however, the decision against children,
to accumulate work experience, carries the risk of not being able to conceive later in life.
Marriage alleviates these trade-offs as it allows partners to share the time cost of raising
children and other household chores. In addition, it generates economies of scale from
sharing household public goods. Finally, marriage is assumed to be the only path to
fatherhood for men.
I use the model to characterize various fertility regimes that emerge from optimal be-
havior. In terms of the intensive margin of fertility, I decompose the fertility of mothers
into “early” and “late” fertility. In terms of the extensive margin of fertility, I differ-
entiate between voluntary and involuntary childlessness. Voluntary childlessness can be
in form of social sterility46 or opportunity cost. Involuntary childlessness is driven by
43Marriage formation is assumed friction-less.
44For a clearer distinction and to avoid confusion I refer to “never married” as “single”.
45These lower wages can be a result of discrimination or human capital effects beyond the effect of
part time work for a short period of time.
46Social sterility refers to a too low level of consumption if having children.
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biological sterility and postponement of childbirth in combination with decreases in bio-
logical fecundity. The distinction of those channels allows for a better understanding of
the drivers of childlessness and the economic origins of low fertility rates.
I estimate the model using simulated methods of moments, and exploit four distinct
demographic facts in Germany—some well-known and others less so—to identify the
model parameters: (i) fertility until age 30 is decreasing for married and single women in
mother’s education, (ii) fertility after age 30 is increasing for married and single women
in mother’s education, (iii) childlessness is increasing in women’s education, (iv) mar-
riage rates are decreasing in education for women and increasing in education for men.
Identification is achieved through differences in initial wages, returns to experience by
education, and the resulting fertility consumption trade-offs.
The main findings are threefold. First, I estimate that the postponement effect ac-
counts for 7.8% of total childlessness (or 33.3% of involuntary childlessness). Depending
on women’s education, the share increases from 4.4% (20.7%) for women with low lev-
els of education to 15.6% (68.2%) for women with the highest level of education. For
married women, childlessness is mostly a choice driven by high opportunity cost. When
it comes to single childless women, the wish to have children is often restrained by eco-
nomic conditions. For involuntary childlessness, the importance of biological sterility
is decreasing in importance with growing levels of education. Postponement effects in
combination with decreasing fecundity by age become more important with education. I
quantify the individual’s loss in utility for realization of involuntary childlessness. Invol-
untary childlessness has two counteracting effects on lifetime utility: disutility due to the
lower number of children and a higher utility due to higher consumption as more labor
income is available. I find that being unable to conceive already early in life results in
a negative effect on lifetime utility (measured in equivalent net present value consump-
tion) four times the size of the effect when realized only later in life. However, the labor
income effect is larger for involuntary childlessness that occurs early in life, thus making
involuntary childlessness more costly in relative terms.
Second, I compare former East and West German states. This comparison is inter-
esting for two reasons: (i) Compared to West Germany, public provision of childcare was
(and partly still is) fundamentally different (ii) non-employment and taking time off work
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was less acceptable for women (and even more so for men) in East Germany. I find lower
time cost of having children and a larger negative wage effect of spacing children across
time in East Germany. Unlike many reduced form empirical studies that look at imme-
diate effects on “at-risk” sub-groups of the population, the results of this study apply
to the general population. Furthermore, I find that social sterility and postponement of
children explain a larger share of childlessness in West Germany.
Third, I perform counterfactual analyses of fertility and childlessness for increases in
public provision of childcare and changes in labor market conditions. In particular, I
simulate the effect of the full application of the East German public childcare system
to West Germany and the application of the East German wage penalty for long term
private child-rearing to West Germany. These counterfactuals indicate that reductions in
the costs of children mainly affect the timing of childbirth rather than the final number
of children. Childlessness can be reduced significantly by an expansion of available public
childcare for both married and unmarried women. Furthermore, I show that an expansion
of publicly available childcare that would contribute to the development of children’s
human capital can function as a counteracting measure to increases in wage penalties of
extended child-rearing times.
This paper contributes to two distinct strands of literature: The literature on child-
lessness and the literature on optimal allocation of children across time. The first paper
separating the extensive from the intensive margin of fertility is by Baudin et al. (2015),
who investigate this issue in a static one period model using US data. Myong et al.
(2018) build on this model to address the impact of social norms, such as Confucianism,
on fertility along both dimensions for a large set of East Asian countries. In a follow-up
paper, Baudin et al. (2020) investigate cross-country variation in fertility and childless-
ness. I build on the model of Baudin et al. (2015) and expand the model to a three period
setting.
Earlier work on labor market participation and skill acquisition includes Rios-Rull
(1993) who builds an overlapping generation model in which individuals choose between
market and home production. In this way, the model endogenously creates heterogeneous
agents through individual choices. Caucutt et al. (2002) find that when women face a
high wage penalty for childbirth, they tend to postpone having children and build up
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human capital first. Greenwood et al. (2003) and Regalia et al. (2011) propose household
models which include fertility and parental investment in a marriage market equilibrium
framework. Adda et al. (2017) estimate the short and long-term career cost of children
in a model of labor supply and fertility with occupational choice.
My paper combines the two strands of literature by adding fertility timing and the
resulting wage dynamics to the model of Baudin et al. (2015). Compared to the base-
line one period model, the dynamic setting allows me to investigate the interaction of
econmic reasons that lead individuals to postpone children and and natural decreases in
fecundity by age that jointly result in involuntary childlessness. The structural results on
fertility postponement are furthermore in line with much of the reduced form literature
on the relationship between fertility choices and labor market outcomes. See for example
Bertrand et al. (2010), Wood et al. (1993), Budig and England (2001) or Lundborg et al.
(2017) for labor market consequences of childbirth, or Miller (2011) and Herr (2016) for
the effects of postponement of children on labor market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: Section 3.2 motivates
the research by illustrating the importance of both margins of fertility and discussing
some distinct empirical facts from the German Microcensus. Section 3.3 introduces the
theoretical model. Section 3.4 describes the data, estimation strategy and results. Coun-
terfactual policy simulations are provided in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Motivation
3.2.1 Historic Development in Germany
Germany’s remarkable demographic development during the last years results from sig-
nificant changes in both the extensive (decision to become a mother) and the intensive
(number of children conditional on being a mother) margin of fertility. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.1, which plots the historic development of both margins of fertility by focusing
on cohorts of German women born between 1933 and 1966.47 Overall, Germany experi-
47Birth cohorts marked in red are used for model identification. Figure B.1 in the Appendix plots
the extensive and intensive margin of fertility by birth cohort for different broad levels of education
categories. The pattern observed in Figure 3.1 remains relatively unchanged when splitting up birth
cohorts by educational background of the women.
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enced an increase in the rate of childless women and a decrease in the average number of
children per mother. This development can broadly be separated in two distinct phases.
In the early phase (birth cohorts from 1933 to 1945, regular dashed line), childless-
ness rates remained relatively constant while the average number of children per mother
decreased from about 2.2 to 1.8. This phenomenon is in line with the theory of the
demographic transition48, which phased out at approximately that time in Germany.49
In the second phase (birth cohorts after 1945, bold dashed line), I observe a much more
moderate decrease in the average number of children per mother but a strong increase in
the childlessness rate from about 12.4% to 20.3%.
While the first phase is in line with the literature on fertility decrease, increases in
(female) education and economic growth, as suggested by standard fertility theories (see,
e.g., Becker and Barro, 1988; Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 2000; Lee, 2003; Doepke,
2004), this is not the case for the rapid increase in childlessness during the second phase,
which still remains a puzzle.
3.2.2 Cross-sectional Evidence for Germany
Figure 3.2 provides a cross-sectional analysis of birth cohorts in the 2008 and 2012 waves
of the German Microcensus. The 2008 and 2012 waves of the German Microcensus are
the only waves that include a question on completed fertility. I restrict the sample to
individuals where I can infer the timing of childbirth. Years of education are assigned to
secondary, tertiary and/or vocational qualification.50 The birth cohorts (1960-1966) are
marked red in Figure 3.1. Several stylized facts about fertility and marriage patterns in
Germany emerge.
Empirical Fact 1 - Fertility until Age 30: Panel (I) of Figure 3.2 plots the number
of children born to women until age 30 who have at least one child during their lifetime
against years of education. This represents the intensive margin of fertility, namely the
decision on the number of children conditional on having at least one child, for model
48The deliberate reduction in fertility and the increase in human capital investment into children
(Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011)
49Knodel (1974) dates the onset of the demographic transition for various regions (and different
definitions of the onset) in Germany from 1871 to 1939.
50For information regarding data and methods used, see chapter 3.4.1.
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Figure 3.1: Fertility along the Intensive and Extensive Margin
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45. Average Completed Fertility (x-axis) is the total fertility of all women above age 45. Birth cohorts used for
estimation in the empirical part of this paper are marked red. Data: German Microcensus, survey years 2008 &
2012, own calculations.
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Figure 3.2: Facts from the 2008 & 2012 German Microcensus
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period51 1. The relationship between education and the number of children born before
age 30 is downward sloping for both married (blue) and single women (red). Across
all education groups, married women have on average a higher number of children than
unmarried women.
Empirical Fact 2 - Fertility after Age 30: Panel (II) of Figure 3.2 plots the number
of children born to women after age 30 who have at least one child during their lifetime
against years of education. This is the intensive margin of fertility for model period52
2. The relationship between education and the number of children born after age 30 is
upward sloping for both married (blue) and single women (red). Similar to the intensive
margin for model period 1, married women have on average a higher number of children
than unmarried women for model period 2.
Empirical fact 1 and empirical fact 2 jointly indicate the postponement of having
children for higher educated women. While women with a relatively low level of education
have their children relatively early in life, highly educated women choose to have children
later. This can be observed for both married and single women.
Empirical Fact 3 - Increasing Childlessness: Panel (III) plots the share of women
who never become mothers by years of education. This represents the extensive margin
of fertility, namely the decision to become a mother and have at least one child. The re-
lationship between education and childlessness is upward sloping for both married (blue)
and single (red) women. Between 67 and 80 % of single women remain childless. Child-
lessness rates of married women more than double from less than 8% for women with 9
years of education to almost 18% for women with a PhD.
Empirical Fact 4 - Marriage Patterns: Panel (IV) plots marriage rates for women
(gray) and men (orange) by their respective education level. The relationship between
education and marriage rates for women is downward sloping, indicating that women
with a higher level of education are less likely to get married. The same relationship for
51Model period 1 refers to individuals until age 30.
52Model period 2 refers to individuals above age 30 and until age 45.
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men is upward sloping, indicating that men with a higher education level are more likely
to get married.
3.2.3 Fertility and Childlessness across Countries
Low fertility rates and high levels of childlessness are not confined to Germany. As a
matter of fact, low fertility rates and high levels of childlessness have become a com-
mon phenomenon in many countries, both developed and developing. Table B.1 in the
appendix provides an overview of total fertility rates and childlessness for a sample of
OECD and developing countries.
Germany serves as an exceptionally good example for this phenomenon as it is among
the countries with the lowest total fertility rate and highest childlessness rate. Moreover,
Germany is composed of regions that belonged to different states until 1990, GDR (Ger-
man Democratic Republic; East Germany) and FRG (Federal Republic of Germany; West
Germany). Both countries had very different approaches to providing publicly available
childcare and to encourage female labor force participation.
3.3 Model
In order to capture postponement and childlessness in a structural model, I expand the
model by Baudin et al. (2015) to a three-period model.53 Individuals face a trade-off
between accumulating experience during period 1 and a lower likelihood of conception in
period 2. Conception in period 1 is more likely, but also costlier in terms of foregone wage
growth.54 The model aims to capture the very basic idea that (female) fecundity decreases
with age. In a three-period model, this is reflected by a higher rate of individuals who
are unable to conceive for biological reasons. Lastly, the model captures negative wage
53Baudin et al. (2015) build a model explaining childlessness and fertility conditional on having chil-
dren in a one-period setting. Childlessness can occur due to biological sterility and economic factors.
By additionally adding the timing of children, I expand the model to also include strategic postpone-
ment of children for economic reasons. In combination with a naturally decreasing fecundity over time,
postponement of children constitutes an additional channel for unintended childlessness.
54Similar to Baudin et al. (2015), the model abstracts from unwanted births. Studies on unwanted
births place the magnitude in the order between 5% and 8.5% of all births in the US (Mosher et al.
(2012) or Bumpass and Westoff (1970)). Since unwanted births are concerning mainly least educated
women, I exclude all individuals without any educational background from the analysis. This also partly
tackles the issue of reverse causality when women drop out of education because they become pregnant.
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penalties after longer times of part-time employment or non-employment due to time
taken off for childcare.55
Decreases in biological fecundity in the three-period model are captured by a decreas-
ing likelihood to conceive over periods.56 For the remainder of the paper, “sterility” refers
to the inability to conceive children in any period, and “infertility” refers to the inability
to conceive children from period 2 onward. In period 3, all women are beyond of their
reproductive age. The model assumes that everyone who is willing to have children and
is not biologically sterile or infertile can have them in period 1 and 2.57
The sequence of events of the model is illustrated in Figure 3.3: In period 1, before
fecundity shocks in period 1 are realized, women and men are matched with a potential
partner of the opposite gender and have to make their decision on marriage. During the
matching process, the share ω ∈ [0, 1] of individuals will be matched randomly with a
potential partner across all education groups. The remaining share (1 − ω) is matched
with someone within the individuals’ own education group. The information available to
them is gender, the education level of both partners and the non-labor income of both
partners. This allows them to calculate the expected wages and thus expected gains from
marriage.
The decision to get married is a non-cooperative decision on whether an individual will
enter marriage.58 Once marriage is entered both spouses behave cooperatively within.
Individuals make the decision on entering marriage by calculating their gains from col-
lective cooperative behavior under marriage and comparing their obtained utility to the
outside option of single-hood. The model assumes that married couples and single women
can have children, whereas single men can not.59 Individuals who choose to stay single
55By focusing on never married (single) and always married (married) individuals, the model abstracts
from the risk of marriage failure. I am, however, currently working on an extension of this model that
will incorporate divorce risk and endogenous divorce decisions.
56Notes on terminology: The realized number of children is referred to as “fertility”. “Fecundity” refers
to the biological ability to have children. Some individuals are born sterile. Over time, the biological
ability to produce children decreases and more individuals become sterile. For a clear distinction and to
avoid confusion, I introduce the terms “sterility” and “infertility”.
57Leridon (2004) shows that under normal conditions (e.g. without the additional use of assisted
reproduction technologies) 75% of all women age 30 will conceive within 1 year and 91% within four
years. Since the length of a period in the empirical part is 15 years, one can assume that conception can
always be achieved when this is desired and biologically feasible.
58Alternatively, marriage could be described as “mutual coincidence of selfish wants”.
59Women have both an earnings potential and reproductive capital (Low, 2017), whereas men are left
with only their earnings potential.
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Figure 3.3: Timeline of the Series of Events
1 2 3
Draw potential partner
Learn about types
Marriage
decision
Children
Period 1
Learn aboutsterility
Children
Period 2
Learn aboutinfertility End offecundity
Notes: Timeline of the series of events in the model. Numbers indicate the beginning of the respective period.
Events depicted above the timeline are exogenous shocks or realizations of the agents. Events illustrated below the
timeline are endogenous choices by the agents in the model. Sterility refers to the biological inability to conceive
children in any period and is equally distributed between men and women. Infertility refers to the inability to
conceive children from period 2 onward and only affects women. At the beginning of period 3 all individuals are no
longer able to conceive.
in period 1 remain single in all subsequent periods. Lifetime utility from marriage and
under single-hood is calculated by backward induction, given the available information on
expected labor income and fecundity. After the decision on fertility is made, individuals
(or couples) try to have children. If having children is desired and biologically feasible,
the desired number of children is realized. If children are desired but not biologically
feasible, individuals learn about their (or their partner’s) biological sterility.
At the end of period 2, single women and married couples learn about their biological
infertility by not being able to have children if biologically infertile.60 In the last period,
there is no additional decision on fertility, as all women are beyond of their reproductive
phase. However, individuals, who had children in both previous periods experience lower
wages in the last period.
3.3.1 Utility
The lifetime utility function of the individuals is independent of gender and marital status
and defined by:
U i =
t=3∑
t=1
βt−1[ρ log(cit) + (1− ρ)log(Nt + ν)] (3.1)
where i indicates individuals and t indicates periods. cit is the consumption of individual
i in period t . Nt is the number of children in the household in period t. This includes
60Biological infertility refers (slightly deviating from the medical usage of the term) to individuals
who are unable to receive children during the later phase of what is usually considered the reproductive
phase. The parameters for sterility and infertility are taken from the Hutterites and are assumed to be
equally distributed across sex and education group. Values are taken from Tietze (1957).
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children born in time t and born in all previous periods and can thus be interpreted as
the stock of children living in the household at time t. ν is a preference parameter which
ensures that utility is well defined even when the number of children is zero. This allows
to disentangle childlessness and completed fertility conditional on having children. The
model assumes the utility flows from children to be constant across the child’s age.61
The stock of children is considered a public good within the household, consumption is
private. Marriage in itself does not provide utility directly, but rather through economies
of scale and sharing of child-rearing time between spouses.
3.3.2 Budget Constraints
Having children and taking care of them requires time that would otherwise be available
for labor market activity.62 The time cost required to raise children is split up in a fixed
and a variable term. The fixed cost (ηt ∈ [0, 1]) has to be paid each period in which a
woman gives birth to at least one child. I allow the fixed cost for motherhood to vary
across periods to capture changes that make the transition to motherhood less costly over
time. This picks up the effect of changes in the children production function over time,
as well changes in the costs of becoming a mother that depends on the mothers age at
the time of birth of the child. The variable cost (φ ∈ [0, 1]) has to be paid per child in
the period the child is born. This implies that the time spent on child-rearing per child
is constant across education groups and time.63
Similar to Baudin et al. (2015) and Echevarria and Merlo (1999), the husband con-
tributes (1−α) to the time spent on raising the children. The remaining share α ∈ [0, 1]
is contributed by the wife. This allows married women to have more children than single
61During the early years of the child, the utility flow may come from watching the child play and
learn. Later, the utility flow may very well come from the child’s achievements or simply the fact that
the child is able to fix the WiFi/printer/smartphone when visiting.
62The model abstracts from leisure. Furthermore, there is no saving or lending in the baseline model.
In theory, couples with consumption above cˆ but below what is necessary to have children could save in
order to be able to be able to afford children later in life. Couples could also borrow money in order to
have children early in life. Furthermore, savings that would be split up during a divorce could act as a
marriage stabilizing device (similar to Lafortune and Low (2017)).
63Potentially, one can assume that more educated individuals spend less time with their children due
to the larger opportunity costs. However, there are cases in which more educated individuals spend
more time with their children in order to induce more human capital in them (Chiappori et al., 2017).
Assuming φ to be constant across education groups constitutes a good combined effect and simplifies
the model.
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women and also makes married women less likely to remain childless. Furthermore, there
is a public household good µ that has to be produced by the household, independent of
household size. If married, this household good cost is produced jointly.64
Time available for work is reduced by the amount of time spent on children. For
single women and men, the total time endowment is reduced by the amount δf ∈ [0, 1]
and δm ∈ [0, 1], respectively. This cost of being single accounts for the time necessary for
household chores that can not be shared with the spouse. δf is forced to be smaller than
δm to account for the fact that women might receive help from others (e.g. their mothers
or cohabiting partners) with raising the children, which is otherwise not captured in the
model.65
There is a minimum consumption level (cˆ) required for women to be able to have
children in a given period. The requirement of a minimum consumption level introduces
a non-convexity in the budget constraint that is needed to generate the fertility-income
relationship that discretely jumps from zero to one and then decreases in period 1 (as in,
Baudin et al., 2015).
Individuals have two sources of income - labor (w) and non-labor (a) income.66 Labor
income partly depends on individual choices. In the model, wages depend on gender, edu-
cation and previous labor market experience. Individuals observe the wage for their given
education level and are fully aware of their return to experience. They are furthermore
aware that long periods of part-time employment can impact their future wage substan-
tially. With that in mind, individuals choose how many children to have and how to space
them across time. Non-labor income does not depend on any choices or educational back-
ground and is drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean κ = ln(ma ·w)− 12σ
2
a and
variance σ2a. w is defined as the mean wage of all women. Thus, ma can be interpreted as
the average ratio of labor to non-labor income of women. The non-labor income can be
64Note that the public household good µ is produced using income rather than time. For married
individuals, the public household good is produced before income is redistributed among spouses. See
Section 3.3.4 for more details on the bargaining within marriage and resource allocation after bargaining.
65The penalty for single-hood also captures other benefits from marriages, such as joint taxation.
A single-hood penalty that is smaller for women than for men would also capture relative advan-
tages in home production that women may or may not have and taxation benefits that support single
women/mothers.
66Non-labor income is necessary to generate the negative aggregate fertility-income behavior in the
first period when using a log specification for utility (see, Jones et al., 2010; Baudin et al., 2015).
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interpreted as the sum of unconditional transfers, gifts or bequests and is unconditional
on education level or endogenous choices.
Formally, this translates into different per period budget constraints for single men
(3.2), single women (3.3) and married couples (3.4), respectively.
bs,mt (cmt ) = cmt − (1− δm)wmt − amt + µ ≤ 0 (3.2)
bs,ft (cft , nt) = cft + ηtwft 1(nt > 0) + ntφwft − (1− δf )wft − aft + µ ≤ 0 (3.3)
bwt (c
f
t , c
m
t , nt) = c
f
t + cmt + ηtw
f
t 1(nt > 0) + ntφ[αwmt + (1− α)wft ]
− wft − wmt − aft − amt + µ ≤ 0 (3.4)
In addition to the budget constraint, women also face a pure time constraint in the
production of children. Women who spend all their available time raising children in
fertile periods are restricted in their per period fertility by the pure time constraint
nst =
1− δf − ηt
φ
for single women and nwt =
1− ηt
αφ
for married women. Married women
can conceive a larger number of children as the husband helps raising the children and
the cost of single-hood are absent.67
3.3.3 Wages and Labor Market Attachment
At the beginning of period 1, individuals learn about their expected wage for all peri-
ods conditional on their labor market participation. The realized wage is a function of
their exogenous gender (gen) and education level (educ), as well as the endogenously
determined previous labor market experience (exp):
wit = f(gen, educ, exp) (3.5)
If individuals choose to have children they lose labor market experience which negatively
influences future wages. In addition to the loss of experience due to foregone labor
market experience in every period, individuals also face a negative wage effect ( ∈ [0, 1])
67The resulting value is rounded (down) to the next integer as children are a discrete variable in the
model. This makes the model both easier to compute as well as more realistic.
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if they spend both fertile periods raising children. The negative wage effect can be a
result of discrimination or human capital depreciation due to long absence from full time
employment.68 The negative wage effect is shared between spouses according to their
relative share in child-rearing, α for married women and (1 - α) for married men.
3.3.4 Marriage and Bargaining
At the beginning of period 1, individuals draw from the pool of available singles. Each
individual draws a peer of own educational background with probability (1 - ω) and ran-
domly from the pool of all available singles with probability ω (drawn from uniform).
This ensures some level (1 - ω) of assortatively matched couples by educational back-
ground. There is no altruism within marriage.69 However, there can be transfers within
a household as a result of the bargaining process over fertility and consumption choices.
Spouses renegotiate their choice variables at the beginning of each period according the
cooperative collective decision model:70:
u(cft , cmt , Nt) = θt(w
f
t , w
m
t )u(c
f
t , Nt) + (1− θt(wft , wmt )u(cmt , Nt) (3.6)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the wife’s bargaining parameter, which itself is defined as:
θ(wft , wmt ) =
1
2θ + (1− θ)
wft
wft + wmt
(3.7)
The first part of the bargaining parameter θ is constant, whereas the second part
1− θ varies with the relative income of the partner. This captures the fact that women,
regardless of their relative income, always have some minimum level of bargaining power
in the marriage.71 If the parameter θ takes the value of 1, then both spouses have the
68Long absence from full time employment can also increase the risk of unemployment, which may
in addition affect the expected wage in the same way. However, the model does not distinguish those
channels, but takes them as given and includes the effect on wages in individuals decision making.
69This assumption is in line with Chiappori (1988) and also made in Baudin et al. (2015).
70This follows Baudin et al. (2015). The alternative of Nash bargaining, where partners share the
marriage surplus, requires some sort of shock to the quality of marriage in order to avoid marriage rates
equal to 1. While something of that sort is possible in theory, this model assumes a cooperative collective
decision model for simplicity.
71Alternative specifications could use relative labor income (as in, e.g., Iyigun and Walsh, 2007) or
further include the non-labor income (as in, e.g., Pollak, 2005) instead of the relative wage of both
spouses.
85
Childlessness and Fertility Choice
exact same bargaining power, irrespective of the relative wage they earn. When θ takes
the value 0, then only the relative wage they earn matters for the bargaining position
within the marriage. For any given number of children, married individuals pool their
financial resources and redistribute them according to the bargaining parameter θ.
When deciding about marriage formation both potential spouses evaluate the value
functions for being single and being married and compare the expected obtained utilities.
While both potential spouses do not know about their own and their partner’s sterility,
they take the potential sterility and expected wages for all periods into account. They
calculate the expected value of marriage and being single.72 Only if both agree that
marriage is beneficial, they get married. If one of the partners decides not to marry, both
remain single and behave optimally under single-hood. For tractability, individuals only
have one single draw for a potential marriage partner. As a result, there is no option
value of single-hood since there is no outside option of finding a potentially better partner
in a subsequent period.
Marriage can be beneficial for several reasons: (i) it provides a higher time endowment
as time costs for being single (δf and δm) are not endured; (ii) the cost for the public
household good µ is shared;73 (iii) women can reach a higher level of consumption for a
given number of children as part of the husbands’ income is transferred via the household
bargaining; (iv) men can (in contrast to being single) enjoy their children and obtain
utility from them; and (v) consequences of spacing children out over both periods are
mitigated through transfers from the spouse and sharing of costs.
3.3.5 Value Functions and Marriage Decision
Before deciding on marriage formation, individuals calculate their expected utility of
marriage and single-hood. In order to do this, individuals evaluate value functions for
different potential states they could be in. These states depend on gender (women, men),
marital status (married, single) and biological fecundity (sterile, infertile, fertile). The
72The expected values are calculated by weighting the optimization outcome under sterility (fertility)
with the likelihood of being matched with someone who is biologically sterile (fertile), taking one’s own
potential sterility into account.
73A public good within the household is often used in the literature to create the incentive to form a
couple.
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Table 3.1: Value Functions
Value Functions for the Marriage Decision, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}
V s,m ≡ max U({cmt }T=3t=1 , 0, 0, 0) s.t. {bmt (cmt ) ≤ 0}T=3t=1 Single Men
V s,f ≡ max U({cft }T=3t=1 , {Nt}T=3t=1 ) s.t. {bft (cft , nt) ≤ 0}T=3t=1 Single Fertile Women
V˜ s,f ≡ max U({cft }T=3t=1 , 0, 0, 0) s.t. bft (cft ) ≤ 0}T=3t=1 Single Sterile Women
V¯ s,f ≡ max U({cft }T=3t=1 , N1, N1, N1) s.t. {bft (cft , nt) ≤ 0}T=3t=1 Single Infertile Women
V w,i ≡ U({cit}T=3t=1 , {Nt}T=3t=1 ) , Married & Fertile
where {cft , cmt , nt}T=3t=1 = argmax U({cft }T=3t=1 , {cmt }T=3t=1 , {Nt}T=3t=1 )
s.t. {bt(cft , cmt , nt) ≤ 0}T=3t=1
V˜ w,i ≡ U({cit}T=3t=1 , 0, 0, 0) , Married & Sterile
where {cft , cmt , 0, 0, 0}T=3t=1 = argmax U({cft }T=3t=1 , {cmt }T=3t=1 , {Nt}T=3t=1 )
s.t. {bt(cft , cmt , 0, 0, 0) ≤ 0}T=3t=1
V¯ w,i ≡ U({cit}T=3t=1 , N1, N1, N1) , Married & Infertile
where {cft , cmt , n1, 0, 0}T=3t=1 = argmax U({cft }T=3t=1 , {cmt }T=3t=1 , {Nt}T=3t=1 )
s.t. {bt(cft , cmt , n1, 0, 0) ≤ 0}T=3t=1
Notes: All relevant function values are being evaluated before the individuals make their choice on
marriage. Women are only potentially fertile in period 1 and period 2.
different value functions for men and women are displayed in Table 3.1. Single men are not
able to have children and do not care about sterility or infertility. All other combinations
of marriage status and gender (single women, married women, married men) care about
infertility and sterility and evaluate the corresponding value functions. Once these value
functions are evaluated, the individual chooses the regime that provides most utility.
Marriage occurs if it is beneficial for both partners, which formally means that:
(ζf+(1−ζf )ζm)V˜ w,i+(ξf (1−ξm−ζm)+ξm(1−ζf ))V¯ w,i+(1−ζf−ξf )(1−ζm−ξm)V w,i (3.8)
is larger than
ζf V˜
s,f + ξf V¯ s,f + (1− ζf − ξf )V s,f (3.9)
and
V s,m (3.10)
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V˜ , V¯ and V denote the value of being sterile, infertile and fertile for status ∈ (single,married)
and gender ∈ (women,men). ζi and ξi are parameters for sterility and infertility, respec-
tively. Biological sterility and infertility are assumed to be equally distributed across
education levels.
Women calculate the value of being married (Equation 3.8) and compare it to the value
of single-hood (Equation 3.9). Men compare the value of being married (Equation 3.8)
with the value of being single (Equation 3.10). Both individual decisions are independent
and there are no general equilibrium effects as there is only a single draw for a potential
marriage partner in the model.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The estimation strategy fixes some parameters of the model and estimates the remaining
parameters with a minimum distance estimation technique using Powell’s UOBYQA
algorithm. A detailed explanation of the identification of the remaining model parameter
can be found in section B.9 in the Appendix.
The values for biological sterility and infertility are taken from the Hutterites74, on
whom a number of studies on fecundity exist. According to Tietze (1957), sterility is
observed for 2.4% of couples. An additional 8.6% of couples are unable to bear any
children after the age of 30. Following Baudin et al. (2015), sterility is split equally
among men and women and set at 1.21%. The decrease in fecundity (8.6%, referred to
as “infertility”) is attributed exclusively to decreases in female fecundity. Both biological
components of fecundity are assumed to be equally distributed across education groups
and marital status.
Wages are estimated as described in section 3.4.2. I set the bargaining parameter
θ to 1. This reflects an equal bargaining weight between men and women that does
not depend on the relative wage.75 Following the specification of the utility function in
Baudin et al. (2015), I set the preference parameter ρ to 0.5.
74Hutterites are a ethnoreligious group, similar to Amish or Monnonites. They are part of a christian
movement that originated in the radical reformation in the 16th century. Today, most Hutterites live in
North America.
75I thank David De La Croix for this helpful suggestion to reduce the estimated parameter space.
88
Childlessness and Fertility Choice
3.4.1 Empirical Moments
I obtain empirical moments from the pooled 2008 and 2012 waves of the German Micro-
census. The German Microcensus is an annual survey that yields representative statistics
on the German population and labor force. Data access is provided by the Research data
center (FDZ) of the statistical offices of the German federal states. The Microcensus
samples 1% of all persons legally residing in Germany. It is the largest household survey
in Europe. Participation is mandatory76 and only a subset of questions can be answered
on a voluntary basis. Typically, one household member responds to the survey for all in-
dividuals living in the household, including the spouse and children. The survey program
of the German Microcensus consists of a set of core questions that remains unchanged
in each wave, covering general socio-demographic characteristics like marital status, ed-
ucation, employment status, individual and household income, and many other things.
Unfortunately, only the 2008 and 2012 waves of the German Microcensus entail a ques-
tion on the completed fertility of women, while all other waves only ask for the number
of children (not distinguishing from own biological and other) at different age groups
currently present in the household.
I exclude women under the age of 45 from the data to observe completed fertility.
To further correctly identify women who gave birth before they were 30 years of age, I
make two assumptions. The first one is that children live with their parents until age
18. This is supported by the fact that, from a legal perspective, children under the age
of 18 are not allowed to sign legally binding contracts such as rental contracts for an
apartment without parental consent. The second one is that in case of divorce and re-
marriage there is no systematic trend in the selection of a partner by education. This is
necessary because remarried women are indistinguishable from only once married women
in the data. On the basis of these two assumptions, the moments for identification per
education group can be constructed. I subtract the children currently present in the
household that were born after age 30 from the completed fertility. This separation gives
me children born before and after age 30. Unfortunately, this reduces the sample further
as now all mothers over the age of 48 (30 + 18) have to be excluded from the analysis.
76According to the German Microcensus law, non-response may be fined.
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For the baseline results, both waves of the German Microcensus are used in order
to maximize the number of observations per cell. Furthermore, I perform a sub-sample
analysis for an East-West split and for both waves of the Microcensus separately. I
construct the years of education by assigning years of education to individual degrees
earned. Then I sum up those years of education across the individuals secondary and
tertiary degree, if applicable. The year value assignment to secondary, tertiary and
vocational degrees follows the standard of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)
and is displayed in Table B.2 in the Appendix. All statistics of the observed individuals
are weighted by the official sample weights provided by the German Microcensus.
This results in a total of 64 (8 moment dimensions and 8 education groups per mo-
ment dimension) means and the corresponding standard deviations that are available as
moments for model parameter identification. The moment dimensions are childlessness
(for single and married women), children before age 30 (for single and married women),
children after age 30 (for single and married women) and marriages rates (for women and
men). Education groups (9, 10, 10.5, 11.5, 13, 16, 18 and 21) are constructed to always
include a sufficiently high number of observations per cell as well as to reflect population
groups with a roughly equivalent educational background.
3.4.2 Wages
In the model, education and gender are exogenous and known before any of the decisions
of the individuals are made. Labor market participation is, in every period, a choice
variable.77 I estimate the return on education and experience using the 2015 wave of the
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) and compute wages based on the results as model
inputs. The GSOEP provides separate measures for labor market participation depending
on full-time or part-time employment.78 I add both those measures and weight the part
time employment by the number of hours worked relative to full time employment. In
addition, the GSOEP also provides detailed information on education (see Table B.2 for
translation from educational degrees to years of education). The estimation includes an
77Technically speaking, individuals choose their time spent on reproductive activities and thereby
determine their labor market activity. However, individuals are fully aware of the time cost of raising
children and implicitly choose fertility and labor market activity simultaneously.
78I restrict the sample to individuals who were always employed, either part or full time.
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intercept, a linear gender dummy (gen), education (educ) and labor market experience
(exp). Education and experience are estimated using a third order polynomial to pick up
non-linearities in the development of wages.79 Table B.4 in the Appendix provides the
results of the wage regression.
ln(wage) = β0 + β1gen+ β2educ+ β3educ2 + β4educ3 + β5exp+ β6exp2 + β7exp3 (3.11)
3.4.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
The model is estimated by a minimum distance procedure of the following form:
f(p) = [d− s(p)][W ][d− s(p)]′, (3.12)
where p is the vector of parameters, d is the vector of empirical moments and s(p) is the
vector of simulated moments, which depend on the model parameters. The weighting
matrix W contains 1/var(d) on the main diagonal, thus putting a higher weight on more
precise moments relative to less precise moments.
I set the parameters for wages (depending on education and experience) based on
the estimation result of Section 3.4.2. The wage of individuals is normalized to the
wage of a married male with a PhD who contributed all his time to work.80 The mean
(female) wage used for the estimation of non-labor income is taken from the same dataset.
The bargaining weight θ is set to 1 (reflecting equal bargaining power of both men and
women), the elasticity of the utility function is set to 0.5 to comply with Baudin et al.
(2015). Natural rates for sterility and infertility for men and women are taken from
Tietze (1957). The remaining 14 parameters (see: Table 3.2) are estimated using the
minimum distance procedure. Wages in period 1 are further scaled in order to account
for the longer working period of lower educated in comparison to individuals who spend
more time in education.
79I deflate net wage using the CPI with base year 2011. Reported net wages below EUR 1 are excluded
as they are unrealistic.Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables are displayed in Table B.3 in the
Appendix.
80This is simply to obtain relative wages. Married men, who contributed all their time to work have
the highest labor income.
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The objective function is minimized in three steps to reduce the time required for
estimation. First, an initial grid of 500,000 random grid points is evaluated in order to
obtain adequate starting values for the optimization routines. Then, a genetic algorithm
is used to obtain a rough81 vector of parameter values. Once the rough region of the global
maximum is identified, I use Powell’s UOBYQA algorithm to obtain the final results.
All optimization routine steps are performed under R version 3.5.1 with 10,000 ob-
servations (matched potential couples) per education group. A detailed description of
the optimization routine of Powell can be found in Powell (2002). Standard errors are
obtained in a bootstrapping style fashion. The optimization routine is performed for a
smaller simulated sample size (10% sample) across various different (n = 500) random
number seeds. Rather than drawing repeatedly from the same sample - as standard
bootstrapping is performed - this approach samples from different populations to ensure
that the parameter values are not a result of a specific drawn sample. The restrictions
imposed by this approach are thus more restrictive compared to drawing sub-samples
repeatedly from the same sample.
3.4.4 Estimation Results
3.4.4.1 Goodness of Fit
The model fit is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Empirical moments are depicted by solid lines.
Simulated model moments are illustrated by dashed lines. The model performs reasonably
well in terms of childlessness and fertility patterns for both married and single individuals.
Section B.4 in the Appendix provides an overview over the normalized differences between
the model and data moments along all model dimensions.
The fertility patterns (Sub-figures (I) and (II) of Figure 3.4) are captured very well
for single women for both periods. For married women, the model predicts slightly higher
fertility rates for medium educated women in the early life phase and women until 16
years of education after age 30. Sub-figure (III) of Figure 3.4 shows the childlessness rate
81The generic algorithm is a stochastic optimization method for finding global maxima. In order to
save time, the optimization routine is performed until the optimization converges. Once the optimization
converged, a more systematic local optimization routine is performed.
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Figure 3.4: Model Fit
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Notes: Internal fit of the simulated model. Lines are empirical moments, dashed lines are simulation results. (I)
Completed Fertility for married (blue) and single (red) women for different educational groups. (II) Childlessness
rate for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (III) Fertility of mothers until age
30 for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (IV) Fertility of mothers after age 30
for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (V) Marriage rates for women (gray) and
men (orange) for different education groups. (VI) Divorce rates for women (gray) and men (orange) for different
education groups. Data: German Microcensus, survey years 2008 & 2012, own calculations.
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for married (blue) and single (red) women by education group, which are closely captured
by the model.
The model does a fairly well job capturing the levels of marriages rates (Sub-figure
(III) of Figure 3.4). In absence of many aspects that drive marriage formation are absent
of the model82, the model fails to capture the slope for marriage rates. However, nor-
malized differences indicate a relatively good model fit, compared with the other model
dimensions.
3.4.4.2 Parameter Values
The estimated structural parameters are reported in Table 3.2. I calculate the standard
errors by estimating the model 500 times across different random number seeds for a 10%
subset of simulated matched individuals. The discount factor β is estimated at 0.971,
indicating very little discounting in the context of fertility planning. The estimated
discount factor is roughly equivalent to a 0.2% annual discount rate.83 The discount rate
equivalent to an interest rate below the market rate on the capital market suggests that
individuals are willing to save in period 1 in order to be able to afford children in period
2. The preference parameter (ν) is estimated to be 6.137.
On top of the cost of motherhood (η1 = 0.187, η2 = 0.013) women contribute the
(slightly) larger share (α = 0.546) of the variable time cost of children (φ = 0.620). The
estimated parameter α from Baudin et al. (2015) is very close to the α estimated here.
However, in Baudin et al. (2015) the male partner also contributes to the fixed cost of
becoming a parent, which results in a larger share of male participation. Comparing the
total cost of children over the lifecycle indicates that both partners have a more equal
share of the child-rearing for children born after the age of 30. This is due to the sharp
decrease in the fixed costs of becoming a mother. In period 1, married women contribute
65.1% of the total child rearing time for the first child. This number decreases to 55.5%
for married women in period 2. The negative wage effect of spacing children across both
periods  is estimated at 62%.
82Most prominently: Love
83Without savings/borrowing, the number of children is the only “asset” that can be inter-temporally
allocated. The “consumption” of children throughout the lifecycle is thus driving this very low discount
rate.
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The time costs of single-hood δf and δm are estimated at 0.106 and 0.321, for women
and men respectively. Thus, single women loose 10.6% of their available time per period
(time is normalized to 1) for being single. In addition to the cost of single hood, single
women also face the full cost of the public household good (µ = 0.677), while married
women share this cost with their spouse. The minimum consumption level (cˆ), after
which individuals decide to have children, is estimated at 0.461. These numbers together
indicate that married women can have two children per period, whereas single women
can only have one child per period at most. While these numbers seem very low, it is
important to keep in mind that public childcare during the times when those women
became mothers was largely unavailable and even school for children ended around noon.
This forced many women/couples to spent a considerable amount of time with their
children rather than working.
The estimation results indicate that social benefits and other non-labor income (ma)
roughly equals 1.3 times (standard deviation σa = 0.513) the average earnings of a female
individual. While this seems to be rather high, Baudin et al. (2015) find their estimate
to be around 1 in the context of the US, where social policies tend to be less generous
than in Europe. A single woman of the lowest education level needs a non-labor income
of 1.106 (= cˆ+ µ−w(1− δf − η1− φ), based on unrounded values) in period 1 not to be
social sterile. In period 2, a single woman of the highest educational background needs
a non-labor income of 0.947 (= cˆ+ µ− w(1− δf − η2 − φ), based on unrounded values)
not to end up childless.84
Germany has a relatively generous social system, supporting (single) mothers in finan-
cial distress. Nevertheless, the non-labor income is unreasonable large unless we include
potential monetary flows from parents and biological fathers, who do not live with the
single mother, to the interpretation. However, it is also important to keep in mind that
this is an “optimal choice” model that abstracts from unwanted births. In reality, this
may not always be given. When getting shocked with a “non-optimal” child85, (single)
women would probably end up consuming less than under optimality, investing less in
84The non-labor income is relative to the earnings of a married male with a PhD, since time is normal-
ized to 1 for married and wages are normalized to the wage of a married male with a PhD. Furthermore,
consumption above the minimum consumption level does not automatically result in children as those
may not be optimal.
85Conditional on giving birth, as abortions are an option.
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their child (e.g. through φ), save on the public household good µ or do a combination of
those things.
The percentage of individuals marrying someone with the same educational back-
ground is almost 60%. While this may be surprising in the context of other countries,
this is very much within expectations for Germany, given the education system that puts
children into certain academic achievement tracks from early age onward. Depending
on individual competencies and achievements, German schoolchildren attend separate
schools after the 4th or 6th grade (depending on the federal state) already.
Table 3.2: Estimation Results
Parameter Description Estimate S.E.
β Discount factor 0.971 0.008
σa Standard deviation of the log-normal distribution 0.513 0.003
ν Preference parameter 6.137 0.013
µ Good cost to be supported by a household 0.677 0.005
α Fraction of child-rearing to be supported by women 0.546 0.003
φ Time cost of having children 0.620 0.003
η1 Fixed cost of children (period 1) 0.187 0.003
δm Time cost for being single (men) 0.321 0.010
δf Time cost for being single (women) 0.106 0.003
cˆ Minimum consumption level for procreation 0.461 0.003
ma Average ratio of non-labor income to labor income 1.327 0.005
 Wage effect of spacing children across time 0.617 0.008
η2 Fixed cost of children (period 2) 0.013 0.003
ω Share of randomly matched on marriage market 0.427 0.011
Note: Estimated parameters of the model. Parameters for wages and natural sterility and infertility
are set. Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping across different random number seeds. Values
rounded.
3.4.5 Decomposition of Childlessness
The model allows decomposing the reasons for childlessness into two main categories:
Voluntary childlessness and involuntary childlessness. In the case of voluntary child-
lessness, individuals optimally decide not to have children. In the case of involuntary
childlessness, individuals would like to have children, but are unable to have them. Vol-
untary childlessness again can be separated into two sub-categories: On the one hand,
women (or couples) who’s consumption would fall below the minimum consumption level
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if having children are too poor to have children. Their reason for childlessness is thus
“Poverty”. On the other hand, women (or couples) can choose to have zero children due
to high opportunity costs. The reason for their childlessness is “Optimal”. Involuntary
childlessness can also be separated into two sub-categories86: Some women (or couples)
are unable to conceive children in any period for biological reasons. The reason for child-
lessness of sterile women (or couples) reflects “Sterility”. Other women (or couples) are
exposed to declining fecundity, namely infertility. They would have been able to have
children in period 1, decide to postpone having children to period 2 for economic reasons
and end up childless. The reason for childlessness of infertile women (or couples), who
decide to postpone their fertility to period 2, is “Postponement”.
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3 present the reasons for childlessness (conditional on being
childless) for all education groups estimated by the model. The results by marital status
are reported in Table B.9 in the Appendix. Within each block, rows sum up to 1. My first
finding is that the vast majority of childlessness in Germany is voluntary. Involuntary
childlessness explains only about 21% to 26% of childlessness, depending on educational
background. Within voluntary childlessness, the share of women, who remain childless
due to “Poverty”, is declining in education. This is a result of increasing wages. How-
ever, the higher wages of highly educated women also make those more likely to remain
childless due to opportunity cost (“Optimal”). The results for reasons of involuntary
childlessness show large variation. The relative share of women who remain childless
due to postponement of children increases monotonically from about 20% (women with
basic secondary education, 9 years) to almost 70% for women with a PhD (21 years
of education). Thus, “Postponement” is twice as important in explaining childlessness
among highly educated women than “Sterility”. When investigating the sub-sample of
single women, the relative share of involuntary childlessness due to “Postponement” even
exceeds 80% for highly educated women. The share of total childlessness within an ed-
ucation group that is a result of “Postponement” can be calculated by multiplying the
share of “Involuntary” with the share of “Postponement”. Depending on education, this
share increases from 4.4% in the case of basic secondary education to 15.6% for women
86I can also separate childlessness by the time individuals learn about the fact that they will be
involuntarily childless. Results are reported in Table B.10 in the Appendix.
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with a PhD. Similarly, the share of “Sterility” decreases from 11.6% to 7.2%. I obtain
the aggregate effect on the population level by weighting those shares according to the
relative size of the education groups in the population. “Postponement” explains 7.6%
and “Sterility” explains 15.0% of total childlessness at the population level.
Figure 3.5: Reasons for Childlessness (Baseline)
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In the case of voluntary childlessness, the outcome is optimal from an individual’s
perspective. This is not the case for involuntary childlessness, which results in utility
loss. The size of the loss in individual’s utility depends on the type of involuntary
childlessness, marital status as well as labor and non-labor income. In general, there are
two counteracting effects. First, the loss in the number of children directly results in
lower utility. Second, the time that is now available for market work (rather than child-
rearing) results in more consumption, both directly via the supply of labor and indirectly
via the return to experience that increases wages for following periods. I quantify the
loss of utility (in terms of equivalent net present value consumption) for some illustrative
98
Childlessness and Fertility Choice
Table 3.3: Reasons for Childlessness (Baseline)
Voluntary Childlessness Involuntary Childlessness
Education Voluntary Involuntary Poverty Optimal Sterility Postponement
1 0.786 0.214 0.457 0.543 0.793 0.207
2 0.781 0.219 0.531 0.469 0.746 0.254
3 0.784 0.216 0.518 0.482 0.724 0.276
4 0.762 0.238 0.522 0.478 0.615 0.385
5 0.741 0.259 0.528 0.472 0.557 0.443
6 0.776 0.224 0.488 0.512 0.535 0.465
7 0.773 0.227 0.481 0.519 0.359 0.641
8 0.771 0.229 0.382 0.618 0.318 0.682
Note: Reasons for childlessness by women’s education. Sample restricted to women/couples who
are childless in baseline. Values within one line per sub-block add up to one. The blocks
“Voluntary Childlessness” and “Involuntary Childlessness” contain the sub-groups of “Voluntary”
and “Involuntary”, respectively. Values rounded.
examples of the following population groups: (i) a single sterile woman and (ii) a single
infertile woman, (iii) a married couple exposed to sterility, (iv) a married couple exposed
to infertility.
Single women require a sufficiently large non-labor income, to avoid social sterility
and potentially become mothers. Depending on the relative size of labor and non-labor
income those single women decide to have a child in period 1 or period 2. The first
illustrative example is a single sterile woman with 16 years of education and a non-labor
income 47.9% above the average. Optimally, such a woman would choose to have one child
in period 1 and zero children in period 2. The change from having one child in period 1
to childlessness results in a loss of lifetime utility equivalent to 22.0% of net present value
lifetime consumption. This effect is counteracted by increases in consumption as a result
of higher labor market participation. This second effect closes the gap in individual’s
utility from 22.0% to 4.6% in equivalent net present value consumption. The total loss
in utility increases with non-labor income as a higher labor income is needed to offset
the loss in utility from having zero children. Increases in education, on the other hand,
lower the final gap for a given non-labor income as a result of higher wages and larger
returns to experience.
The second illustrative example is a single infertile woman with 16 years of education
and a non-labor income 23.4% above the average. This woman would optimally wait until
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period 2 to have a child and benefit from larger wage growth in period 1. The loss in utility
due to the transition from one child in period 2 to zero children is equivalent to a net
present value lifetime consumption loss of 14.4%. The counteracting labor supply effect
closes the gap in individual utility to 1.2% in equivalent net present value consumption.
Compared to sterility, the total effect of infertility is substantially smaller as the loss in
utility from the reduced number of children is only experienced for two instead of three
periods. Similar to the case of sterility, the total loss in utility increases for small increases
in non-labor income and decreases by educational background. Sufficiently large changes
in non-labor income, however, will result in children being optimal in period 1 already.
Due to a higher number of children under optimal conditions, the effects of sterility
and infertility are substantially larger for married couples. For a marriage in which both
partners have 16 years of education, an average non-labor income and where (at least)
one partner is biologically sterile, the loss in lifetime utility per person is equivalent to a
present value lifetime consumption decrease of 62.1%. The labor supply effect decreases
the loss in utility to 25.9% in equivalent consumption. Since married individuals pool
their financial resources, this value is the same across genders. The total loss in utility
increases with the non-labor income of both partners and decreases with the education.
The effect of increases in education is not equal across both genders. Women contribute
a larger share of child-rearing, which increases the effect size of the labor supply effect
more for women than men.
The same married couple (both 16 years of education and average non-labor income)
would experience a loss in total utility equivalent to 5.2% of net present value consumption
per individual in the case of biological infertility. The effects are substantially smaller
than for sterility, as the couple is only restricted in their period 2 fertility and can have
the intended number of children in period 1. The effect of the loss in period 2 children is
reduced by the labor supply effect from 21.0% to 5.2% in equivalent consumption.
3.4.6 Heterogeneity between East and West Germany
For the baseline results I use the pooled 2008 and 2012 waves of the German Microcensus,
covering Germany in total. In this section, I estimate the model separately for East
and West Germany to address (persistent) institutional differences between both former
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countries. Furthermore, I estimate the model separately for the 2008 and 2012 waves of
the Microcensus. The model parameters are displayed in Table 3.4. For readability, the
results, including standard errors, are reported in Table B.11 in the Appendix.
Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Subsamples
Parameter Description Baseline West East 2008 2012
β Discount factor 0.971 0.954 0.964 0.971 0.994
σa Standard deviation of the log-normal distribution 0.513 0.537 0.500 0.513 0.524
ν Preference parameter 6.137 6.010 6.129 6.237 6.154
µ Good cost to be supported by a household 0.677 0.689 0.658 0.677 0.678
α Fraction of child-rearing to be supported by women 0.546 0.554 0.537 0.546 0.535
φ Time cost of having children 0.620 0.617 0.600 0.620 0.623
η1 Fixed cost of children (period 1) 0.187 0.198 0.074 0.187 0.192
δm Time cost for being single (men) 0.321 0.346 0.345 0.321 0.331
δf Time cost for being single (women) 0.106 0.105 0.157 0.106 0.103
cˆ Minimum consumption level for procreation 0.461 0.417 0.445 0.461 0.462
ma Average ratio of non-labor income to labor income 1.327 1.211 1.344 1.327 1.314
 Wage effect of spacing children across time 0.617 0.544 0.719 0.617 0.614
η2 Fixed cost of children (period 2) 0.013 0.005 0.041 0.013 0.010
ω Share of randomly matched on marriage market 0.427 0.498 0.452 0.427 0.428
Note: Estimated parameters of the model for different data subsets (West Germany, East Germany, 2008
Microcensus and 2012 Microcensus). Parameters for wages and natural sterility and infertility are set. For
readability bootstrapped standard errors are reported in table B.11 in the appendix.
Overall, all subsets yield relatively similar results. This is in particular the case for
the separate analyis of the 2008 and 2012 waves of the German Microcensus. There are,
however, substantial87 differences between East and West Germany.
There are three different channels through which the exposure to the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) could have affected fertility behavior for East
German women.88 First, government ideology could change the utility received from
children. This would be captured in differences in the preference parameter ν. Second,
women were expected to work and not take time off to raise children. Thus, staying at
home to raise children could result in a higher wage penalty in East Germany compared
to West Germany. Third, socialist ideology aimed to emancipate women in the labor
market by providing largely available public childcare. In the model, this is captured by
differences in the cost of children, either fixed (η1, η2) or variable (φ).
87In the presence of generally very low standard errors in structural estimation, I refrain from using
the term “significant” to avoid confusion.
88Presented in reverse order of magnitude/importance. However, I acknowledge that there are poten-
tially more that are not captured by the model.
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For the preference parameter for children, I find a difference of 0.119 between East
and West Germany. Women (and couples) in East Germany obtain a larger utility
already from having zero children. However, these differences are small compared to
the parameter value (6.010 for West and 6.129 for East Germany). The small difference
relative to the parameter value indicates that there are no large effects of government
ideology on the preference for children between East andWest Germany.89 I find the effect
of spacing children over both periods, a negative wage penalty, to be substantially larger
in East Germany. Compared to 0.544 for West Germany, the parameter value increases
by 32% to 0.719 in East Germany. This shows that there are larger negative effects of
prolonged absence from the labor market in East compared to West Germany. The wage
effect may be intensified by the fact that the late reproductive phase of the women in the
sample starts around the time of the German Reunification. During this time, individuals
in the East had to adapt to the market-based economy of West Germany, which made
absence from the labor market even more costly as previously obtained human capital
depreciated faster.90 All those effects jointly result in a 32% larger wage penalty for a long
absence from the job market due to child-rearing for East compared to West Germany.
For a more short-term microeconometric analysis of the consequences of the fall of the
Berlin wall see Chevalier and Marie (2017), who find strong but short-lasting negative
fertility responses in East Germany, in particular among higher educated women.
Finally, there is a remarkable difference between East and West Germany in the
fixed costs of becoming a mother (η1 and η2). While the costs of becoming a mother
are relatively constant for East Germany, it decreases substantially for West Germany
and even surpasses East Germany. Differences in the variable cost of children (φ) are
relatively small. Historically, East and West Germany had very different approached to
public provision of childcare. While women in West Germany usually dropped out of the
labor force for the time they raised their children, women in East Germany continued their
career and could rely on largely available public childcare. In fact, the extent to which
affordable public childcare was available in East Germany is often seen as a potential role
89For a childless married West German women, where both spouses have 16 years of education and
an average non-labor income, the effect of having the East German ν instead of the West German ν
results in a utility increase that is equivalent to a 2.8% increase in net present value consumption.
90An additional option can be higher unemployment risk as a result of long absence from the labor
market. This effect would also be stronger in combination with the German Reunification.
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model for West Germany, even today. For a more detailed investigation of the changes
of the fixed cost of becoming a mother, a back-of-the-envelope difference-in-difference
calculation of the time cost of the first child is performed in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Time Cost for First Child (Differences Analysis)
Time West East Difference
Before Age 30 0.541 0.396 0.145
After Age 30 0.347 0.363 -0.016
Difference 0.194 0.033 0.161
Note: Full (fixed and variable) time cost of the first child
for married women. Values are based on sub-sample
estimation results for East and West Germany. Values
rounded.
There are several potential reasons for the large decline in the fixed cost of be-
coming a mother over the lifecycle in West Germany: (i) Increasing efficiency due to
age/experience, (ii) expansion of the public provision of childcare, or (iii) increasing sup-
port from parents, as those are more likely to reach retirement and are able to provide
informal childcare. As a matter of fact, García-Morán and Kuehn (2017) document
that some women/couples in Germany locate near their parents or in-laws for informal
childcare support.
Unfortunately, this simple calculation does not allow to disentangle the effects of the
expansion of public childcare over the observed time from the effect of the provision of
informal childcare by relatives, such as parents. However, under two assumptions the
joined effect of informal provision of childcare and increases in the publicly availability
of childcare can be calculated. First, age-related efficiency gains in the production of
children developed in parallel in East and West Germany. Second, due to the large scale
availability of public childcare the informal provision of childcare, informal childcare is
not of major importance / less common in East Germany. The raw difference in the
time required to raise the first child between the two periods is 0.194 for West Germany
and 0.033 for East Germany. Attributing the 0.033 to the age effect, leaves a joint effect
of 0.161 for increases in the provision of both public and informal childcare for West
Germany. This equals 83% of the fixed cost of becoming a mother in period 1.
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Figure 3.6: Reasons for Childlessness (West Germany vs. East Germany)
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Notes: Subsample Analysis - Reasons for childlessness by womens’ education for West Germany (left sub-figure)
and East Germany (right sub-figure). Sample restricted to women who are childless.
These differences in the costs of having children are also reflected in the reasons for
childlessness in East and West Germany. Then differences are illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Table 3.6 and tables B.12 and B.13 in the Appendix provide an overview over the rea-
sons for childlessness by womens’ education level. The left block contains the reasons
for childlessness for West Germany, the right block for East Germany. The higher time
costs of children in West Germany are a large factor for childlessness. The higher costs
of children lead to a larger share of voluntary childlessness among most education groups
in West Germany Within voluntary childlessness, “Poverty” is (apart from the very low
educated) consistently of greater importance in West Germany. Within involuntary child-
lessness, “Postponement” is of larger importance in West Germany. This is a result of
the larger drop in fixed time cost of becoming a mother between period 1 and period 2
for West Germany. Given the same return to experience, the very small difference in the
fixed time cost of mother-hood does not trigger as much postponement of parenthood in
East Germany. This is illustrated by the larger share of “Postponement” (red) in the left
sub-figure of Figure 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Reasons for Childlessness (West Germany vs. East Germany)
West Germany East Germany
Voluntary Childlessness Involuntary Childlessness Voluntary Childlessness Involuntary Childlessness
Education Voluntary Involuntary Poverty Optimal Sterility Postponement Voluntary Involuntary Poverty Optimal Sterility Postponement
1 0.819 0.181 0.371 0.629 0.704 0.296 0.756 0.244 0.374 0.626 0.933 0.067
2 0.831 0.169 0.397 0.603 0.656 0.344 0.788 0.212 0.332 0.668 0.896 0.104
3 0.819 0.181 0.432 0.568 0.579 0.421 0.789 0.211 0.372 0.628 0.892 0.108
4 0.786 0.214 0.395 0.605 0.505 0.495 0.767 0.233 0.376 0.624 0.876 0.124
5 0.795 0.205 0.410 0.590 0.504 0.496 0.802 0.198 0.384 0.616 0.894 0.106
6 0.787 0.213 0.419 0.581 0.463 0.537 0.807 0.193 0.364 0.636 0.894 0.106
7 0.799 0.201 0.406 0.594 0.333 0.667 0.816 0.184 0.366 0.634 0.675 0.325
8 0.812 0.188 0.368 0.632 0.300 0.700 0.807 0.193 0.307 0.693 0.446 0.554
Note: Reasons for childlessness by women’s education. Sample restricted to women/couples who are childless. Left block for West Germany, right block for East Germany. Values
within one line per sub-block add up to one. The blocks “Voluntary Childlessness” and “Involuntary Childlessness” contain the sub-groups of “Voluntary” and “Involuntary”,
respectively. Values rounded.
3.5 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, I use the estimated model parameters to simulate the impact of policy
changes and labor market conditions on fertility along the intensive and extensive margin.
I use the structural model to simulate the behavior for a sample of 10,000 (potential)
couples per education group91 for counterfactual underlying parameter values. In partic-
ular, I simulate changes in the availability of public childcare and changes in the wage
penalty for spacing children across time. I make use of the previously obtained results
for East and West Germany to simulate the counterfactual states for the implementation
of the East German public childcare system and the East German wage penalty to West
Germany. Furthermore, I assess how potential future increases in the wage penalty can
be counteracted by expansion of public childcare. The model fit of the West German
model is displayed in Table B.2 in the Appendix.
3.5.1 Public Provision of Childcare
For the first counterfactual experiment, I simulate a full application of the East German
public provision of childcare to West Germany. I assume that everyone who desires
publicly provided childcare is able to obtain it. I further assume that individuals always
choose the cheapest childcare option. In period 1, this is the East German fixed (η1) and
variable (φ) cost of children. In period 2, this is the West German fixed (η1) and East
German variable (φ) cost of children. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.7 and tables
B.14 and B.15 in the Appendix. The comparison of the counterfactual experiments with
the empirical moments is illustrated in Figure B.3 in the Appendix. The solid line plots
91With 8 education groups, this results in 80,000 potential couples.
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Figure 3.7: Application of the East German Children Production Costs
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Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulating the application of the East German children production costs to
West Germany. Lines are baseline estimation moments, dashed lines are simulation results for the application of the
fixed cost (η1) in period 1 only, dotted lines are the simulation results for the full application of the East German
children production costs (η1 & φ).
the baseline moments. The dashed line plots the results for the application of the fixed
cost of motherhood (η1). The dotted line plots the full application of both fixed (η1 and
variable (φ) cost of children.
For the sole implementation of the East German fixed cost of becoming a mother
in period 1 (η1, dashed line), I observe a lower number of childless single women for all
education groups but the most highly educated. As a result of the changed composition,
the completed fertility for single mothers of all but the most highly educated is lower.
Most highly educated single women postpone motherhood to period 2, both in baseline
and counterfactual. As a result, I observe very little differences in the rate of highly
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educated childless single women. However, those highly educated single women, who
in counterfactual decide to have their children in period 1 already, increase completed
fertility. For married women, I find slightly lower rates of childlessness and higher rates
of fertility across all education groups.
When additionally also applying the East German variable cost for children (φ), the
rate of childlessness is lower for both married and single women across all education
groups. For single women, in particular highly educated ones, I find lower rates of
childlessness. The completed fertility of highly educated single women is slightly lower
compared to the application of only the East German fixed cost of children. This is due
to women’s transition from single-hood to marriage. For married women, I observe a
substantial lower degree of childlessness. The main reason for the differences between
the application of only the fixed costs and the application of both fixed and variable
costs is that the latter also affects the costs of children from the husbands’ labor supply
perspective. In the case of a sole reduction in the cost of becoming a mother, men are only
affected via consumption and consumption transfers from/to their wife. This makes the
childlessness of married women react stronger to changes in the variable cost of children
(φ), both compared to single women and to only the application of the East German
fixed cost of children in period 1 (η1).
More striking than the differences in the completed fertility, are the differences in
the postponement of children. In particular, the education level after which optimal
postponement behavior starts increases to about 16 years of education for married women
and 18 years of education for single women. The higher number of children in period
1 is offset by a lower number of children in period 2, resulting in little change in the
completed fertility of mothers. I find relatively little differences for the shift in inter-
temporal allocation of children between both counterfactual scenarios. However, the
transition from baseline to counterfactual results in substantial inter-temporal allocation
shifts for children.
Next, I investigate the transition from childlessness to motherhood under the coun-
terfactual scenario. I decompose the fertility rates of women, who have children in coun-
terfactual, into “new” mothers and mothers who were already mothers in baseline. Sub-
figure (I) of Figure 3.8 plots the completed fertility of mothers. The solid line plots the
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baseline results. Dashed lines illustrate the completed fertility of previously not childless
women. Dotted lines illustrate the results for previously childless women. Single women
are marked red, married women blue. I observe that previously married women who
already had children in baseline display a slightly higher completed fertility following the
reduction in childcare cost. Married women with children in counterfactual who were
childless in baseline have a completed fertility between 1.3 and 1.5 children, depending
on education. Those women exhibit a lower average number of children per mother (con-
ditional on having children), but a higher overall number of children are born as they
were previously childless. Compared to baseline, we observe lower completed fertility
rates for most single women as a result of some women leaving single-hood into marriage.
Single women who were childless at baseline but are single mothers now only have one
child, independently of educational background. Single women are constrained in their
per period fertility to one child, due to the time constraint. Thus, if previously childless
single women decide to have children in one period only, they will automatically have
exactly one child.
Sub-figure (II) of Figure 3.8 plots the completed fertility of women who are childless
in baseline and married in both the baseline and the counterfactual. This comparison
investigates only the impact of the lower costs of children for married women, exclud-
ing selection into marriage that changes the composition of the underlying population
of married women. The solid line plots the baseline results. The dashed line illustrates
mothers who were previously married and childless. I observe an upward sloping com-
pleted fertility pattern. If children are considered a normal good, decreases in the relative
price, compared to other types of consumption, will result in a larger consumption share
of children.
Lastly, I investigate how the full adoption of the East German cost of children affect
the reasons for childlessness. The reasons for childlessness are reported in Table 3.7. I
find that the lower fixed cost of becoming a mother causes less postponement of chil-
dren to period 2. This is reflected in the lower relative share of “Postponement” as the
reason for childlessness, compared the West German baseline results. Next, I focus on
individuals who transition from one reason of childlessness in baseline to either being a
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Figure 3.8: Transitions Out of Childlessness
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Regular lines indicate the baseline results, dashed lines plot previously not childless women and dotted lines plot
previously childless women. Single women in the counterfactual simulation are illustrated in red, married women in
blue. The right figure plots the completed fertility of women who are married in both baseline and counterfactual
were childless in baseline. Regular lines plot the baseline results, dotted lines illustrate previously married childless
women.
parent or to another reason for childlessness in counterfactual.92 The transition shares
of previously childless women are displayed in Table 3.8. The reason for childlessness
in baseline is reported in rows, the reason for childlessness in counterfactual in columns.
Within each block, shares sum up to one. Individuals (or couples) not changing their
status in childlessness are displayed on the diagonal. The largest movement, when using
the full sample of previously childless women, is from optimal childlessness to not being
childless. This effect is largely driven by married women. The effect size of the transition
from constrained to not childless is substantially smaller in absolute terms. However,
childlessness due to poverty is only a factor for single women in baseline. Weighting
the share by the relative size of single compared to married women, effect sizes become
roughly similar. Focusing only on individuals who change their status (either in child-
lessness or the reason for childlessness, right block of Table 3.8), I find that almost 60%
of women/couples transition from “Optimal” to not being childless. The second largest
group, with almost 30% of all transitions, switches from “Postponement” to not child-
less. Regarding transitions into involuntary childlessness, I find 1.3% of all transitions to
transition to “Sterility” and 4.2% to transition to “Postponement.”
92Application of both East German fixed cost of becoming a parent in period 1 (η1) and variable cost
of children (φ)
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Table 3.7: Reasons for Childlessness (East German η1 / East German η1 & φ)
East German η1 East German η1 & φ
Voluntary Childlessness Involuntary Childlessness Voluntary Childlessness Involuntary Childlessness
Education Voluntary Involuntary Poverty Optimal Sterility Postponement Voluntary Involuntary Poverty Optimal Sterility Postponement
1 0.842 0.158 0.364 0.636 0.837 0.163 0.813 0.187 0.407 0.593 0.809 0.191
2 0.858 0.142 0.391 0.609 0.820 0.180 0.832 0.168 0.451 0.549 0.790 0.210
3 0.858 0.142 0.426 0.574 0.800 0.200 0.839 0.161 0.489 0.511 0.807 0.193
4 0.851 0.149 0.393 0.607 0.805 0.195 0.821 0.179 0.454 0.546 0.784 0.216
5 0.856 0.144 0.408 0.592 0.810 0.190 0.827 0.173 0.474 0.526 0.763 0.237
6 0.848 0.152 0.419 0.581 0.718 0.282 0.823 0.177 0.486 0.514 0.708 0.292
7 0.839 0.161 0.408 0.592 0.449 0.551 0.813 0.187 0.485 0.515 0.476 0.524
8 0.833 0.167 0.369 0.631 0.351 0.649 0.800 0.200 0.432 0.568 0.347 0.653
Note: Reasons for childlessness by women’s education. Sample restricted to women/couples who are childless in the counterfactual scenarios. Left block for the application of the
East German η1 to West Germany, right block for the application of the East German η1 and φ to West Germany. Values within one line per sub-block add up to one. The blocks
“Voluntary Childlessness” and “Involuntary Childlessness” contain the sub-groups of “Voluntary” and “Involuntary”, respectively. Values rounded.
Table 3.8: Childlessness Transitions (East German η1 & φ for West Germany)
New Status (All) New Status (Switchers)
Not Childless Sterility Postponement Poverty Optimal Not Childless Sterility Postponement
Old Status Sterility 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Postponement 0.057 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.000
Poverty 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.061 0.002 0.000
Optimal 0.112 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.363 0.585 0.011 0.042
Note: Transitions in the reason for childlessness. Sample restricted to women/couples who are childless in baseline. Old status refers to the
reason for childlessness in baseline, new status in the counterfactual. “Switcher” is restricted to women/couples that change their status, either
with respect to childlessness or the reason for childlessness. Values rounded.
Summing up, both counterfactual simulations indicate that public provision of acces-
sible childcare affects the timing of children much more than the final number of children
per mother. As a result of the much lower costs for children in terms of foregone labor
income and experience, a larger fraction of women/couples decides to have children ear-
lier in life. This is counteracted by (almost equally) corresponding lower fertility rates
after the age of 30. I find childlessness to decrease for all women, independent of marital
status and education. Overall, about 19% of previously childless women change either
their reason for childlessness or transition out of childlessness, with the largest share tran-
sitioning to parenthood. Calculating the completed cohort fertility for the counterfactual
state, weighting the education groups by their respective share in the population, results
in a completed cohort fertility of 1.737. This is equivalent to a 13.5% increase in the
completed cohort fertility compared to the observed data93 for the birth cohort of 1966.
In the observed data for women born in 1966, the completed cohort fertility in Sweden
is 31.0% above the one for Germany. In the counterfactual state, this difference would
be reduced by half to 15.4%.
93Data taken from the Human Fertility Database (www.humanfertility.org)
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Figure 3.9: Application of Alternative Wage Penalties to West Germany
10 12 14 16 18 20
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
(I) Childlessness
Education (Years)
Sh
ar
e 
Ch
ild
le
ss
Baseline (married)
Baseline (single)
East Wage Penalty (married)
East Wage Penalty (single)
75% Wage Penalty (married)
75% Wage Penalty (single)
10 12 14 16 18 20
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
(II) Completed Fertility of Mothers
Education (Years)
N
um
be
r o
f C
hi
ld
re
n
Baseline (married)
Baseline (single)
East Wage Penalty (married)
East Wage Penalty (single)
75% Wage Penalty (married)
75% Wage Penalty (single)
10 12 14 16 18 20
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
(III) Number of Children before age 30
Education (Years)
N
um
be
r o
f C
hi
ld
re
n
Baseline (married)
Baseline (single)
East Wage Penalty (married)
East Wage Penalty (single)
75% Wage Penalty (married)
75% Wage Penalty (single)
10 12 14 16 18 20
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
(IV) Number of Children after age 30
Education (Years)
N
um
be
r o
f C
hi
ld
re
n
Baseline (married)
Baseline (single)
East Wage Penalty (married)
East Wage Penalty (single)
75% Wage Penalty (married)
75% Wage Penalty (single)
Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulating changes in the wage penalty (). Solid lines are the baseline results
moments, dashed lines are simulation results for the application of the East German wage penalty (), dotted lines
are the simulation results for a 25% decrease in the wage penalty ().
3.5.2 The Wage Effect of Spacing Children across Time
The other major difference between the East and West German sub-sample concerns
the wage penalty for having children in both periods, which is the parameter of interest
for this counterfactual experiment. The results of changes in the parameter  to West
Germany are illustrated in Figure 3.9 and Tables B.18 and B.19 in the Appendix. The
comparison of the counterfactual experiments with the empirical moments is illustrated
in Figure B.4 in the Appendix. The solid line plots the baseline moments. The dashed
line plots the results for the application of the East German wage penalty () to West
Germany. The dotted line plots the result of a 25% reduction in the wage penalty ().
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The wage penalty affects only individuals who choose to have children in both periods.
Provided that there are no changes in the marital status, a decrease in the parameter
should only affect fertility rates, leaving the childlessness rates unaffected.94 The reaction
of the childlessness rate to a change in the labor market attachment risk are very small for
both married and single women (see Tables B.20, B.21 and B.22). This indicates that the
labor market attachment channel does not influence the marriage decision substantially.
In addition, there are almost no changes in the reasons for childlessness as indicated
by Table B.20 for the full childless population and Table B.21 and Table B.22 in the
Appendix for the heterogeneity analysis with respect to marital status.
When applying the East German wage penalty to West Germany, I observe declining
fertility rates for both married and single women across all education levels. The effect
size is slightly smaller for highly educated women, as those are less likely to space children
across time in baseline already. The opposite effect can be observed for the 25% decrease
in the wage penalty. For most women the wage penalty of spacing children across affects
only the number of children born after age 30. However, the opposite is true for highly
educated women, who are more likely to postpone motherhood. As a result of lower costs
of spacing children across time, all individuals are more likely to have an additional child
in the period in which they would otherwise not have children.
3.5.3 Counteracting the Wage Penalty by Expansion of Public
Childcare
In a last counterfactual experiment, I show how increases in the wage penalty of spacing
children across time () can be counteracted by reductions in the variable cost of children
(φ). In particular, I assume a 25% increase in the wage penalty () and a counteracting
5.5% decrease in the variable cost of children (φ). The increase in the wage penalty can
come in many forms. Either through discrimination of women spending extended periods
of time taking care of their children, or in the form of human capital depreciation. A
possible example of human capital depreciation is automation and artificial intelligence,
which fundamentally changes the way we work and has the potential to render some
94In the first period, sterility is the only driver of involuntary childlessness. If sterile, the woman (or
couple) does not have children. If not sterile, the women (or couple) will not be childless.
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Figure 3.10: Changes in Wage Penalty and Variable Costs of Children
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Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulation of a 25% increase in the wage penalty () and a counteracting 5.5%
reduction in the variable cost of children (φ). Regular lines indicates the new baseline simulation, dashed lines
illustrate the application of only a 25% increase in the wage penalty () and dotted lines indicate an additional 5.5%
reduction in the variable cost of children (φ).
currently useful human capital obsolete in the future. Not keeping up with the quickly
changing work environment and adopting important human capital can negatively affect
future wages. The reduction in the variable cost of children can come in many forms
that are individual specific, such as investments in the child’s human capital in publicly
available childcare. The new baseline scenario uses the baseline results for Germany.
Furthermore, I apply the East German cost of children and the West German cost of
spacing children across time for a more realistic baseline comparison for the future.
The results are illustrated in Figure 3.10. A figure including fertility per period
(Figure B.5) and tables indicating the differences per education group (Table B.23 and
Table B.24) are in the Appendix. The solid line plots the new baseline moments. The
dashed line plots the results for the application of a 25% increase in the wage penalty
(). The dotted line illustrates an additional counteracting 5.5% decrease in the variable
cost of children (φ).
In line with the previous results of changes in the wage penalty, as documented in
Section 3.5.2, the increase in the wage penalty has no influence on childlessness. For the
number of children, conditional on being a mother, I observe a parallel downward shift
of the completed fertility curve for both married and single women. When additionally
applying a 5.5% reduction to the variable cost of children, heterogeneous effects by edu-
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cation and marital status can be observed along both margins of fertility. Childlessness
decreases for all education levels, with larger effects for highly educated women, both
single and married. The 5.5% reduction in the variable cost of children leads to an in-
crease in completed fertility for married women across all education groups. The effect is
largest for very low and very highly educated women. For those two groups, the decrease
in variable cost of children almost completely offsets the reduction in completed fertility
due to the increase in the wage penalty. For single women, we observe an additional
decrease in completed fertility across all education groups. Similar to the observations
from previous counterfactuals, this is the result of single women now transitioning out of
childlessness to motherhood and from single-hood to marriage.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a structural estimation of fertility and childlessness that includs
various potential causes of the observed low fertility rates that Germany experienced
since the early 1980s. The structural model parameters are identified using labor mar-
ket conditions of individuals combined with distinct features of fertility behavior. The
research provides novel insights into the interaction of economic and biologic channels in
determining childlessness.
The model allows me to decompose the reasons for childlessness into voluntary and
involuntary childlessness. Even though voluntary childlessness is the main driving factor
for high rates of childlessness, I find that a substantial share of childlessness is involuntary.
Women who choose to have children late in life and suffer from decreasing fecundity
explain 7.6% of total childlessness. The effect size increases by education from 4.4%
for women with only a low level of secondary education to 15.6% for women holding a
PhD. I quantify the disutility of childlessness in terms of equivalent consumption and find
larger effects for married women compared to single women and for sterility compared to
infertility.
I perform a sample split between former East and West Germany to further inves-
tigate the impact of institutional differences between those two former states. When
looking at the cost of the first child, I find consistently smaller costs of children in East
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Germany compared to West Germany across both periods. However, the gap between
East and West Germany decreases substantially over time, which may be a result of the
expansion of the provision of publicly available childcare and/or the availability of in-
formal childcare in West Germany. The long lasting persistent differences between East
and West Germany with respect to time cost of children result in higher levels of poverty
driven childlessness and involuntary childlessness due to postponement of having children
in West Germany.
Lastly, I perform several counterfactual analyses. I show that lowering the costs of
children can result in lower rates of childlessness and higher rates of fertility, conditional
on having at least one child. However, the inter-temporal allocation of children is much
more affected than the final number of children born to mothers. Nevertheless, expansion
of public childcare would result in a lower age at first birth of women, a lower number
of women who remain childless and a higher completed fertility, conditional on having
children. I also show that increases in the negative wage effects of spacing children across
time can be counteracted by reductions in the variable costs of children. Those reductions
can come in any child-specific human capital investment, such as public provision of after
school care that helps children develop their talents and prepare for school.
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Appendix B
B.1 Historic Development by Mother’s Education
Figure B.1: Fertility along the intensive and extensive Margin - by Education
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Notes: Childlessness (y-axis) is defined as the share of the female population that remains without children by
age 45. Average Completed Fertility (x-axis) is the total fertility of all women above age 45. Women with a low
education level (≤ 9 years of schooling) are plotted black, women with some sort of vocational training (years of
schooling > 9 & < 13) are plotted blue and women with a high level of education (years of schooling ≥ 13) are
plotted red. Due to the low number of women with a high level of education in the birth cohorts before 1945, those
cohorts are not plotted for the high education subgroup. Data: German Microcensus, survey years 2008 & 2012,
own calculations.
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B.2 Cross Country Comparison for TFR and Childlessness
Table B.1: TFR and Childlessness: Cross Country Comparison
Country TFR Childlessness Data Source
Austria 1.52 0.21 OECD Family Database
Czech Republic 1.69 0.08
Denmark 1.75 0.13
Estonia 1.59 0.10
Finland 1.49 0.21
Hungary 1.49 0.12
Japan 1.43 0.27
Lithuania 1.63 0.12
Netherlands 1.62 0.18
Norway 1.62 0.11
Poland 1.45 0.16
Portugal 1.37 0.07
Slovak Republic 1.52 0.12
Slovenia 1.62 0.12
Spain 1.31 0.18
Sweden 1.78 0.12
United States 1.77 0.12
Argentina 2.26 0.30 Myong, Park and Yi (2018)
Cameroon 4.64 0.18
China 1.60 0.08
Hong Kong 1.19 0.12
Singapore 0.83 0.24
Tanzania 4.77 0.09
Uruguay 1.08 0.27
Note: For countries where data is obtained from the OECD Family
Database, TFR are measured in 2017, whereas childlessness is measured for
women born in 1970. For countries where data is obtained from Myong, Park
and Yi (2018), childlessness is calculated by multiplying marriage rates with
childlessness rates conditional on marital status.
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B.3 Wage Regressions
Table B.2: Years of Education by Educational Type
Education Type Education Title Years
Secondary Education Hauptschule 9.0
Polytech. Oberschule DDR 10.0
Realschule 10.0
Fachhochschulereife 12.0
Abitur 13.0
Tertiary Education Anlernung 0.0
Berufsvorbereitungsjahr 1.0
Lehre 1.5
Berufsschule 1.5
Beamtenschule 1.5
Gesundheit (1 Jahr) 2.0
Meister 2.5
Fachschule DDR 2.0
Fachakademie (Bayern) 2.0
FH 3.0
Uni 5.0
PhD 8.0
Note: Assignment of years of education to educational degrees following the
procedure used in the GSOEP.
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics (GSOEP)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev.
Education (Years) 50,520 12.35 2.63
Experience (Years) 50,520 15.20 7.82
Gross Labor Income (EUR) 50,520 2,317.01 1,540.43
Net Labor Income (EUR) 50,520 1,514.72 963.03
Net Wage (EUR) 50,520 16.42 11.81
Log Wage 50,520 2.66 0.52
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Table B.4: Regression Output
Dependent variable:
Net Labor Income (log)
Male 0.232∗∗∗
(0.002)
Education −0.075∗∗∗
(0.011)
Education(sq) 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
Education(cu) −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002)
Experience 0.039∗∗∗
(0.001)
Experience(sq) −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
Experience(cu) 0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00000)
Constant 1.991∗∗∗
(0.045)
Observations 225,805
R2 0.332
Adjusted R2 0.332
Residual Std. Error 0.348 (df = 225797)
F Statistic 16,065.220∗∗∗ (df = 7; 225797)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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B.4 Model Fit: Normalized Differences
Table B.5: Model Fit: Childlessness
Marital Status Education (Group) Model Data Std. Dev. Norm. Diff.
Single Women 1 0.619 0.662 0.473 0.091
2 0.644 0.709 0.454 0.144
3 0.681 0.718 0.450 0.083
4 0.673 0.710 0.454 0.081
5 0.688 0.675 0.468 0.029
6 0.734 0.711 0.453 0.052
7 0.809 0.770 0.421 0.093
8 0.846 0.812 0.391 0.087
Married Women 1 0.094 0.070 0.255 0.094
2 0.080 0.103 0.304 0.075
3 0.084 0.095 0.294 0.037
4 0.089 0.104 0.305 0.048
5 0.102 0.098 0.297 0.013
6 0.108 0.113 0.316 0.016
7 0.137 0.146 0.353 0.027
8 0.176 0.160 0.367 0.042
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Table B.6: Model Fit: Children before Age 30
Marital Status Education (Group) Model Data Std. Dev. Norm. Diff.
Single Women 1 1.000 1.160 0.924 0.173
2 1.000 0.996 0.794 0.005
3 1.000 1.145 0.946 0.153
4 0.997 0.968 0.885 0.032
5 0.889 0.938 0.833 0.059
6 0.745 0.766 0.703 0.029
7 0.517 0.527 0.735 0.013
8 0.400 0.407 0.591 0.011
Married Women 1 1.625 1.836 1.081 0.195
2 1.597 1.719 1.093 0.113
3 1.584 1.514 0.913 0.076
4 1.511 1.437 0.954 0.078
5 1.444 1.322 0.964 0.127
6 1.370 1.098 0.958 0.284
7 0.989 0.840 0.922 0.161
8 0.575 0.632 0.943 0.061
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Table B.7: Model Fit: Children after Age 30
Marital Status Education (Group) Model Data Std. Dev. Norm. Diff.
Single Women 1 0.273 0.398 0.642 0.194
2 0.354 0.366 0.612 0.019
3 0.348 0.447 0.590 0.168
4 0.406 0.512 0.688 0.153
5 0.500 0.486 0.686 0.021
6 0.667 0.643 0.678 0.034
7 0.970 0.871 0.697 0.142
8 0.973 1.149 0.864 0.204
Married Women 1 0.607 0.488 0.761 0.157
2 0.644 0.528 0.820 0.141
3 0.669 0.505 0.734 0.225
4 0.718 0.569 0.776 0.191
5 0.809 0.651 0.834 0.189
6 0.850 0.822 0.879 0.032
7 1.106 1.116 0.945 0.011
8 1.327 1.400 0.943 0.078
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Table B.8: Model Fit: Marriage Rates
Gender Education (Group) Model Data Std. Dev. Norm. Diff.
Women 1 0.920 0.956 0.319 0.111
2 0.915 0.926 0.390 0.027
3 0.914 0.951 0.349 0.105
4 0.912 0.922 0.406 0.025
5 0.905 0.898 0.428 0.016
6 0.899 0.874 0.442 0.058
7 0.876 0.860 0.443 0.038
8 0.857 0.813 0.457 0.097
Men 1 0.922 0.860 0.418 0.148
2 0.918 0.836 0.449 0.183
3 0.908 0.908 0.383 0.002
4 0.914 0.898 0.403 0.039
5 0.900 0.865 0.429 0.082
6 0.900 0.907 0.382 0.018
7 0.877 0.883 0.396 0.014
8 0.860 0.914 0.357 0.151
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B.5 Additional Baseline Results
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Table B.10: Timing of Involuntary Childlessness (Baseline)
Married Childless Women Single Childless Women Married Childless Men
Education Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
1 0.717 0.283 1.000 0.000 0.656 0.344
2 0.664 0.336 1.000 0.000 0.617 0.383
3 0.631 0.369 1.000 0.000 0.583 0.417
4 0.507 0.493 0.750 0.250 0.479 0.521
5 0.425 0.575 0.714 0.286 0.422 0.578
6 0.352 0.648 0.300 0.700 0.353 0.647
7 0.192 0.808 0.059 0.941 0.211 0.789
8 0.079 0.921 0.062 0.938 0.116 0.884
Note: Reasons for involuntary childlessness. Sample restricted to women/couples who are
involuntariy childless. Period refers to the period in which sterility/infertility is realized by
individuals. Values rounded.
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B.6 Additional Sub-sample Results
Table B.11: Estimation Results for Subsamples
Parameter Description Baseline West East 2008 2012
β Discount factor 0.971 0.954 0.964 0.971 0.994
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
σa Standard deviation of the log-normal distribution 0.513 0.537 0.500 0.513 0.524
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
ν Preference parameter 6.137 6.010 6.129 6.237 6.154
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
µ Good cost to be supported by a household 0.677 0.689 0.658 0.677 0.678
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
α Fraction of child-rearing to be supported by women 0.546 0.554 0.537 0.546 0.535
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
φ Time cost of having children 0.620 0.617 0.600 0.620 0.623
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
η1 Fixed cost of children (period 1) 0.187 0.198 0.074 0.187 0.192
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
δm Time cost for being single (men) 0.321 0.346 0.345 0.321 0.331
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
δf Time cost for being single (women) 0.106 0.105 0.157 0.106 0.103
(0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
cˆ Minimum consumption level for procreation 0.461 0.417 0.445 0.461 0.462
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
ma Average ratio of non-labor income to labor income 1.327 1.211 1.344 1.327 1.314
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
 Wage effect of spacing children across time 0.617 0.544 0.719 0.617 0.614
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
η2 Fixed cost of children (period 2) 0.013 0.005 0.041 0.013 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ω Share of randomly matched on marriage market 0.427 0.498 0.452 0.427 0.428
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Note: Estimated parameters of the model for different data subsets (West Germany, East Germany, 2008 Microcensus and
2012 Microcensus). Parameters for wages and natural sterility and infertility are set. For readability bootstrapped
standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Figure B.2: Model Fit for West Germany
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Notes: Internal fit of the simulated model for West Germany only. Lines are empirical moments, dashed lines are
simulation results. (I) Completed Fertility for married (blue) and single (red) women for different educational groups.
(II) Childlessness rate for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (III) Fertility of
mothers until age 30 for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (IV) Fertility of
mothers after age 30 for married (blue) and single (red) women for different education groups. (V) Marriage rates
for women (gray) and men (orange) for different education groups. (VI) Divorce rates for women (gray) and men
(orange) for different education groups. Data: German Microcensus, survey years 2008 & 2012, own calculations.
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B.7 Counterfactual Figures and Tables
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Figure B.3: Application of the East German Children Production Costs (vs. Em-
pirical Moments)
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Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulating the application of the East German children production costs to
West Germany. Lines are empirical moments, dashed lines are simulation results for the application of the fixed
cost (η1) in period 1 only, dotted lines are the simulation results for the full application of the East German children
production costs (η1 & φ). Data: German Microcensus, survey years 2008 & 2012, own calculations.
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Table B.14: Effect of the East German Fixed Cost of Children for West Germany
(η1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.116 0.118 0.120 0.123 0.132 0.136 0.169 0.208
vs. Empirical 0.045 0.010 0.019 0.004 0.002 -0.019 0.003 0.028
vs. Baseline -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012
Childlessness (single) Value 0.610 0.650 0.684 0.688 0.705 0.750 0.805 0.874
vs. Empirical -0.049 -0.088 -0.046 -0.071 -0.045 -0.019 0.016 0.018
vs. Baseline -0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.035 -0.025 -0.025 -0.017 -0.000
Fertility (married) Value 2.196 2.215 2.206 2.197 2.172 2.164 2.049 1.876
vs. Empirical -0.116 -0.009 0.192 0.176 0.137 0.193 0.052 -0.186
vs. Baseline 0.037 0.025 0.015 -0.004 0.011 0.049 0.059 0.067
Fertility (single) Value 1.304 1.346 1.338 1.381 1.357 1.380 1.448 1.520
vs. Empirical -0.241 0.069 -0.202 -0.038 -0.004 0.014 0.066 -0.123
vs. Baseline -0.025 -0.033 -0.059 -0.093 -0.086 -0.109 -0.027 0.141
Note: Application of the East German fixed cost of becoming a mother in period 1 (η1) to West Germany. VS.-rows
are calculated by subtracting empirical values / baseline simulation results from the counterfactual results. Values
rounded.
Table B.15: Effect of the East German Cost of Children for West Germany (η1 &
φ)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.091 0.079 0.083 0.085 0.094 0.098 0.123 0.171
vs. Empirical 0.020 -0.030 -0.018 -0.034 -0.037 -0.057 -0.043 -0.010
vs. Baseline -0.030 -0.046 -0.047 -0.055 -0.055 -0.056 -0.062 -0.049
Childlessness (single) Value 0.585 0.619 0.646 0.637 0.652 0.681 0.778 0.845
vs. Empirical -0.074 -0.119 -0.084 -0.123 -0.099 -0.088 -0.011 -0.011
vs. Baseline -0.048 -0.054 -0.063 -0.087 -0.079 -0.094 -0.044 -0.030
Fertility (married) Value 2.294 2.295 2.296 2.263 2.281 2.279 2.199 1.997
vs. Empirical -0.017 0.072 0.282 0.242 0.245 0.309 0.202 -0.065
vs. Baseline 0.136 0.106 0.105 0.062 0.120 0.164 0.209 0.188
Fertility (single) Value 1.248 1.299 1.296 1.316 1.303 1.296 1.365 1.429
vs. Empirical -0.297 0.023 -0.244 -0.103 -0.058 -0.069 -0.017 -0.215
vs. Baseline -0.081 -0.079 -0.100 -0.158 -0.139 -0.193 -0.110 0.049
Note: Application of the East German cost of becoming a mother in period 1 (η) and the variable cost of children
(φ) to West Germany. VS.-rows are calculated by subtracting empirical values / baseline simulation results from the
counterfactual results. Values rounded.
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Figure B.4: Application of Alternative Wage Penalties to West Germany
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(II) Completed Fertility of Mothers
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Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulating changes in the wage penalty (). Lines are the empirical moments
observed in the data, dashed lines are simulation results for the application of the East German wage penalty (),
dotted lines are the simulation results for a 25% decrease in the wage penalty () to West Germany. Data: German
Microcensus, survey years 2008 & 2012, own calculations.
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Table B.18: Effect of the East German Wage Penalty for West Germany ()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.121 0.125 0.130 0.140 0.149 0.154 0.185 0.222
vs. Empirical 0.050 0.017 0.029 0.021 0.019 -0.001 0.019 0.042
vs. Baseline 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Childlessness (single) Value 0.631 0.666 0.705 0.718 0.728 0.772 0.823 0.873
vs. Empirical -0.028 -0.072 -0.026 -0.041 -0.022 0.003 0.035 0.017
vs. Baseline -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
Fertility (married) Value 2.022 2.049 2.034 2.054 2.019 1.974 1.835 1.712
vs. Empirical -0.289 -0.174 0.020 0.033 -0.017 0.004 -0.162 -0.350
vs. Baseline -0.136 -0.140 -0.158 -0.147 -0.142 -0.141 -0.155 -0.097
Fertility (single) Value 1.193 1.212 1.220 1.285 1.269 1.338 1.364 1.306
vs. Empirical -0.352 -0.065 -0.320 -0.134 -0.093 -0.028 -0.018 -0.337
vs. Baseline -0.135 -0.166 -0.176 -0.189 -0.174 -0.151 -0.111 -0.073
Note: Application of the East German wage penalty to West Germany. VS.-rows are calculated by subtracting
empirical values / baseline simulation results from the counterfactual results. Values rounded.
Table B.19: Effect of a 25 % Reduction in the Wage Penalty for West Germany ()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.121 0.124 0.130 0.140 0.149 0.154 0.184 0.217
vs. Empirical 0.050 0.016 0.029 0.021 0.019 -0.001 0.018 0.037
vs. Baseline -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003
Childlessness (single) Value 0.635 0.677 0.710 0.729 0.735 0.779 0.821 0.875
vs. Empirical -0.024 -0.061 -0.020 -0.030 -0.015 0.010 0.032 0.019
vs. Baseline 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.001
Fertility (married) Value 2.289 2.326 2.326 2.339 2.308 2.257 2.127 1.898
vs. Empirical -0.023 0.102 0.312 0.318 0.273 0.286 0.130 -0.163
vs. Baseline 0.131 0.136 0.135 0.138 0.147 0.142 0.137 0.090
Fertility (single) Value 1.450 1.559 1.532 1.632 1.603 1.645 1.557 1.449
vs. Empirical -0.095 0.282 -0.008 0.213 0.242 0.280 0.174 -0.194
vs. Baseline 0.121 0.181 0.135 0.157 0.160 0.156 0.081 0.070
Note: Simulation of a 25 % reduction in the wage penalty to West Germany. VS.-rows are calculated by subtracting
empirical values / baseline simulation results from the counterfactual results. Values rounded.
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Figure B.5: Changes in Wage Penalty and Variable Cost of Children (all plots)
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(II) Completed Fertility of Mothers
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(III) Number of Children before age 30
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(IV) Number of Children after age 30
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Notes: Counterfactual Simulation - Simulation of a 25% increase in the wage penalty () and a counteracting 5.5%
reduction in the variable cost of children (φ). Regular lines indicates the new baseline simulation, dashed lines
illustrate the application of only a 25% increase in the wage penalty () and dotted lines indicate an additional 5.5%
reduction in the variable cost of children (φ).
Table B.23: Effect of a 25% Increase in Wage Penalty for Germany ()
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.082 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.069 0.070 0.090 0.118
vs. Baseline 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Childlessness (single) Value 0.599 0.631 0.658 0.651 0.666 0.692 0.788 0.834
vs. Baseline -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000
Fertility (married) Value 2.629 2.622 2.605 2.575 2.578 2.568 2.474 2.249
vs. Baseline -0.058 -0.053 -0.056 -0.057 -0.053 -0.055 -0.060 -0.055
Fertility (single) Value 1.284 1.361 1.323 1.388 1.344 1.315 1.420 1.449
vs. Baseline -0.058 -0.048 -0.056 -0.071 -0.057 -0.072 -0.057 -0.049
Note: Application of a 25% increase in the wage penalty for Germany.Germany is the new baseline with East
German cost for children in period 1 (η1) and West German wage penalty (). VS.-rows are calculated by
subtracting the new baseline simulation results from the counterfactual results. Values rounded.
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Table B.24: Additional Effect of a counteracting 5.5% decrease in Variable Cost of
Children (φ) for Germany
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Childlessness (married) Value 0.072 0.054 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.038 0.046 0.068
vs. Baseline -0.009 -0.010 -0.019 -0.024 -0.027 -0.032 -0.044 -0.050
Childlessness (single) Value 0.597 0.633 0.653 0.652 0.664 0.682 0.774 0.811
vs. Baseline -0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.010 -0.014 -0.024
Fertility (married) Value 2.688 2.667 2.647 2.606 2.598 2.573 2.489 2.285
vs. Baseline 0.000 -0.008 -0.013 -0.026 -0.033 -0.050 -0.046 -0.019
Fertility (single) Value 1.255 1.299 1.293 1.328 1.311 1.290 1.340 1.324
vs. Baseline -0.087 -0.111 -0.086 -0.131 -0.090 -0.097 -0.137 -0.174
Note: Application of a in 25% increase in the wage penalty and a counteracting 5.5% decrease in the variable cost
of children for Germany. Germany is the new baseline with East German cost for children in period 1 (η1) and West
German wage penalty (). VS.-rows are calculated by subtracting the new baseline simulation results from the
counterfactual results. Values rounded.
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B.8 Optimization Routines
The model parameter are estimated using a tree stage estimation procedure. First, a set of
initial values of size 500,000 is drawn from the complete solution space for each parameter
and the model is evaluated using this initial grid. Second, - based on the results from
step one - a genetic (global optimization) algorithm is run using the best combinations of
values from step one as starting values. The second step is used in order to find the area
in the parameter space in which the global maximum lies. The final parameter values
are obtained using the (local) Powell Optimization (PO) routine. Estimation steps one
and two are performed at the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre of the Bavarian Academy
of Science and Humanities (LRZ), while the last step (PO-Optimization) is performed
on a local machine. All optimization routines have standard implementations in R,
which I use. However, I have adjusted the genetic algorithm package in order to work
with Rmpi communication based parallelization between computing nodes on the Leibniz
Supercomputing Centre of the Bavarian Academy of Science and Humanities (LRZ).
B.8.1 Genetic Algorithm
The genetic algorithms R-package “GA” provides a valuable and flexible toolbox for
general-purpose stochastic optimization of binary and real-valued functions. Genetic al-
gorithms are stochastic optimization routines that work by mimicking biological evolution
and natural selection. At the end of each iteration of the optimization the fittest individ-
uals survive. Additional biological mechanisms of evolution, such as crossover between
surviving individuals and random mutation are applied when generating the new popu-
lation for the next round from the surviving population of the last round. Thus, GA’s
provide a powerful general purpose optimization strategy for complex problems where
first order conditions are not available. GA is robust against local extrema and can thus
be used in a setting where the existence of multiple local extrema can not be ruled out.
Unfortunately, GA’s are - similar to the biological evolution of life - relatively slow and
thus require high computational cost and time until convergence is achieved.
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B.8.2 Powell Optimization Algorithm
The R-package “powell” provides the R implementation of the Unconstrained Optimiza-
tion by Quadratic Approximation (UOBYQA) Algorithm, originally developed under
Fortran by Michael J. D. Powell (Powell, 2002). Powell’s UOBYQA Algorithm is an iter-
ative, numerical and derivative free optimization algorithm that minimizes the objective
function within a trust region by constructing and minimizing a quadratic model at each
iteration step.
B.9 Identification
In this section, I illustrate the identification of the structural model parameter. I use
64 moments along 8 dimensions to identify my 14 model parameter. In the following I
change each structural model parameter individually, leaving the remaining parameter
constant to illustrate how changes in one parameter affect the simulated moments.
B.9.1 µ and m¯a
Increases in the public household good (µ) as well as decreases in the mean of the non-
labor income decrease the available consumption in the household. Figure B.6 plots the
response of the simulated moments for a 20% increase in µ (dashed line / triangles)
and a 20% decrease in m¯a. Both parameter influence childlessness and marriage rates
in roughly the same way. However, the number of children born to single women, both
before and after age 30, is affected differently by both parameters across education levels,
which allows for parameter identification.
B.9.2 δf and δm
δf and δm affect both marriage rates as well as childlessness and the inter-temporal
allocation of children of single women. Figure B.7 plots the response of the simulated
moments for a 20% increase in δf (dashed line / triangles) and a 20% decrease in δm. The
model parameter can be identified as both parameters affect both childlessness and the
inter-temporal allocation of children for single women differently across education levels.
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Furthermore both parameter increase childlessness for single women but have different
effects on marriage rates.
B.9.3 φ, η and η2
The time cost of children φ and η affect both childlessness and the number of children
born in each period. Figure B.8 plots the response of the simulated moments for a 20%
increase in φ (dashed line / triangles) and a 20% decrease in η. The structural parameter
affect childlessness differently by marital status and education level. The same is true
for the number of children born before and after age 30 of the mother. This allows for
model parameter identification.
The fixed time cost of children η and η2 affect the number of children born in each
period and the inter-temporal allocation of children. Figure B.9 plots the response of the
simulated moments for a 20% increase in η (dashed line / triangles) and a 20% decrease
in η2. The parameter are identified via their different effect on the number of children
per period by education group.
B.9.4 ν and β
The preference parameter allowing for zero children (ν) and the discount rate (β) enter
the utility function directly. While the preference parameter is constant across periods
and education groups, the discount rate affects individuals differently by education level
due to the return to experience which depends on individuals education level. While both
changes in parameter values have effects going in the same direction for childlessness and
marriage rates, the effects differ for the number of children born before and after age
30 both by marital status and by education level. Figure B.10 plots the response of the
simulated moments for a 20% increase in ν (dashed line / triangles) and a 20% decrease
in β.
B.9.5 cˆ and σa
Increases in the minimum consumption level for procreation (cˆ) and decreases the stan-
dard deviation of the non-labor income affect marriage rates in a similar way (yet of dif-
ferent sign). At the same time, both changes in parameter values decrease childlessness
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for married women across almost all education levels in a non-linear way. Furthermore,
both parameter affect childlessness and the number of children born in each period in a
substantially different way across marital status and education background. Figure B.11
plots the response of the simulated moments for a 20% increase in cˆ (dashed line /
triangles) and a 20% decrease in σa.
B.9.6 ω and 
The level of assortative matching on the marriage market ω overall shows little effects
compared to the negative wage effect of long term child-rearing . While ω mainly affects
childlessness of single women and marriage rates,  affects the timing of children in a way
that strongly depends on mothers educational background and marital status. Further-
more, marriage rates of men are affected differently by education level. Figure B.12 plots
the response of the simulated moments for a 20% increase in ω (dashed line / triangles)
and a 20% decrease in .
B.9.7 α
The share of child rearing provided by the husband only affects the fertility behavior of
married couples and marriage rates. The extend to which α affects the optimal conditions
depends on the relative income of both spouses, which varies by education level. In
particular the number of children born after age 30 show heterogeneity in effect size by
education level which allows for parameter identification. Figure B.13 plots the response
of the simulated moments for a 20% increase in α (dashed line / triangles) and a 20%
decrease in α.
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Figure B.6: Identification of µ & m¯a
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Notes: Identification of µ & m¯a - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in µ. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in m¯a.
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Figure B.7: Identification of δf & δm
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Notes: Identification of δf & δm - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in δf . Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in δm.
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Figure B.8: Identification of φ & η
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Notes: Identification of φ & η - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in φ. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in η.
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Figure B.9: Identification of η & η2
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Notes: Identification of η & η2 - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in η. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in η2.
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Figure B.10: Identification of ν & β
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Notes: Identification of ν & β - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in ν. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in β.
151
Childlessness and Fertility Choice
Figure B.11: Identification of cˆ & σa
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Notes: Identification of cˆ & σa - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in cˆ. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in σa.
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Figure B.12: Identification of ω & 
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Notes: Identification of ω &  - Regular lines plot the baseline estimation results. Dashed lines/triangles symbolize
a 20% increase in ω. Dotted lines/circles symbolize a 20% decrease in .
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Figure B.13: Identification of α
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Chapter 4
Marriage and Divorce:
The Role of Labor Market
Institutions
This chapter is joint work with Bastian Schulz from Aarhus University.
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4.1 Introduction
Living in a union with another individual has many benefits. Besides companionship
and mutual affection, there is arguably an economic dimension to partner choice and
household formation. Economies of scale can be realized by joint consumption (Brown-
ing et al., 2013). Moreover, the partner’s time endowment, employed either in home
production or through the labor market, can provide utility for multiple household mem-
bers.95 Labor supply is a joint decision due to implications for the whole household
(Chiappori, 1992; Chiappori et al., 2002). Thus, marriage and labor markets interact
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1984).
In addition to its effect on current consumption, the spouse’s employment and income
stream may also provide insurance during times of economic hardship, e.g. prolonged
unemployment. This form of risk pooling, however, does not exclusively take place within
households. In many countries, the social insurance system provides a substitute for
within-household insurance: with good unemployment insurance coverage one does not
need to rely on one’s spouse. The role of the family and partnership formation (or
dissolution) decisions, therefore, depend on the institutional environment. It influences
marital surplus, that is, the economic rents that are gained and shared by individuals
who form a union.96
In this paper, we empirically study the household insurance channel, its interaction
with the generosity of the public unemployment insurance system, and implications for
marriage formation and stability.97 We estimate marital surplus using the transferable
utility marriage market matching model of Choo and Siow (2006). Suppose unemploy-
ment benefits are generous such that there is no need for within-household insurance
against unemployment. This increases marital surplus and, therefore, leads to more mar-
riages and higher marital stability. If unemployment benefits are low, for example due
95The traditional specialization of one individual in market work while a second individual focuses
on home production can be understood as a policy that maximizes joint household utility in this setting
(Becker, 1981).
96In equilibrium models of the marriage market, the marital surplus governs marriage formation and
marital stability, see Goussé et al. (2017) and Gayle and Shephard (2019) for two recent examples.
97In principle, all of our arguments also apply to unmarried cohabitation and same-sex couples. The
nature of our data, however, forces us to focus on legally married heterosexual couples in this paper.
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to means-testing against the partner’s income, shocks have to be absorbed within the
household to a larger extent, lowering marital surplus.
Means testing, a common feature of many social insurance systems, makes it costly in
expectation to marry a partner who is exposed to high unemployment risk. We study a
large-scale institutional reform in Germany that changed the rules of means testing and,
thus, the generosity of unemployment insurance for couples. In January 2003, the first
part of the comprehensive German labor market reforms, the so-called “Hartz reforms”,
was implemented.98 One specific element of the reform was a tightening of means testing
exemptions, implying a sharp increase in the need for within-household insurance during
a period of very high unemployment risk. In 2003, the German unemployment rate stood
at 10% with an increasing trend.
We identify the effect of this labor market reform on marital surplus and stability in
a differences-in-differences framework under the assumption that interethnic marriages,
that is, marriages with one German spouse and one spouse of foreign nationality, were
more exposed to unemployment risk as compared to marriages with two German spouses.
We find support for this identifying assumption in German social security data.99 We
find that the labor market reform had a sizable negative impact on the marital surplus of
interethnic marriages in Germany. Accordingly, the intermarriage rate of German men
and women declined by about 30% between 2003 and 2008. This feedback effect of the
German labor market reforms on the marriage market, and on interethnic marriages in
particular, constitutes and important finding of high policy relevance. Interethnic mar-
riages can be an important vehicle for the integration of migrants (Adda et al., 2019;
Azzolini and Guetto, 2017). An institutional environment that makes this kind of mar-
riage relatively unattractive may therefore hinder the success of migration policy.
An important confounding factor that we have to take into account to identify the
effect of the labor market reform is the Eastern expansion of the European Union (EU)
in May 2004. The EU expansion granted the right to live and work in any EU country to
citizens of eight Eastern European countries, Malta, and Cyprus (the EU10 countries).
98Named after the chairman of the commission that worked out the reform package, Peter Hartz, who
was at that time director of human resources at Volkswagen. We provide more details in Section 4.2.
99Caucutt et al. (2018), who investigate racial differences in marriage market outcomes in the US,
make a similar identification argument related to the unemployment and incarceration rates of black
men.
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Most member states opened their labor markets straight away. Germany and Austria,
however, implemented a seven-year transitional period during which free movement of
workers for citizens of the new member states was only gradually introduced.
It is likely that the EU expansion had by itself an impact on the German marriage
market, similar to what Adda et al. (2019) find in the Italian context. From a theoretical
perspective, the marital surplus of interethnic marriages between Germans and citizens
of the new EU member states was negatively affected by the EU expansion. The reason
is that marrying a German citizen was in principle no longer necessary to obtain the
right to reside and work in Germany. Due to the gradual opening of the German labor
market, however, one would expect to find a smaller effect in Germany as compared to
Italy, a country that immediately granted full labor market access.
We control for the effect of the EU expansion on marital surplus and stability in
a double differences-in-differences setting. That is, we estimate the effect of the EU
expansion conditional on the impact of the aforementioned labor market reform using
a second set of treatment and control groups. We compare marriages of Germans with
a EU10 spouses (treatment group) with marriages of Germans with natives of countries
outside Europe (nonEU, control group). Taking into account the effect of the labor
market reform, we find no statistically significant effect of the EU expansion on marital
surplus and stability of interethnic marriages. For the German case, this finding seems
reasonable,
The main sources of micro data we use in this study are the German marriage and
divorce registers. Between 1997 and 2013, we observe all legal marriages and divorces in
Germany that were formed or dissolved with daily precision and a rich set of covariates.
We are not aware of any other research paper in the literature on marriage market and
family economics that uses these data. As complementary data sources, we use the Ger-
man Microcensus, the largest household survey in Europe, and linked employer-employee
data drawn from the social security registers at the German Federal Employment Agency.
Figure 4.1 depicts the development of the German intermarriage rates between 1997
and 2013 using the marriage register, along with the unemployment rate, to highlight the
interaction of marriage market outcomes and unemployment risk. Intermarriage rates
evolve almost in parallel for men and women. The level of the marriage rate is always
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Figure 4.1: Intermarriage Rates in Germany
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higher for German men marrying foreign women as compared German women marrying
foreign men, so men are more likely to marry a partner of foreign nationality. Note that,
after increases around the year 2000, the German intermarriage rates essentially became
flat. This was a period of rising unemployment in Germany. The unemployment rate
increased from 7.8% in 2001 to a maximum of 11.2% in 2005. The negative correlation
between intermarriage and unemployment rates in this time period suggests a potential
link between marriage market decisions and labor market conditions, which is what we
study in this paper. Note that once the “Hartz I” labor market reform had been imple-
mented (black dashed line), intermarriage rates started to fall for both German men and
women. The negative trend was hardly affected by the EU expansion (red dashed line)
and intermarriage rates only started increasing again around the year 2011, when the
German unemployment rate had reached a historical low.
There is a large literature in family economics on the long-run interaction between
marriage and labor markets, see Greenwood et al. (2016), Chiappori et al. (2018), and
Greenwood et al. (2017) for a survey of this literature. The steep increase of female
educational attainment and labor force participation in most developed economies after
World War II has been a revolution according to Goldin (2006) and was without doubt
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a source of enormous economic growth. Our paper complements this literature by pro-
viding evidence for short-run interactions between marriage and labor markets, identified
through interethnic marriages and institutional change. Other papers have documented
that unemployment, especially male unemployment, is associated with an increase in the
divorce rate.100 Also, we know that marriage and divorce rates are negatively correlated
with the unemployment rate over the business cycle.101 Regarding the interaction of so-
cial insurance systems and marriage, Persson (2020) finds that the elimination of survivor
insurance in Sweden affected marriage formation, divorces and the degree of assortative-
ness on the marriage market. Lastly, there is also a relatively large literature (Basu, 2015;
Dribe and Nystedt, 2015; Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2009; Kantarevic, 2005; Meng
and Gregory, 2005; Meng and Meurs, 2009) on intermarriage and labor outcomes with
mixed results.
In a related paper, Adda et al. (2019) show that intermarriage rates in Italy have been
falling relative to the increasing number of foreign residents since the eastern expansions
of the EU in 2004 and 2007.102 Large groups of immigrants received immediate and
full access to the Italian labor market. Adda et al. (2019) argue that lower intermarriage
rates between Italians and foreigners after the expansions reflect that marrying an Italian
spouse was no longer necessary to gain labor market access in Italy. Thus, if immigrants
react to obtaining labor market access by marrying among themselves to a larger extent
rather than natives of the host country, the labor market access of immigrants might
paradoxically interfere with their integration in the host country instead of fostering it.
We find no significant effect of the EU expansion on interethnic marriages in Germany,
conditional on the effect of the earlier labor market reform.103 There are two main
differences between Italy and Germany to consider in this context. First, labor market
access for citizens of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 was restricted in
Germany until 2011.104 Thus, the channel highlighted in Adda et al. (2019) (an Italian
100See Jensen and Smith (1990), Hansen (2005), and Amato and Beattie (2011) among others.
101See Schaller (2013), González-Val and Marcén (2017), and González-Val and Marcén (2018) among
others.
102The 2007 expansion admitted Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, which is of special
importance in the Italian context due to the geographic proximity.
103We cannot identify what the EU expansion’s effect would have been in the counterfactual scenario
absent the labor market reform. We do find, however, that the expansion’s effect on marital surplus is
negative and significant (as in, Adda et al., 2019) if we estimate the EU effect in isolation.
104Even though it is debatable how much bite those restrictions had, see Section 4.2.
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spouse was no longer necessary to obtain labor market access in Italy) should be much
weaker in Germany. Second, Germany has a very different history of receiving migrants
as compared to Italy and intermarriages have been relatively common for a long period of
time. While large-scale immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy105, Germany
has experienced sizable inflows of migrants since guest worker programs started in the
1950s/60s. During the 1990s and 2000s, the period we study in this paper, the share
of residents without German citizenship was stable at around 8–9% of the population, a
level that Italy did not reach until 2013.106 Adda et al. (2019) report an intermarriage
rate among newly formed marriages of below 3% for Italian men with foreign wives and
around 1% for Italian women with foreign husbands in 1996, the first year of their data.
In Germany, about 10% of all new marriages in 1997, the first year of our data, were
intermarriages. This high baseline level of intermarriages in Germany might make the
EU expansion “shock” quantitatively less important.
Our finding of a significant and quantitatively important negative effect on the mar-
ital surplus of interethnic marriages in Germany as a result of the labor market reform,
however, leads to a conclusion similar in spirit to Adda et al. (2019): if natives react to la-
bor market reforms by marrying each other rather than foreigners, paradoxically, reforms
that are intended to lower the unemployment rate might interfere with the integration of
foreigners, at least in the short-run.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the insti-
tutional background and Section 4.3 our data. Section 4.4 reviews the Choo and Siow
(2006) marriage market matching model that we use to estimate marital surplus. Section
4.5 takes the model to the data and presents our empirical strategy with the main results.
Section 4.6 provides a concluding discussion of the findings.
105As Adda et al. (2019) report, the share of foreign residents in Italy had been below 2% during the
1990s and started increasing during the 2000s. It reached around 9% in 2013.
106The share increased from 3% in 1967 to around 8% by the time of reunification. After the period
of relative stability between 8–9%, the share surpassed 10% in 2014 and stood at more than 13% by the
end of 2018. The recent increase is mainly related to prolonged recessions in Southern Europe and the
inflow of refugees. All numbers are according to the federal statistical office.
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4.2 Institutional Background
Our empirical analysis builds on a distinct change to the institutional environment in
which individuals decide who to marry or stay married to in Germany. The change was
a specific element of the so-called Hartz reforms, a comprehensive labor market reform
package that was worked out by a commission chaired by Peter Hartz, who was at that
time director of human resources at Volkswagen. The commission’s work took place
during the first half of 2002 and results were presented to the public on August 16, 2002.
The Hartz reforms consisted of four reform packages that came into force consecutively.
The reform packages were designed to increase labor demand (Hartz I and II), matching
efficiency (Hartz III), and labor supply (Hartz II and IV).107
We focus on the Hartz I reform package, which came into force on January 1, 2003.
The reform package was passed in parliament only shortly before, on December 23, 2002.
Anticipation effects that would influence marriage-related decisions can thus expected to
be minimal. As it was mainly designed to increase labor demand, the most prominent
policy changes in the package liberalized temporary employment and subcontracted labor
in Germany. Less prominently, however, Hartz I also severely tightened exemptions from
household-level means-testing in the long-term unemployment benefits system, thereby
increasing the extent to which spouses have to insure each other against unemployment.
Traditionally, the German social security system featured three types of transfers.
The first transfer, unemployment benefits108, is a social insurance benefit that replaces
60 to 67% of the previous net salary. It is not means-tested. Prior to 2005, the duration
varied between 12 and 36 months depending upon age and work history. Since 2008, the
duration of these benefits has been restricted to 12 months for workers below the age
of 50.109 Upon exhaustion of unemployment benefits, a second transfer, unemployment
107Hartz I, liberalized temporary employment and subcontracted labor in addition to the changes to
means testing. Hartz II introduced subsidies for one-person companies (“Me-inc”), reformed marginal
employment legislation by introducing new forms of tax-exempt part-time employment (so-called mini
and midi jobs), and made it easier for firms to lay off workers. Hartz III reorganized the Federal
Employment Agency to improve the process of offering suitable jobs to unemployed workers. Hartz IV
heavily reformed the unemployment benefit system, mainly by shortening the duration of unemployment
benefits and merging long-term unemployment assistance with means-tested social assistance.
108“Arbeitslosengeld” in German. The “Hartz IV” reform renamed it to “Arbeitslosengeld I” in 2005.
109For older workers, it is 15 months below 55, 18 months below 58, and then 24 months.
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assistance110, followed prior to 2005. Unemployment assistance claims had to be renewed
yearly, but receipt was not time-limited otherwise. This transfer was tax-financed and
amounted to 53 to 57% of the last net salary. It was, however, means-tested against the
partner’s income for both married and cohabitating individuals.111 The threshold above
which the partner’s income reduced transfer entitlements was lowered substantially by
the Hartz reforms.
From January 1 2003, the Hartz I reform lowered the partner-income threshold by
more than 60% from 520 to 200 Euros per year of age with a maximum of 13000 Euros.
This is the primary reform cutoff we exploit in our empirical analysis. Two years later,
Hartz IV effectively set the means-testing threshold to zero when the long-term unem-
ployment assistance program was discontinued. From January 1 2005, only tax-financed
social benefits, traditionally the third and lowest tier of transfer payments in the German
social security system, were available for unemployed individuals who exhausted their
primary unemployment benefits. These social benefits112 are strictly means-tested and
additional sources of income, including the partner’s income, are counted against benefit
entitlements from the first Euro.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
4.3.1 Marriage and Divorce Registers
The marriage and divorce registers, MR and DR in the following, cover the universe of
marriages and divorces in Germany. Data access is provided through the Research Data
Centers (FDZ) of the statistical offices of the German federal states. The marriage and
divorce registers are two separate sources of process-generated micro data that originate
from the German civil registry offices and divorce courts, respectively. Both data sources
contain information on legally registered marriages of different-sex couples only. Although
110“Arbeitslosenhilfe” in German.
111From 2001 onward, the partner’s income above a threshold of 520 Euros per year of age of the
partner was taken into account. The maximum value of the exemption was 33800 Euros for partners of
age 65 and above.
112“Arbeitslosengeld II” or simply “Hartz IV” in colloquial German.
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same-sex couples could form a civil union in Germany starting in 2001, these unions are
not included in the marriage and divorce registers.113
Both data sets are organized at the level of the couple and contain information on the
birth dates of both spouses, the date of marriage, and, in the DR, the date of divorce.
Additionally, the data contain various covariates including religion and citizenship of
both spouses, place of residence, number of children (before marriage and at the time of
divorce), as well as who filed for divorce and the court’s ruling. There is no information
about education or other indicators of socioeconomic status.
Due to strict German data protection legislation, it is illegal to link the MR and
DR registers at the level of the individual couple. Thus, we first use the MR data only
and study marriage formation at the couple level. We estimate marital surplus based
on the Choo and Siow (2006) transferable utility model of marriage-market matching,
introduced in Section 4.4. To this end, we combine the flow of new marriages observed
in the MR with stocks of unmarried individuals for different nationalities and age groups
obtained from the German Microcensus (MC, described below).
To study marital stability and the incidence of divorce, we need to link the MR and
the DR data. We do so by counting in both data sets the number of marriages in cells
formed by the marriage date in quarterly terms and the nationality of both spouses. We
can then merge both data sets at the quarter-nationality-nationality level to estimate
survival models for different types of marriages that were formed before and after the
institutional change.
The marriage and divorce data are organized as separate yearly files. We have access
to all waves from 1991–2013 (MR) and 1995–2013 (DR). A few federal states did not
report data prior to 1997, so we start our analysis in 1997 and merge the single yearly
files for marriages and divorces into one data set, respectively. We clean the yearly MR
and DR files from missing and inconsistent observations, that is, we remove duplicates,
observations with missing marriage and birth dates, and marriages formed outside Ger-
many. The latter should be removed for conceptual reasons because the two spouses
matched on a different marriage market. Furthermore, marriages formed outside of Ger-
113Same-sex marriages were fully legalized in Germany only in 2017.
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Table 4.1: Number of Marriages by Nationality and Gender
Nationality Men Women
German 6,090,937 5,978,700
EU15 (w/o Germany) 121,023 83,040
Poland 13,380 81,368
Turkey 100,981 55,487
EU10 (w/o Poland) 1,446 15,644
Romania 4,214 24,472
Former Yugoslavia 5,184 33,647
Rest of the World 255,304 313,680
Total 6,626,083 6,626,083
Data: German Marriage Registry, 1997–2013. EU15 (w/o Germany) countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
EU10 (w/o Poland) countries are Cypress, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia
and Slovenia.
many were not recorded before 2008.114 Furthermore, we disregard cases in which one of
the individuals’ birth date implies an age at marriage below 18. Most of these marriages
were formed abroad, although this was a legal possibility in Germany during our period
of observation.115
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of nationalities in the new marriages we observe
between 1997–2013 for men and women, respectively. We observe a total of 6,626,083
marriages. Roughly 6 million of these marriages have at least one spouse with German
nationality. The largest groups of non-Germans who get married in Germany are citizens
of the other EU15 member states, Turkish men, and Polish women. Interestingly, the
numbers of Turkish women and Polish men, respectively, are much smaller. For most
nationalities, the foreign spouse is more often the wife. Exceptions are EU15 and Turkey,
for which the number of husbands is higher. Marriages in which at least one spouse is
non-European (“Rest of the World” in Table 4.1) also make up a significant share of all
observed marriages in Germany.
114Marriages formed abroad represent only 0.15% of all marriages after 2008. Some descriptive infor-
mation on marriages formed abroad can be found in Appendix C.1.
115Before 2017, it was in legal in Germany to form marriages in which there is one adult spouses and
the other is between 16 and 18 years old. However, this type of marriage needed to be approved by a
family court.
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Table 4.2: Number of Marriages by Nationality Combination and Age
Wife German Wife EU15 Wife Polish Wife Turkish
(w/o Germany)
Husband German Mean Age Husband 35.82 36.18 37.40 30.34
Mean Age Wife 32.91 33.21 31.08 26.37
Difference 2.91 2.96 6.32 3.97
N 5,587,615 52,736 70,377 29,429
Husband EU15 Mean Age Husband 35.89 30.92 35.62 30.16
(w/o Germany) Mean Age Wife 32.87 27.83 28.90 26.54
Difference 3.02 3.09 6.72 3.62
N 82,425 22,331 2,585 1,002
Husband Polish Mean Age Husband 30.32 29.27 33.01 30.00
Mean Age Wife 29.68 29.76 29.72 27.46
Difference 0.64 -0.49 3.29 2.54
N 9,236 79 3,747 13
Husband Turkish Mean Age Husband 27.94 27.23 32.46 27.17
Mean Age Wife 27.79 26.24 27.55 24.51
Difference 0.14 0.99 4.91 2.67
N 71,014 1,754 1,077 21,929
Data: German Marriage Registry, 1997 - 2013. Total number of observations for the shown sub-sample 5,957,349.
Table 4.2 provides a closer look at the marriage data by showing the number of
observations for all combinations of the four most numerous (groups of) nationalities:
German, EU15, Polish, and Turkish. It also shows the mean ages of both spouses along
with the mean age difference. Marriages where none of the spouses is a German citizen are
rare. They constitute less than 1% of the total number of marriages for the subsample in
Table 4.2. 0.36% are marriages among Turkish citizens. In 8.2% of all marriages, at least
one spouse is German. There are slighty more marriages between German women and
foreign men than there are between German men and foreign women. However, German
men who marry a non-German woman are on average older compared to German-German
couples, although they are much younger in case the wife is Turkish. German women
who marry a non-German man are on average younger compared to German-German
couples, and much younger in case the husband is Turkish.
Age differences between men and women are almost always positive, that is, the hus-
band is on average older than the wife in almost all nationality combinations. We observe
a slightly negative average age difference for couples of EU15 women and Polish men,
but this estimate is likely noisy due to the small subsample. The largest average age
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differences exist between Polish women and German or EU15 men. In these marriages,
the woman is on average more than 6 years younger than the man. This is more than
twice the unconditional average age gap of about 3 years in our sample. Overall, the
descriptive evidence from the MR data points towards substantial differences in mar-
riage market matching behavior across the different nationalities present in the German
marriage market.
For the empirical analysis, we follow the marriage market matching model by Choo
and Siow (2006), which uses the number of marriages relative to the number of available
singles (see Chapter 4.4). To comply with the German data protection law, we can only
extract these single stocks for groups that are sufficiently large. This criterion is met
for citizens of Germany, EU15 (excluding Germany), Poland, Turkey, EU10 (excluding
Poland), Romania, former Yugoslavia, and “Rest of the World”. We use the age groups
18-25, 26-32, 33-39, 40-46, 47-54, and 55-68. Finally, we merge the number of marriages
obtained from the MR with the single stocks obtained from the German Microcensus.
4.3.2 The German Microcensus
The German Microcensus (MC) is an annual survey that delivers representative statistics
on the German population and labor force. Data access is provided through the Research
data centers (FDZ) of the statistical offices of the German federal states. The MC samples
1% of the population, consisting of all persons legally residing in Germany.116 It is the
largest household survey in Europe. Participation is mandatory117 and only a subset of
questions can be answered on a voluntary basis.
In the survey, one household member responds for all individuals living in the house-
hold, including the spouse, children, and other cohabitants if applicable. The survey
program of the MC consists of a set of core questions that remains the same in each
wave, covering general demographic and socioeconomic characteristics like marital sta-
tus, education, employment status, individual and household income, among many other
116The MC survey design relies on single-stage stratified cluster sampling. The primary sampling
units are artificially delimited districts with a number of neighboring buildings. All households residing
in these buildings are interviewed (principal residence). Since 1990 the average number of buildings has
been 9, the targeted number of individuals is 15. Larger buildings are subdivided.
117According to the German Microcensus law, non-response may be fined.
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things. In addition to that, every yearly wave has a special topic on which specific
questions are asked.
We select all individuals between 18 and 68 years of age who live in private house-
holds.118 For the period after German reunification (1993–2013), this MC sample is
representative of a roughly constant population of about 53 million individuals.119 47%
are men and 53% women. 72% of men and 64% of women are married. The average
labor force participation rates are 62% for men and 46% for women.120
For the questions we seek to answer in this paper, the MC data alone would be
insufficient, however. For married individuals, they contain only the year of marriage,
so the length of marital spells can only be calculated imprecisely. Also, this information
is no longer collected since a redesign in 2005. Finally, the MC is not a panel data set,
so studying at the individual level how marriage and divorce behavior has changed in
connection with the institutional reforms considered in this paper is not possible.
Instead, we use the MC data to identify the respective populations of singles out of
which new marriages are formed, by nationality and age. To this end, we select all adult
individuals of ages 18 to 68 who live in private households as singles, either alone or with
cohabitants. This includes never-married, divorced, and widowed individuals. We use
the age groups 18-25, 26-32, 33-39, 40-46, 47-54, and 55-68. We compute the single stocks
for the following nationalities/nationality groups for which we have sufficient numbers of
observations in the MC: Germany, EU15 (excluding Germany), Poland, Turkey, EU10
(excluding Poland), Romania, and former Yugoslavia. Moreover, we form a residual
group of nationalities denoted “Rest of the World”.
4.3.3 Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
The Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) is an administrative data
set provided by the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the Institute for Employment Re-
search (IAB) at the German Federal Employment Agency. We use these data to test a
118The MC also samples individuals who are in the military and live in barracks.
119Extrapolated from information on 8,426,756 surveyed individuals using sample weights. The average
number of observations per wave is 443,513. The population increases somewhat after reunification and
reaches a maximum of almost 55 million people in 2007. Afterwards it starts declining.
120The participation-age profiles are hump-shaped. In the 2006 MC wave, participation for men is
highest in the age bracket 35-39 (88%) and the maximum for women (77%) is reached for ages 40-44.
168
Interethnic Marriages
central assumption of our empirical analysis: interethnic marriages were disproportion-
ately affected by the labor market reform. The idea is that non-German workers face a
higher risk of becoming unemployed. They and their partners are thus more affected by
the tightening of means-testing thresholds in the unemployment insurance system.
The SIAB data cover a 2% random sample of the German social security registers. One
observation in the data corresponds to a time period (spell) with at least one of the fol-
lowing characteristics: (i) employment subject to social security (in the data since 1975),
(ii) marginal part-time employment (in the data since 1999), (iii) benefit receipt121, (iv)
officially registered job-seekers at the German Federal Employment Agency or (planned)
participation in programs of active labor market policies (in the data since 2000). We
observe these (un)employment spells with daily precision.
(Un)employment Spells end either by a change of employment status, employer or
always at the end of calender year. The duration variable (tenure) is the accumulated
time from the beginning of employment. We are interested in estimating conditional
rates of job loss (firings/quits) and job finding (hirings). To identify the rate of job
loss, we count transitions from employment into unemployment and from employment
into inactivity. Transitions from unemployment into employment, both full and part
time, identify the job finding rate. Changes from full to part-time employment (and
vice versa) and transitions between employers are treated as continuous employment.
The SIAB data also include information about, among other things, gender, nationality
(German, non-German), regional identifiers, and education.122
To estimate the effect of the labor market reform on marital surplus below, we use
a differences-in differences strategy and divide individuals into treatment and control
groups according to their nationality, based on the idea that unemployment risk is higher
for workers with an immigrant background and, thus, the treatment intensity of the
reform is higher for interethnic marriages. The SIAB data allows us to formally test this
identifying assumption. To this end, we estimate labor market transition probabilities
121According to the German Social Code: SGB III since 1975 and SGB II since 2005, The introduction
of SGB II was part of the implementation of the Hartz IV reform.
122The education variable in German social security data suffers from missing values and inconsis-
tencies, essentially because misreporting has no negative consequences. We impute missing and incon-
sistent observations using the methodology proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). We use five levels
of education: Lower secondary education without/with vocational training, higher secondary education
without/with vocational training and tertiary education (University, University of Applied Sciences).
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Table 4.3: Labor Market Hazard Rates
Transitions into Unemployment Transitions into Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
German -0.130∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.052∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
[0.878] [0.866] [0.832] [0.820] [1.025] [0.975] [0.995] [0.949]
Female -0.191∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
[0.826] [0.882] [0.829] [0.890] [0.851] [0.867] [0.852] [0.867]
N 1,857,659 1,857,659 1,857,659 1,857,659 1,232,908 1,232,908 1,232,908 1,232,908
Stratified by Education X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
Notes: robust standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. Hazard rates reported in square brackets.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
conditional on gender and nationality (German, non-German). We do not observe marital
status in the SIAB data. Additionally, we stratify by education. To test whether non-
natives face a higher unemployment risk in Germany, both in terms of transitions into
unemployment and duration, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972).
This Cox model assumes a baseline hazard that is common to both employed and un-
employed individuals along with a log-linear function of covariates.123 With stratification,
the five different education groups are allowed to have different baseline hazards.124
We calculate hazard rates for transitions into unemployment and into new employ-
ment out of unemployment. Table 4.3 presents the results. The covariates of interest are
nationality and gender of the employed/unemployed individuals. Columns (1)–(4) of ta-
ble 4.3 present the hazard rates for job loss (transitions into unemployment) and columns
(5)–(8) present the hazard rates for job findings (transition into employment). We find
that the hazard of transitioning from employment into unemployment is significantly
higher for non-natives as compared to Germans. Thus, as we conjectured, non-natives
123The hazard rate for transitions out of and into unemployment after a number of days, d, with
the vector of covariates Z is denoted h(d, Z). γ indicates the vector of coefficients to be estimated
and λ(d) the baseline hazard and v is an error term. Thus, the hazard model can be specified as
h(d, Z) = λ(d) · exp(γ′Z) · v.
124Separate Cox models for each education group are estimated with stratification under the assump-
tion that coefficients are the same across strata and that each education group has its own baseline
hazard for job loss and job findings, respectively. As education is unobserved in the marriage and di-
vorce data, we also estimate hazard rates without stratification, see Table C.2 in the Appendix. The
conclusions are unchanged.
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face a higher risk of becoming unemployed. Our preferred specification includes both
year and labor market region fixed effects, see columns (4) and (8). German nationals
have a job loss hazard rate that is 20% lower than the respective hazard rate for workers
without German citizenship, who are thus on average more likely to lose their jobs. For
transitions into employment, the hazard rate of Germans is 5% lower than the hazard
rate for foreigners. Thus, workers without German citizenship find new jobs out of unem-
ployment quicker than Germans, their unemployment duration is on average shorter. An
explanation for this finding are lower reservation wages, for example due to lower unem-
ployment benefit entitlements or because for some nationalities continued employment is
a necessary requirement for residence status.125
Note that the estimated hazard rates reflect differences between Germans and a di-
verse group of individuals without German citizenship. One would expect that labor
market transition probabilities vary greatly across individuals of different foreign nation-
alities. For example, citizens of other EU15 countries face no legal barriers to employment
in Germany and unemployment benefit entitlements can be transferred across countries.
Thus, they might be more comparable to German workers in terms of labor market at-
tachment than workers from non-EU countries are. The hazard rate differences we find
can therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the differential exposure to labor market
risk for workers without German or EU15 citizenship.
Finally, women are 12% less likely to become unemployed and about 14% less likely
to move into employment according to our preferred specification. That is, women are on
average employed longer, but it takes them longer to find a new job out of unemployment.
Thus, the need for additional insurance after the reform might be higher for women.
4.4 Theory
To formally investigate how changes to labor market institutions affect decisions in the
marriage market, we rely on a marriage market matching model that lends us structure.
Choo and Siow (2006) derive a simple non-parametric estimator of the marriage surplus,
125Selection also plays a role: upon job loss, some foreign workers might simply leave the German
labor market and return to their home country, so we don’t observe those individuals transitioning back
into employment.
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using a static matching model with transferable utility between spouses in the spirit of
Becker (1973, 1974). Choo and Siow (2006) generate the market demand for marriages
using the extreme-value logit random utility model of McFadden (1974), which yields
characteristic functional forms.
4.4.1 Marriage Surplus
The marriage surplus reflects the gains from marriage for both partners, and those gains
may change systematically in response to changes in the institutional environment. The
marriage surplus is calculated using market clearing conditions and, thus, depends on
the relative numbers of married and single individuals of a particular type.
The independent utility of a type i man g married to a type j women is given by equa-
tion 4.1.126 It consists of a systematic gross return (α˜ij) that depends on the particular
type combination, a systematic utility transfer from the man to the women (τij) and an
independently and identically distributed random variable with a type I extreme-value
distribution (ijg). Thus, the systematic gain from marrying a type j for a type i man is
given by α˜ij − τij.
Vijg = α˜ij − τij + ijg (4.1)
Symmetrically, for a female of type j the systematic gain from marrying a type i man
is denoted γ˜ij. Following the notation of Choo and Siow (2006) the sign of the utility
transfer (τij) is positive for women. A male (female) individual g will choose the type of
the marriage partner type j (i) according to
Vig = max
j
{Vi0g, ..., Vijg, ..., ViJg}. (4.2)
Following McFadden (1974) and assuming a large number of men and women, this
translates into a quasi-demand function for type i, j marriages demanded by type i men:
126In our empirical implementation, type i and j are a combination of nationality and age. See
Section 4.5 for more details.
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lnµdij = lnµdi0 + α˜ij − α˜i0 − τij
= lnµdi0 + αij − τij, (4.3)
where αij = α˜ij−α˜i0 is the systematic gross return to a type i man for a type i, j marriage
relative to being unmarried. Symmetrically, the supply of type i, j marriages by women
j is given by:
lnµsij = lnµs0j + γij + τij. (4.4)
In equilibrium—when all I × J submarkets of the marriage market clear—the joint
surplus generated by a marriage between a type iman and type j woman can be calculated
by adding equations (4.3) and (4.4). The utility transfers between both spouses cancel
out and only the two systematic components, αij and γij, remain:
lnµij −
lnµdi0 + lnµs0j
2 =
αij + γij
2 , (4.5)
so the joint surplus for both partners consists solely of the systematic gains from marriage.
The LHS of equation (4.5) can be rewritten as
Φij = ln
(
µij√
µi0 µ0j
)
. (4.6)
Choo and Siow (2006) refer to this expression as the marriage market matching function:
the number of marriages between type i men and type j women is given by µij in the
numerator. It is scaled by the the number of single men and single women of the same
type, µi0 and µ0j, in the denominator, so the expression is scaled by the observed pop-
ulation vectors. Intuitively, the total systematic gain (surplus) to marriage per partner
for any i, j pair can be expected to be high if we observe many i, j marriages relative to
the respective single populations.
For a constant marriage surplus Φij, a percentage increase in the stock of available
singles of a particular type (µi0 and µ0j) should result in a percentage increase of marriages
that include this particular type (µij). Consequently, changes in the marriage surplus are
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deviations from this constant relationship between marriages and single stocks.127 Thus,
any inflow of singles of a certain type should—in case the systematic factors underlying
the marriage surplus did not change—result in a proportional increase of marriages that
include this particular type.
4.4.2 Reform Effects on Marital Surplus
The labor market reform we consider in this paper lowered the generosity of social insur-
ance in case of prolonged unemployment. The need to self-insure within the household
increased. Thus, the systematic component of the marriage surplus changed, assuming
that married individuals take into account that they may have to support their partner.
From the male perspective, the reform affected both α˜ij and α˜i0 in the model. On
the one hand, the lower generosity of social insurance reduced α˜i0 and thus increased
incentives to get married due to the need for additional insurance through a partner.
On the other hand, stricter means testing decreased α˜ij, the gains from being married,
because of the larger need to support the partner in case of unemployment. From the
female perspective, the reform affected γ˜ij and γ˜i0 in the same way.
The net effect of the changes to both model objects is a priori unclear. We evaluate it
empirically in Section 4.5 by exploiting the reform-induced variation in observed marriage
rates and the estimated surplus for different types of individuals.
Note that, according to the model, utility transfers, τij, do not matter for marital
surplus and, thus, do not have to be observed to study the reform’s effect on marital
surplus. In theory, however, they are part of an important adjustment mechanism. Utility
transfers change relative gains to marriage for both partners by transferring resources to
one partner at the expense of the other. For example, the loss of systematic gains from
marriage for a certain type of women may have to be compensated by men through
a larger transfer to keep the marriage preferable to singlehood for both partners. If
increasing the transfer sufficiently is infeasible, a lower number of marriages of that
particular type i, j, and, potentially, more divorces (which are not modeled here) would
be the consequence.
127Implicitly, the marriage surplus is always defined relative to the value of being single. Thus all
changes that affect both the value of being single as well as the value of being married to the same
extend will not alter the marriage surplus.
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4.4.3 Expected Gains to Entering the Marriage Market
In addition to the marriage surplus, the Choo and Siow (2006) model also provides
functional forms for the expected gains to marriage that can be computed directly from
the data. The labor market reform arguably also affected gains to entering the marriage
market for both genders, due to the aforementioned insurance considerations. Thus, we
will also study how these gains evolved over time in conjunction with the institutional
changes in the labor market.
Starting from the demand for marriages, equation (4.3) above, the expected value of
entering the marriage market for a type i man g before all individual realizations of ijg
is
EVig = c+ α˜i0 + ln
(
mi
µdi0
)
, (4.7)
where c is a constant and α˜i0 the gains from being single of this particular type. The
value of entering the marriage market is proportional to the log of the number of type
i men who enter the marriage market, mi, divided by the number of type i men who
remain single. The last term can thus be interpreted as the expected gains to entering
the marriage market for type i men, denoted
Qi = ln
(
mi
µdi0
)
. (4.8)
By symmetry, the expected gains to enter the marriage market for women are
Qj = ln
(
fj
µs0j
)
, (4.9)
where fj is the number of type j women who enter the marriage market.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
4.5.1 Taking the Model to the Data
Using the Choo and Siow (2006) model, one can compute the marriage surplus from a
single cross section of data. Our data has a time dimension, so we adapt this approach
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by calculating the marriage surplus annually using the flow of new marriages relative to
the number of available singles in that particular year. Essentially, this measures the flow
out of singlehood.128
In the data, we interpret the individual types i and j of men and women as a combina-
tion of age and nationality. Thus, we let Φˆ(fa,n,ma,n)t denote the estimated surplus of a
marriage between a man of age a and nationality n and a woman of age a and nationality
n in year t in our data. We estimate it using equation (4.6):
Φˆ (fa,n,ma,n)t = ln
 µ(fa,n,ma,n)t√
µ(0, fa,n)t µ(ma,n, 0)t
 , (4.10)
where the marriage surplus in any particular year t depends on the observed numbers
of females fa,n and males ma,n of a certain age a and nationality n who get married,
µ(fa,n,ma,n)t, relative to the geometric average of the available singles of the same types,
µ(0, fa,n)t and µ(ma,n, 0)t. The more new marriages we observe for given population
vectors, the higher is the estimated marriage surplus for this particular age-nationality
combination. As our data inputs, we use observed new marriages in the MR data and
single stocks in the MC data for six age groups (18-25, 26-32, 33-39, 40-46, 47-54, 55-68)
and eight nationalities (Germany, EU15 (excluding Germany), Poland, Turkey, EU10
(excluding Poland), Romania, former Yugoslavia, Rest of the World) as explained in
Section 4.3.
Moreover, we estimate the gains to entering the marriage market for both men (Qˆmn)
and women (Qˆfn) of all nationalities n (irrespectively of age, for brevity) according to
equations (4.8) and (4.9), respectively:
Qˆfn = ln
(
fn
µ(0, fn)t
)
, Qˆmn = ln
(
mn
µ(0,mn)t
)
. (4.11)
The numerator in both expressions represents the total number of women and men by
nationality, respectively. The denominators (µ(0, fn)t, µ(0,mn)t) represent the respective
numbers of singles. We approximate the total numbers of all male and female individuals
128This approach is also used by Adda et al. (2019), who estimate the Choo and Siow (2006) model
using Italian census data.
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in the marriage market by adding to the number of singles from the MC the number of
individuals for which we observe a marriage in the same year.129
4.5.2 Trends on the Marriage Market
Figure 4.2 plots the estimated marriage surplus for different nationality combinations of
spouses over time. We focus on marriages where at least one partner is German. To
increase visibility, we separately show the surplus for marriages in which both partners
are German (black line) one spouse is an EU15 citizen (blue line), one spouse is an EU10
citizen (orange line). We pool all other nationalities in the “Rest” (of the world) category
(gray line).
From 1998 until the announcement date of the labor market reform (black dashed
line), we observe a slow but steady decline in marriage surplus for all combinations of
spouses. Afterwards, trends diverge. We observe a steep decline in the estimated surplus
for marriages in which one partner is of EU10 or “Rest of World” type.130 According to
our hypothesis, these marriages were disproportionately negatively affected by the reform
due to higher unemployment risk. Conversely, the marriage surplus for German couples
and between Germans and EU15 citizens, arguably the groups with lower unemployment
risk, increases slightly.
It is challenging to isolate the marriage market impact of the labor market reform in
January 2003 due to the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Ten new member states joined
in May 2004 (red dashed line in Figure 4.2) and this was anticipated. For citizens of these
countries, marrying a German was no longer necessary to obtain access to the German
labor market following the enlargement.131 Thus, the EU expansion could have had an
impact on the marriage market in itself, as argued by Adda et al. (2019) in the Italian
context. To take this confounding factor into account, we control for the EU expansion
129This is only an approximation since the MC data is survey-based and individuals could potentially
get married in the same year after reporting in the survey that they are singles. The numbers of
individuals might thus be somewhat upward biased due to double counting.
130By far the largest group of EU10 immigrants are Poles. Figure C.1 in the Appendix separates the
surplus of German-Polish marriages and German-Other-EU10 marriages, The trend is broadly the same,
the decrease somewhat less steep for Poles.
131Although access to the German labor market for migrants from the new EU member states was
initially restricted.
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Figure 4.2: Development of Marital Surplus over Time
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Notes: Marriage surplus for marriages where at least one spouse is German by nationality of the non-German spouse.
The black dashed vertical line indicated the year in which the labor market reform became effective, the red dashed
vertical line marks the year 2004 in which the EU expansion took place. Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office
and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Marriage Registry, survey year(s) 1997-2013, own calculations.
in our main analysis by using separate treatment and control groups to isolate its effect
in our differences-in-differences setup.
In Figure 4.2, the trends described above did not change around the date of the
EU expansion. On the contrary, the divergence between German/German-EU15 and
German-EU10/German-Rest marriages became more pronounced. The surplus of mar-
riages between Germans and between Germans and EU15 citizens continued to increase
before flattening out in 2005. EU10 citizens were directly affected by the EU expansion
and, accordingly, their marriage surplus with Germans decreased at a steeper rate as
compared to German-Rest marriages, especially after 2007. This makes intuitive sense:
arguably, the surplus from marrying a German for EU10 citizens reflected to some extent
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Figure 4.3: Expected Gains to Entering the Marriage Market
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Notes: Expected gains to entering the marriage market for men (left sub-figure) and women (right sub-figure).
the obtainment of a residence permit and labor market access before 2004. Due the EU
expansion, this part of the marital surplus was erased.
The declining marriage surplus for interethnic marriages with non-EU15 spouses is
also reflected in the estimated expected gains to entering the marriage market, see Fig-
ure 4.3, which plots these gains for men (left sub-figure) and women (right sub-figure).
Recall that, according to Equation 4.11, the estimated gains of marriage only depend on
the total number of individuals relative to singles of any particular type. As before, they
are shown for German men/women in black, for EU15 men/women in blue, for EU10
men/women in orange and gray for all remaining nationalities.
Notably, the gains to marriage decrease more substantially for foreign women than for
foreign men and this is mainly driven by EU10 women, who had very high gains in the
beginning of our sample that rapidly decreased thereafter. This is in line with the fact
that we observe relatively many women from Poland and other EU10 countries who get
married in Germany as compared to men from these countries, recall Table 4.1. For EU10
men the gains are essentially flat before the labor market reform, decrease in 2003/2004,
and reach another relatively stable level. Rest-of-the-world men’s and women’s gains are
very similar. They start decreasing before the reform, but the negative trend accelerates
in 2003–2005.
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Table 4.4: Treatment and Control Groups
Type of “Hartz” Treatment EU Treatment “Hartz”-Effect Controls
Marriage (Jan 01, 2003) (May 01, 2004) (EU-Effect)
German-German No No Control —
German-EU15 No No Control —
German-EU10 Yes Yes Treatment Treatment
German-nonEU Yes No Treatment Control
4.5.3 Reform Effects on Interethnic Marriage Formation
In this empirical section, we aim to illustrate the effect of a mayor institutional change
that affected the German marriage market. The institutional change is the labor market
reform in 2003. We run an empirical specification including difference-in-difference terms
to estimate the effect of the institutional change on the treated population. Furthermore,
we extensively control for the 2004 EU expansion. We restrict our sample to marriages
where at least one spouse is German. Table 4.4 illustrates the treatment and control
groups for the evaluation of the labor market reform (see Column 4), and the control
variables that control for the EU expansion in 2004 (see Column 5), which may also have
affected the marriage surplus for a sub-group of the non-native population.
The Labor Market Reform: The labor market reform increased the need to self-
insure within the marriage in case of unemployment, which is more likely for interethnic
marriages as non-natives have a higher unemployment risk compared to natives. This
is causing a decrease in the demand of interethnic marriages from natives, as the mar-
riage with a non-native spouse becomes riskier. As a result, we expect fewer interethnic
marriages relative to the single stocks, which will result in a lower marriage surplus. For
the difference-in-difference specification, we compare marriages formed between spouses
where both have unrestricted labor market access (German, EU15) with marriages where
the non-native spouse had worse labor market access (Polish, Turkish, Romanian, other
EU-2004, former Yugoslavia, Rest of the World) before and after the date the law be-
came effective. Thus, the variable Hartz takes on the value of 1 for marriages where the
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non-native partner is not from a EU member country132. The variable PostHartz takes
on the value of 1 for marriages formed after January 1, 2003.
Empirical Specification: Formally, we estimate the effect of the labor market reform
using a differences-in-differences specification:
Φch,cw,ah,aw,t = β1 ×Hartzch,cw + β2 × PostHartzt + β3(Hartzch,cw × PostHartzt)
+ γXch,cw,t + αt + δc + uch,cw,ah,aw,t, (4.12)
where ch and cw are country of origin for husband and wife. ah , aw and t represent age of
husband, age of wife and year, respectively. αt and δc are time and country of non-German
spouse fixed effects. Φch,cw,ah,aw,t is the marriage surplus for a particular combination of
age and country of origin for both partners in a given year t. Standard errors uch,cw,ah,aw,t
are at the level of the marriage surplus, which depends on the combination of age and
nationality of both spouses in each year. Xch,cw,t is a vector of control variables that
extensively controls for the 2004 EU expansion that may have also affected the marriage
surplus at approximately the same time. A detailed analysis of this vector of control
variables is discussed in Section 4.5.4. The coefficients of interest for the treatment effect
on the treated of the labor market reform is β3.
4.5.3.1 Main Results
We quantify the effect illustrated in Figure 4.2 using the empirical model captured in
Equation 4.12. The baseline estimation results are presented in Table 4.5. Columns 1
and 2 include all marriages where at least one spouse is German. Columns 3 & 4 and
5 & 6 present the results for the sub-samples where the husband or wife are German,
respectively. Columns 1, 3 and 5 include year and nationality of the non-German spouse
fixed effects, whereas columns 2, 4, and 6 additionally control for age fixed effects of both
spouses. The difference-in-difference coefficients of interest for the effect of the labor
market reform on the treatment group are Hartz×PostHartz . Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
132The analysis focuses on marriages with at least one German spouse.
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Table 4.5: Baseline Results for Marriage Formation
Dependent Variable Marriage Surplus
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
Hartz x PostHartz −0.441∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.106) (0.154) (0.133) (0.157) (0.137)
Constant −6.237∗∗∗ −6.055∗∗∗ −6.275∗∗∗ −6.498∗∗∗ −6.191∗∗∗ −5.987∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.154) (0.169) (0.194) (0.167) (0.191)
Year, Nation FE X X X X X X
Age FE (both) X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The baseline specification for the full sample shows a 0.44 log point decrease in the
gains of marriage for marriages formed between a native and a non-EU15 spouse as a
reaction to the ‘labor market reform. The specification controls for year fixed effects
and nationality of the non-German spouse fixed effects. Year fixed effects control for
the generally declining marriage rates in Germany, while the nationality fixed effects
control for any confounding factors that are specific to marriage formation with particular
nationalities. The results are a clear indication that the labor market reform negatively
influenced interethnic marriage formation and, thus, had a substantial negative influence
on the integration of immigrants into society. In particular, existing barriers on the labor
market that already made interethnic marriages riskier than marriages between spouses
where both partners had full labor market access were intensified through the reforms.
After additionally controlling for age fixed effects of both spouses, the effect size
slightly increases in magnitude to -0.473. We estimate the model separately for marriages
where the husband is German and where the wife is German. We find larger negative
effects of the labor market reform for marriages where the husband is non-native compared
to when the wife is non-native. The results for the sub-sample analysis are consistent
with classic gender roles in Germany, where the husband is often seen as the main bread-
winner. Since the husbands’ income is relatively speaking more important for the total
household income, the effect sizes are larger for marriages where the husband is exposed
to the labor market reform treatment.
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Interethnic marriages are often interpreted as a sign of integration of ethnic minorities
and immigrants into society. By negatively affecting the interethnic marriage rates,
these unintended consequences of the labor market reform post a serious threat to social
integration of immigrants, who already face more difficulties on the labor market. In
fact, given the literature on labor market outcomes of immigrants133 that result from
interethnic marriage formation, these reforms may have substantially hurt immigrants
labor market participation though the marriage formation channel as well.
4.5.4 EU Expansion & Robustness Checks
4.5.4.1 2004 EU Expansion
The importance of institutional factors in marriage formation has already been inves-
tigated by other studies. Adda et al. (2019) for example study the effect of the EU
expansion on interethnic marriage formation in Italy and find that the EU expansion
negatively influenced interethnic marriage formation. Germany differs from Italy in some
crucial dimensions, which make a similar analysis more complicated. First, Germany had
a substantial share of non-natives in the total population even before the EU expansion
took place in 2004. Second, following the 2004 EU expansion, Germany did not grant
full labor market access to citizens from newly entering countries. Nevertheless, the EU
expansion may have substantially influenced marriage formation even in the case of Ger-
many, which is why we control for the EU expansion extensively in previously reported
regressions. In this subsection, we will further investigate the estimated parameter values
of these control variables and compare them to the values obtained by Adda et al. (2019).
Institutional Background: The European Union (EU) is a political and economic
union currently consisting of 28 member states (as of August 2019). Initially consisting
of 12 member countries134 (Maastricht Treaty, effective November 1, 1993), the EU was
expanded in multiple steps. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. In
2004, the largest expansion round admitted Cyprus, Malta, and eight Eastern European
133See for example: Basu (2015); Dribe and Nystedt (2015); Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009);
Kantarevic (2005); Meng and Gregory (2005); Meng and Meurs (2009)
134Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.
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countries to the EU: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania followed and Croatia joined in
2013.
The main objective of the EU is the development of a common internal market. This is
achieved through common policies that ensure free movement of people, goods, services,
and capital. Citizens of any EU member state have the right to live and work in any
of the other member states, under the same conditions as the native citizens of that
particular country. Following the 2004 EU expansion, the old member states (EU15) and
new member states (EU10) negotiated a transitional period of up to 7 years in which
labor movement was restricted in order to “protect” the labor market of the old member
states.135 Some countries, such as the UK and Italy (Adda et al., 2019), opened their labor
market immediately, whereas other countries, such as Germany and Austria, restricted
the inflow of workers until all limitations were lifted in 2011. This had a sizable effect on
the direction of migration flows.
The main difference between Germany and Italy is that citizens of the new EUmember
states, as the case of the Poles illustrates, already had legal ways of working in Germany
before the EU expansion. Even with labor market access restrictions, arguably, those
ways continued to exist. While in Italy labor markets access changed, in exaggeration,
from completely closed to completely open almost instantly, in Germany labor market
access changed much more gradually until all restrictions were lifted in 2011.136
Theoretical considerations: For the effect of the 2004 EU expansion, let’s follow the
example of a German man and an EU10 woman. After the EU expansion, the EU10
woman no longer hat to marry a German husband to obtain access to the German labor
market. This is reflected in a lower value of γ˜ij. In addition, the EU10 woman had labor
market access also as a single woman, which increased γ˜i0. Both changes lower the gains
to marriage for this particular type of i, j marriage. The German potential husband
135There was a fear that the EU expansion would lead to a large scale migration of lower wage workers
from newly admitted countries to old member countries, with substantial labor market consequences.
136Between 2007 and 2009, when unemployment rates started to fall, Germany began granting labor
market access to migrants in specific occupations, for example, IT specialists, engineers and medical
doctors, and to college graduates seeking employment in their field of study. These exemptions from
the initial restrictions and the bilateral agreements show that the German labor market was in fact not
completely inaccessible.
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can offset this lower value of marriage by a larger transfer (τi,j) to the potential wife
whenever feasible. However, when this change in transfer may become too large, other
types of marriages become more attractive, leading to fewer particular type i, j marriages
in equilibrium.
One issue with the EU expansion is that some countries (including Germany) only
slowly introduced full access of new EU citizens to the German labor market. While ser-
vices and self employed work could freely be provided, regular employment was initially
restricted and restrictions were lifted in a staggered fashion. Important for the under-
standing of the marriage surplus, it is important to understand the parameter values (e.g.
γ˜ij) as an expected gain over the lifetime. Simply speaking, both spouses discount all
future (potential) benefits from a certain type of marriage.
Empirical Specification: Following the EU expansion, it was no longer necessary to
marry a native in order to get access to the German labor market for citizens of EU10
states. This is causing a decrease in the demand for interethnic marriage from the immi-
grants. As a result, we expect fewer interethnic marriages relative to the single stocks,
which will result in a lower marriage surplus. For the difference-in-difference specification,
we compare interethnic marriages where the non-native spouse is from a country that
joined the EU in 2004 with marriages where the non-native spouses is from a country
that was not affected by the EU expansion. The resulting effect is conditional on the
labor market reform effect, which precedes the EU expansion. Thus, we compare mar-
riages formed between Germans and new EU members with marriages formed between
Germans and never EU members. Conditional on the labor market reform effect, we
compare marriages where the non-native spouse is from a Post-Hartz-New-EU country
(EU10) to marriages where the non-native spouse is from a Post-Hartz-Non-EU country
(Turkey, Romania, former Yugoslavia, Rest of the World). Since the data, in particular
the single stocks taken from the MC, is only available on an annual basis, all marriages
formed in 2004 will be counted as part of the treatment group.137
Results of the EU Expansion: For the investigation of the control variables for the
2004 EU expansion, let’s illustrate the control parameters (previously γXch,cw,t). The
137Traditionally relatively few marriages are formed during the winter month in Germany.
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additional difference-in-difference coefficient (see Equation 4.13) of interest is NewEU ×
PostEU for the effect of the EU expansion. The treatment and control group of the
difference-in-difference specification are illustrated in Column 4 of Table 4.4. The results
for the control variables are reported in Panel A of Table 4.6. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
Φch,cw,ah,aw,t = β1 ×Hartz + β2 × PostHartz + β3(Hartz × PostHartz)
+ β4 ×NewEU + β5 × PostEU + β6(NewEU × PostEU)
+ αt + δc + uch,cw,ah,aw,t, (4.13)
Contrary to Adda et al. (2019) for the case of Italy, we do not find significant effects of
the EU expansion on interethnic marriages in Germany. Throughout all specifications and
sub-samples, we find negative coefficients. However, apart from one single specification
that is significant to the 10% level, all specifications do not indicate statistical significance.
Consequently, we find the large negative effect of the labor market reform to overshadow
the EU expansion effect for the case of Germany.
To illustrate the importance of the labor market reform effect, in particular when
assessing the effect of the EU expansion on interethnic marriages in Germany, we run
the difference-in-difference specification above without including the labor market reform
effect. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.6. Using the miss-specification,
we find a significant and negative effect of the EU expansion on interethnic marriages
in Germany. Without prior knowledge about the labor market reform and the effect on
interethnic marriages that result from it, one might conclude that the EU expansion had
a negative effect on interethnic marriages also in the case of Germany.
4.5.4.2 Availability of Singles
The framework by Choo and Siow (2006), see Equation 4.12, assumes that a percentage
increase in the available number of singles results in a percentage increase in the number
of marriages for a constant value of the gains to marriage. Thus, the marriage surplus can
change for two reasons: (i) underlying factors that fundamentally change the attractive-
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Table 4.6: Baseline Results for the EU Expansion
Dependent Variable Marriage Surplus
Panel A: Baseline Control for EU Expansion
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
NewEU x PostEU −0.107 −0.167∗ −0.222 −0.201 −0.072 −0.157
(0.103) (0.093) (0.161) (0.142) (0.114) (0.100)
Panel B: Without Labor Market Reform Coefficients
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
NewEU x PostEU −0.223∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗ −0.334∗∗ −0.251∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.092) (0.159) (0.141) (0.111) (0.099)
Controls (Both Panels)
Year, Nation FE X X X X X X
Age FE (both) X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ness of a certain combination of spouses and (ii) mechanically due to a larger availability
of spouses of such type. So far, the main focus has been on the former, ignoring the
latter.
In the robustness check, we include the number of available singles (log) to the main
specification in order to control for the purely mechanical effect of the larger availability
of the particular type of single in the population. This is in particular important as
we compute the marriage surplus from the stock of available singles and the flow of
marriages. A sudden inflow of singles decreases the marriage surplus instantly, whereas
the flow of marriages can realistically be expected to react with a certain lag. Table 4.7
provides an overview of the robustness check when step-wise adding the available female
(log) and male singles (log) of the particular type of marriage formed.
For the effect of the labor market reform in the full sample, we find relatively little
differences compared to the baseline specification when step-wise adding the single stocks
of both spouses.138 The size of the coefficient in the main specification is -0.441. When
138Given that the marriage surplus function proposed by Choo and Siow (2006) already controls for
population vectors, these little changes when adding the single stocks are a good check for the validity
of the marriage surplus function.
187
Interethnic Marriages
Table 4.7: Robustness Checks for Marriage Formation
Dependent Variable Marriage Surplus
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
Hartz x PostHartz −0.411∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.255 −0.373∗∗ −0.258∗ −0.518∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗ −0.681∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157) (0.149) (0.156) (0.148)
log(female singles) −0.123∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.290∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −2.208∗∗∗ −2.180∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.047) (0.090) (0.090) (0.096) (0.100)
log(male singles) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.076 0.422∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.046) (0.164) (0.164) (0.059) (0.057)
Constant −4.564∗∗∗ −7.930∗∗∗ −6.606∗∗∗ −2.323∗ −12.031∗∗∗ −8.072∗∗∗ 23.969∗∗∗ −14.101∗∗∗ 16.315∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.198) (1.261) (1.220) (2.219) (2.612) (1.309) (0.815) (1.609)
Year, Nation FE X X X X X X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
including the single stocks of both husband and wife, the effect slightly decreases to
-0.438.
Regarding heterogeneity by gender of the German spouse, we find the effect of the
labor market reform to be significant for marriages where either the husband or the wife
are German. The size of the effect as well as the significance level, however, seem to
be larger for marriages where the wife is German. The effect of the EU expansion on
interethnic marriages becomes significant for marriages where the wife is German, once
controlling for the number of available singles.
The issue of a large inflow of new singles is more of a concern for the EU expansion,
as the EU expansion allowed free movement of citizens. However, for the coefficient size
and significance of the EU expansion control variables, we find no substantial change
when controlling for single stocks.
A different issue linked to the number of available singles is that changes in the
availability of foreign singles could also affect the marriage decision of individuals. This
issue is also stressed by Adda et al. (2019). In our setting, however, the large inflow of
individuals only occurs after the labor market reform following the EU expansion, for
which we control for extensively.
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4.5.5 The Effect on Interethnic Marriage Stability
After illustrating the effect of the labor market reform on the marriage surplus for in-
terethnic marriages, we follow those marriages over time and check for their marriage
stability. As a result of the effects of the institutional changes, selection into marriage
changed, confounding any estimation results. Nevertheless, a descriptive empirical inves-
tigation of marriage stability provides interesting insights, as marriage stability affects
population dynamics.
In a first step, we graphically show how marriage stability changed following the
introduction of the labor market reform. We focus on the largest group of immigrants
that was affected by the institutional change.139 In a second step, we quantify the effect
of the institutional change using a cox proportional hazard model on the full dataset.140
4.5.5.1 Kaplan Meier Plots
We plot the Kaplan Meier hazard rates for German-Polish couples around the cutoff
date to graphically analyze marriage stability. We use these descriptive illustrations to
compare marriages formed one year before the cutoff with marriages formed one year
after the cutoff date. For the case of the labor market reform - years 2002 and 2003 -
both are unaffected by the EU expansion, so we observe only differences in the divorce
hazard due to the labor market reform. The different separation hazards are captured in
Figure 4.4.
The Kaplan Meier hazard of divorce of the after reform year (red) is parallel shifted
below the divorce hazard of marriages formed before the reform (black). The lower
survival rate indicates that marriages formed after the cutoff have a higher separation
rate than marriages formed before the cutoff. Regarding heterogeneity by gender of the
German spouse, we find the effect of the labor market reform to apply roughly equally
to marriages where the husband or the wife are German (Table C.2 in the Appendix).
139Technically, the largest non-EU15 group would be Turks. However, given that the guest worker
programs for Turks started in the 1960’s, many of the individuals that are recorded as Turks are 2nd or
3rd generation immigrants who always lived in Germany.
140In order to comply with the German data protection laws, the number of marriages per quarter are
obtained from the universe of marriages and then matched to the universe of divorces.
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Figure 4.4: Divorce Hazard of German-Polish Marriages (Kaplan Meier Plots)
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The black line plots the Kaplan Meier hazard rates for the pre-year. The red line plots the Kaplan Meier hazard
rates for the post-year. Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States,
Marriage Registry, survey year(s) 1997-2013, own calculations. Sample restricted to include only German-Polish
marriages.
However, marriages where the husband is Polish seem to be affected more by the labor
market reform than marriages where the husband is German.
4.5.5.2 Survival Models
A major shortcoming of the illustrative Kaplan-Meier plots in Figure 4.4 is that the
differences in divorce hazards are only conditional on the two investigated groups. All
other possibly important factors, such as the labor market, are absent. In particular, the
introduction of the ‘labor market reform affected both marriages formed before and after
the law was introduced. The law effectively made both types of marriages more “risky”
through the more restrictive application of means testing in unemployment assistance.
The only difference between those two groups depicted in the Kaplan-Meier plots above is,
that the post-introduction group was aware of the changed law before marriage formation
and the pre-introduction group was not.
We estimate the identical difference-in-difference specification we used to identify
the effect of the policy change on marriages rates in a Cox proportional hazard setting
to overcome this issue. In this setting, the hazard rated (d,Z) indicates the divorce
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hazard of the marriage after d years and the vector of covariates (Z). γ indicates the
vector of coefficients and λ(d) the baseline divorce hazard common to all marriages. The
coefficients of interest are Hartz × PostHartz, which compares marriages where one
partner is non-native before the reform with marriages of that type after the reform.
As before, we extensively control for the effects of the EU expansion. The results are
presented in Table 4.8.
Column 1 of Table 4.8 illustrates the results for the difference-in-difference hazard
rates without taking year fixed effects into account. The results indicate that the divorce
hazard for marriages that are treated by the labor market reform increases by 9% fol-
lowing the introduction of the reform. The issue with this specification is, that it ignores
year-specific situations that contributed to the separation of marriages. Such situations
could be related to the labor market situation. In fact, the introduction of the labor
market reform has substantially changed the importance of labor market situations for
partnerships.
Column 2 presents the results when adding year fixed effects to the specification.
Once controlling for year fixed effects, the effect of the labor market reform becomes
negative, resulting in a divorce hazard below one. This means, that marriages where one
spouse is from a non-EU15 country have a lower separation rate after the introduction,
when controlling for year specific factors in the divorce decision.
Column 3 presents the results when stratifying by divorce year. In this setting, every
divorce year has it’s own baseline hazard, which captures year specific factors that may
influence the baseline hazard. Similar to the results reported in column 2, we find a di-
vorce hazard below 1, indicating a lower divorce hazard of interethnic marriages following
the labor market reform.
Columns 2 and 3 support the hypothesis that the remaining interethnic marriages
that are formed after the labor market reform became effective are positively selected.
In the estimation of the marriage surplus, we have shown that the marriage surplus
dropped as a result of the introduction of the labor market reform. The marriages that
are formed despite the drop in marriages relative to the respective population shares are
more stable than marriages of the same type formed before the change in law became
known and effective. The introduction of the labor market reform resulted in fewer but
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Table 4.8: Divorce Hazard - Diff-in-Diff Estimates
Dependent Variable Duration until Divorce
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
Hartz x PostHartz 0.089∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
[1.093] [0.736] [0.634] [0.919] [0.678] [0.636] [1.195] [0.756] [0.622]
Divorce Year FE X X X
Stratified by Divorce Year X X X
Observations 6,592,292 6,592,292 6,592,292 6,417,362 6,417,362 6,417,362 6,431,657 6,431,657 6,431,657
R2 0.022 0.262 0.186 0.022 0.257 0.184 0.023 0.260 0.186
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Hazard rates in square brackets.
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
more stable interethnic marriages. We confirm the same trends for the sub-samples of
marriages where the husband is German and where the wife is German. There is always
a large drop in the divorce hazard once controlling for year fixed effects or stratifying by
divorce year.
The effect of the labor market reform in the spirit of Choo and Siow (2006) is essen-
tially a transition to a new equilibrium. We would expect an initial large jump shortly
after the introduction and then an effect size that slightly increases in size as more and
more individuals become aware (or fully comprehend) the effects of the institutional
change. Furthermore, we would expect marriage formation to react stronger over time
as marriage logistics typically require some planning, which generally take some time.
To test this hypothesis, we interact the dummy of the Hartz dummy with dummies for
the first and all subsequent years after the introduction of the labor market reform. The
results are reported in Table 4.9. Indeed, we observe an initial large jump followed by a
slightly increasing effect size for subsequent years throughout all specifications.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically investigate the importance of the household insurance chan-
nel in marriage formation and stability. The analysis is performed in the specific context
of the transferable utility marriage market matching model proposed by Choo and Siow
(2006). We exploit a distinct legal change in the institutional environment in which
marriages are formed, namely the so called “Hartz reforms” in 2003, to identify the ef-
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Table 4.9: Divorce Hazard - Treatment Years
Dependent Variable Duration until Divorce
All Marriages German Husband German Wife
Hartz 0.135∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
[1.145] [1.201] [1.188] [1.039] [1.105] [1.099] [1.194] [1.245] [1.234]
Hartz x 1 year post Hartz 0.682∗∗∗ 1.142∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
[1.978] [3.133] [3.557] [1.621] [2.641] [3.108] [2.230] [3.343] [3.684]
Hartz x 2+ years post Hartz 0.762∗∗∗ 1.617∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
[2.143] [5.038] [6.693] [1.902] [4.371] [5.877] [2.291] [5.207] [6.666]
Divorce Year FE X X X
Stratified by Divorce Year X X X
Observations 6,592,292 6,592,292 6,592,292 6,417,362 6,417,362 6,417,362 6,431,657 6,431,657 6,431,657
R2 0.001 0.174 0.005 0.000 0.169 0.002 0.001 0.172 0.003
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Hazard rates in square brackets.
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
fect. As a result of the reform, marriages where one partner had a substantially larger
unemployment risk became more risky and, thus, less attractive. This affected in partic-
ular interethnic marriages, as non-natives have a substantially larger unemployment risk
compared to natives.
We find a significant and quantitatively important negative effect on the marital
surplus of interethnic marriages in Germany as a result of the labor market reform.
Our interpretation of the results are similar to the findings of Adda et al. (2019): if
natives react to labor market reforms by marrying each other rather than foreigners,
paradoxically, reforms that are intended to lower the unemployment rate might interfere
with the integration of foreigners, at least in the short-run.
By following these interethnic marriage over time and investigating their marriage
stability, we find that interethnic marriages formed after the introduction of the labor
market reforms are more stable compared to interethnic marriages formed before the
reform. Our interpretation of these findings is that the labor market reform resulted in
fewer, but better selected interethnic marriages. The interethnic marriages formed after
the reform became effective are more able to absorb economic shocks within marriage,
resulting in fewer divorces.
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Interethnic marriages are often seen as a measure of social integration. Thus, institu-
tional changes directly influenced integration of immigrants, which can have large long
run implications. The interpretation of the net effect on social integration of immigrants
depends on the relative importance of the number of interethnic marriages versus the
stability and duration of interethnic marriages in the assessment. While this is of sub-
stantial importance in social science, this is beyond the scope of this analysis and subject
to future research.
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Appendix C
C.1 Marriages Formed Abroad
From 2008 onward, the German marriage registers include an indicator for marriages
formed outside of Germany (“Auslandsehen”). In addition to German nationals who
get married outside of Germany and register their marriage at home, this category also
includes two other forms of marriages: (i) marriages of refugees or stateless individuals
who reside in Germany and (ii) marriages formed in Germany by foreigners under the
jurisdiction of a foreign country, for instance in case the marriage is conducted at an
embassy in Germany. According to this definition, marriages formed abroad make up
only about 0.15% of all marriages in the data between between 2008–2013. Table C.1
presents the number of marriages formed abroad by nationality of the spouse we observe
between 2008–2013.
Table C.1: Number of Marriages formed Abroad by nationality of the non-German
spouse (selection)
Partner German EU15 Pol TUR EU10 Romania Former Yugoslavia Rus Rest
German Husband 8,619 296 182 173 96 38 69 587 5,442
German Wife 8,619 428 20 528 9 5 71 65 3,315
Data: German Marriage Registry, 2008 - 2013. Total Number of Observations: 20,117
C.2 Additional Plots and Tables
Table C.2: Labor Market Hazard Rates (Stratified by Education)
Employment Duration (Firings) Unemployment Duration (Hirings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
German -0.168∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
[0.845] [0.907] [0.799] [0.860] [1.105] [1.055] [1.071] [1.028]
Female -0.178∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
[0.837] [0.884] [0.804] [0.891] [0.854] [0.870] [0.856] [0.871]
Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
Observatons 1,957,289 1,957,289 1,957,289 1,957,289 1,343,678 1,343,678 1,343,678 1,343,678
Firings / Hirings 1,218,625 1,218,625 1,218,625 1,218,625 1,086,943 1,086,943 1,086,943 1,086,943
Robust standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.1: Pre-Trend of Marriage Surplus - POL vs. Other EU-10
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Notes Marriage surplus for marriages where at least one spouse is German by nationality of the non-German spouse.
The black dashed vertical line indicated the year in which the “Hartz I” Reform became effective, the red dashed
vertical line marks the year 2004 in which the EU expansion took place. Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office
and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Marriage Registry, survey year(s) 1997-2013, own calculations.
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Figure C.2: Kaplan Meier Plots for “Hartz” Reform (DE-POL, by Gender)
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The black line plots the Kaplan Meier hazard rates for the pre-“Hartz”-reform year (left plot: German husband,
right plot: German wife). The red line plots the Kaplan Meier hazard rates for the post-“Hartz”-reform (left plot:
German husband, right plot: German wife). Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the Federal States, Marriage Registry, survey year(s) 1997-2013, own calculations. Sample restricted to include only
German-Polish marriages.
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